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dissertation is concerned whether the pervasive sunk cost phenomenon extends to 
corporate acquisitions and financial markets.  122 students from the University of St 
Andrews participated in three experiments exploring the use of sunk costs in 
interactive negotiation contexts and financial markets.  Experiment I elucidates that 
subjects value the sunk cost issue higher than other issues in a multi-issue negotiation.  
Experiment II illustrates that bidders are influenced by the sunk costs of competing 
bidders in a first price, sealed-bid, common-value auction.   In financial markets their 
exists an analogous concept to sunk cost accounting known as the disposition effect.  
This explains the tendency of investors to sell “winning” stocks and hold “losing” 
stocks.  Experiment III demonstrates that trading strategies in an experimental equity 
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influenced in the direction that reduces the disposition effect but also trading is 
diminished.  Without the brokerage cost there was a significant disposition effect. 
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Chapter 1 : 
Introduction 
 
 
     1.1 Introduction 
 
As humans we are consistently confronted with decision-making challenges on a 
regular basis.  Until relatively recently it was assumed individual decision makers 
conformed to the model of expected utility theory.  The theorem posits individuals are 
completely rational in the selection of their decisions, which are measured against the 
marginal benefits and costs involved in each course of action.  However, real world 
observations demonstrate individuals consistently violate expected utility theory by 
unilaterally deviating away form it.  The underlying motivations for this behaviour are 
explained by competing psychological and cognitive biases, which offset the 
calculations of marginal analysis.  A synthesis of these psychological processes can 
produce what is known in the literature as the sunk cost effect.  This describes the 
tendency of individuals to base future investment decisions on the sunk costs of past 
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investments.  A cost is “sunk” if the cost is irreversible.  For instance, placing a £10 
stake on red in roulette; regardless of outcome, the £10 is irreversible and therefore, 
“sunk”. 
 
Examination of the sunk cost effect has economic relevance because individuals and 
organisations who observe this phenomenon are violating one of the foundations of 
microeconomic theory.  This raises the question of how accurately expected utility 
theory maps human behaviour in the natural world.  In fact, persistent preference of a 
specific failing course of action influenced by sunk costs is labelled entrapment or 
escalation of commitment.   Such behaviour has been presented in academic literature 
as pre-cursors to financial and political disasters (examples of which will be discussed 
in section 1.2).  Thus sunk cost accounting not only has economic importance but also 
social and cultural implications.  Accounting malpractice has led to the collapse of 
some of the world’s largest corporations in the last five years.  These have impacted 
the global financial markets by driving down market indices and thus created a 
sustained period of market uncertainty.  A corollary of this is that the amount of 
downside welfare can be large and significant.  Until recently, despite the prevalent 
nature of sunk costs, academic economists had devoted relatively little attention to 
this phenomenon.  This dissertation aims to rectify this situation by presenting a 
research driven economic appraisal of sunk cost accounting in corporate investments 
and financial markets.  This approach is based on a combination of economic 
reasoning and experimental analysis. 
 
The application of experimental analysis to the sunk cost effect and to decision 
making in general represents an important auxiliary instrument in economic research.  
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This relatively new practice provides economists with the opportunity to observe 
actual human behaviour instead of implementing theoretical models that postulate 
how humans should behave. This area of endeavour has shed light on a wide range of 
important issues, including investor behaviour in financial markets, psychological 
determinants of escalating commitment to an investment, psychological and social 
costs of withdrawing from investments and cultural effects of investment strategies. 
 
The common thread linking research with all of these topics is the development and 
testing of hypotheses in a laboratory setting within which suitable data can be 
collected. A major benefit of experimentation is the ability to obtain results from a 
large number of economic propositions that would be difficult to test in other areas 
because of a lack of suitable data.  Experiments, therefore, have offered opportunities 
for research into areas such as game theory, public goods, markets and individual 
learning processes. 
 
The substance of this dissertation focuses on the foregoing phenomenon by extending 
previous sunk cost literature to assess its impact in the following domains: firstly, the 
sunk cost effect in corporate investments and secondly sunk costs in financial 
markets. 
 
 
1.2 Evidence of the Sunk Cost Effect 
 
 
To illustrate the prevalent nature of sunk costs in investment decision making, the 
following examples vividly portray how individuals and organisations (both private 
and public sector) can become attached to a failing project. 
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1.2.1 The Taurus Project 
 
 
Taurus was touted as a computerised system for the clearance and settlement 
processes on the London Stock Exchange whose implementation would revolutionise 
the way securities were traded and eliminate the antiquated paper based procedures. 1  
The project was initiated in 1986 but at that time there was little agreement 
concerning the requirements of the system.  However, as it stood, the project was 
expected to take three years at a cost of £6 million.  Unfortunately, with the 
deregulation of the London Stock Exchange looming in October 1986 and with 
competing IT projects also to be completed, the Taurus project was neglected. 
 
It was not until 1988 that the Taurus project was resurrected but there was continued 
confusion surrounding the requirements of the system and the costs for completing the 
project.  The estimates had increased by a factor of 10 to £60 million.  After 
considering 17 different designs, an agreement was reached, with implementation 
rescheduled for 1991.  By this time a number of individuals were quietly voicing their 
opposition to the project, but no one was prepared to speak out publicly, for Taurus, it 
was said, had become sacrosanct and vital to London’s continued pre-eminence as a 
world financial centre. 
 
As the Taurus development gathered momentum, the computational software 
problems mounted.  By the end of 1990, it emerged that the software would require 
more modification than originally anticipated causing a further time delay.  In March 
1993, the exchange publicly announced that the Taurus project had been cancelled. 
                                                 
1 Clearance is the process of identifying the parties and what they owe.  Settlement is the process of 
ensuring that shares and payments are properly transferred to buyers and sellers. 
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The stock exchange had spent over £80 million, and securities firms within the city of 
London had collectively spent an estimated £400 million developing their own system 
in preparation for Taurus.  All of this spending was wasted as “Taurus came crashing 
down.” (Keil and Montealegre, 2000, pg.60)    
 
 
1.2.2 The Scottish Parliament 
 
In a referendum on 11th September 1997, approximately 75% of the Scottish 
electorate voted in favour of a devolved Scottish Parliament. This result made it 
necessary to identify a permanent home for the forthcoming Parliament.  The 
timetable for construction dictated the adoption of a “fast track” procurement method 
entailing relatively high risk. The decision was made without an adequate evaluation 
or understanding of the extent of risk involved and without being referred to Ministers.  
The figure of between £40 and £50 million originally put before the Scottish public 
was never going to be sufficient to secure the construction of a new Parliament 
building of original and innovative design, especially when the precept for the 
building was heavily emphasised on quality rather than cost.  This estimate was made 
prior to the identification of a location or a design but when several locations in 
Edinburgh were considered Holyrood was eventually selected as the site for the new 
Parliament. 
 
In July 1998, a design proposed by a Spanish architectural firm was selected for the 
new Parliament building.  At that stage it was estimated that the cost of construction 
could be contained at £55m plus VAT, fees and extras.  Twelve months later the 
project was transferred to the Scottish Parliament Corporate Body, headed by the 
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Scottish Parliament’s Presiding Officer.  After a Parliamentary debate on the building 
project, costs were estimated by the First Minister at £109m including VAT, fees and 
fit-out.  By February 2000 the Corporate Body commissioned an investigation by an 
independent architect. Two months later and a Parliamentary debate on the project 
concluded that work should continue at the Holyrood site.  At this point the estimated 
cost of the completed project had appreciated to £195m.    Initial construction 
commenced shortly afterwards but in July 2000, after the death of the leading 
architect in the project, the Auditor General presented a report to Parliament 
containing a number of recommendations to improve the management of the 
Holyrood project.  However, construction continued, but it wasn’t until the 
appointment of a new First Minister and a report published by the Parliament’s Audit 
Committee citing poor management that further investigations into the project halted 
development.  Three years elapsed before an official independent inquiry investigated 
the problems of the project.  By July 2003 the costs of the project had escalated to 
£431 million.  
 
 
1.2.3 Enron 
 
The rapid decline of Enron illustrates an example of entrapment at its most severe. 
Enron was an American based energy trading company and throughout the 1990’s 
was consistently regarded as the most innovative company in the world whose value 
was greater than Argentina’s economy.   Its trading operations relied heavily on 
complicated transactions, many relating to deals several years in the future. It is 
alleged many of these speculations on the future energy prices were failing.  Enron’s 
solution was to create a series of firms/organisations, which acted as instruments for 
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keeping debts off the balance sheet.  It is said these partnerships would buy business 
from Enron to boost the balance sheet.  These losses were navigated around the Enron 
organisation to secure their anonymity but eventually surfaced in 2001, and with that 
came the downfall of Enron.   
 
Enron collapsed, leaving behind $15bn of debts. Its shares became worthless, and 
20,000 workers around the world lost their jobs.  Many banks were exposed to the 
firm, from lending money and trading with it. JP Morgan admitted to $900m of 
exposure, and Citigroup to nearly $800m.  Former high-ranking Merrill Lynch 
bankers were charged with fraud in connection with Enron transactions.  Andersen, 
which failed to audit the Enron books correctly, collapsed with the loss of 7,500 jobs 
in the US, and 1,500 in the UK.  
 
Senior managers were keen to disguise the fact that the organisation was losing 
money and as a consequence began investing in elaborate processes to accomplish 
this.  As time progressed these processes became more costly.  Even though Enron 
was falling further and further into debt, the managers escalated their commitment, 
unable to withdraw from this course of action.   
 
 
1.2.4 Barings Bank 
 
 
In 1992 Barings Bank appointed Nick Leeson as manager of a new operation in 
futures markets on the Singapore Monetary Exchange (SIMEX).  His job was to bet 
on the future direction of the Nikkei Index and he proved to be highly successful, 
making millions for the bank within months of his appointment.   
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The function of a derivatives trader is taking bets on people making bets, which is 
analogous to the function of a bookmaker at a racetrack.  Leeson had authority to 
perform two types of trading.   
 
1. Transacting futures and options orders for clients or for other firms within the 
Barings Organisation, and 
2. Arbitraging price differences between Nikkei futures traded on the SIMEX 
and Japan’s Osaka Exchange. 
 
SIMEX regulation stated that traders were only required to deposit a small fraction of 
the amount that was being traded. Thus, it was not uncommon for the deposit on the 
table to be exceeded many times by losses.  However, Leeson was perceived to be 
flawless by Barings’ Chief Executives and this view was seemingly validated when he 
made £10 million by the end of 1993. 
 
Leeson took unauthorized speculative positions primarily in futures linked to the 
Nikkei 225 and Japanese government bonds (JGB) as well as options on the Nikkei.   
These transactions were hidden in error account 88888, where Leeson hid his losses. 
This account had been set up to cover up a mistake made by an inexperienced team 
member, which led to a loss of £20,000. Leeson used this account to cover his own 
mounting losses.   
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In a fatal move, the bank allowed Leeson to remain Chief Trader while 
simultaneously being responsible for settling his trades.  Jobs that are usually split. 
This made it much simpler for him to hide his losses. 
 
By December 1994 the red ink hidden in account 88888 totalled $512million. Getting 
increasingly desperate Leeson bet that the Nikkei index would not drop below 19,000 
points. At the time this seemed an educated speculation as the Japanese economy was 
rebounding after a 30-month recession. Then on the 17th January 1995, a devastating 
earthquake measuring 7.2 on the Richter scale hit the Japanese city of Kobe.  
 
The previously stable Nikkei index plummeted by 7% in a week. As the losses grew, 
Leeson requested extra funds to continue trading, hoping to extricate himself from the 
mess by more deals. Leeson was counting that there would be a post quake rebound 
and the Nikkei would stabilise at 19,000. There were no hedges, no bets the other 
way, to protect Bearings' huge exposures. There was no rebound. Over three months 
he bought more than 20,000 futures contracts worth about $180,000 each in a vain 
attempt to move the market. Some three quarters of the $1.3 billion he lost Barings 
resulted from these trades. When Barings executives discovered what had happened, 
they informed the Bank of England that Barings was effectively bankrupt. 
 
In his wake he had wiped out the 233 year-old Baring Investment Bank, who proudly 
counted the Queen as a client. The $1.3billion of liabilities he had run up was more 
than the entire capital and reserves of the bank. Investors saw their savings wiped out 
and some 1,200 of Leeson's fellow employees lost their jobs. Dutch bank ING agreed 
to assume nearly all of Barings’ debt and acquired the bank for the sum of £1. 
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This is a severe case of how even the most stable of institutions can be sent into 
complete financial distress in a matter of days.  Barings had financed the Napoleonic 
Wars, the Louisiana purchase and the Erie canal.  The most striking feature was that 
the failure was caused by the actions of a single trader in a remote office in Singapore. 
 
 
 
 
1.3 What drives the Sunk Cost Effect? 
 
The question why such behaviour arises has been central to the sunk cost literature in 
the last three decades.   Research has determined that there is no single explanatory 
mechanism but offers four key determinants that lead decision makers to engage in 
seemingly irrational acts:  These four factors are labelled: project determinants, 
psychological determinants, social determinants and organisational determinants.  A 
description of these is illustrated in Table 1.1 
 
 
      1.3.1 Project Determinants 
 
Table 1.1 Determinants of the Sunk Cost Effect 
Classification of Determinant Description 
Project Determinants Objective attributes of a project-the project’s benefit 
and costs. 
Psychological Determinants Subjective attributes in the form of information 
processing errors. 
 
Social Determinants Saving face and external binding to an investment 
decision. 
 
Organisational Determinants Attributes of sunk cost accounting which are unique 
to the organisation. 
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“Project variables are the most obvious determinants of persistence in a course of 
action.” (Staw and Ross, 1989, pg. 1)   The literature reveals an individual’s 
commitment to a project is affected by three factors:  firstly, proximity to the goal 
(Rubin and Brockner, 1975), secondly by future expenditures or costs necessary to 
achieve a project’s payoff, (1981) and finally the number of times previous 
commitments have failed to yield a return. (McCain, 1986) 
 
A few project variables are less obvious causes of persistence.  Endeavours such as 
R&D and construction projects often foster commitment because there is a long delay 
between expenditures and economic benefits.  In these cases, shortfalls in revenue or 
outcomes may not be monitored closely or cause alarm, since losses are (at least 
initially) expected to occur.  In other cases, projects may continue in part because they 
have little salvage value if terminated in midstream.  (Noorthcraft and Woolfe, 1984) 
 
 
1.3.2 Psychological Determinants 
 
Psychological determinants of escalating commitment have attracted much research 
and provide subjective motivations for pursuing such a course of action.  The simplest 
of these are information processing errors on the part of the decision makers. 
 
Two mechanisms in particular are said to be the principal theoretical explanations of 
this effect: Self-justification and prospect theory.  Established from cognitive 
dissonance theory, self-justification theory posits individuals will remain with the 
present course of action because they feel they need to rationalise their initial decision 
in the face of losses.  “People do not like to admit that their past decisions were 
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incorrect, what better way to reaffirm the correctness of those earlier decisions than 
by becoming even more committed to them.” (Brockner 1992, pg. 41)   Prospect 
theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is concerned with the behaviour 
of decision makers who face a choice between two risky alternatives.  Decisions 
subject to risk are deemed to signify a choice between alternative actions, which are 
associated with particular probabilities (prospects) or gambles.  The thread of their 
argument is that individuals are hindered by cognitive limitations, which promotes the 
simplification of complex problems.  This approach is inconsistent with the 
proposition that individuals act rationally.   Economists conjecture that individuals are 
highly rational utility maximisers who compute any action's likely effect on their total 
wealth, and choose accordingly. 
 
 
1.3.3 Social Determinants 
 
Experimental and real world evidence demonstrates the pertinent impact of social 
variables upon an individual’s propensity to escalate commitment to a given 
investment.  Fox and Staw (1979) tested the notion of external justification in a role-
playing experiment.  They found that subjects holding administrative roles with low 
job security and lack of support by management allocated the greatest resources to a 
losing course of action.  Similar results were also reported by Brockner, et al. (1981).  
They found persistence to be highest under a large audience, high social-anxiety 
condition and interpreted these results as a face-saving effect. 
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1.3.4 Organisational Determinants 
 
The simplest organisational determinant is institutional inertia.  Just as there is less 
than full consistency between individual attitudes and behaviour there is also a very 
loose coupling between organisational goals and action.  Organisations have 
imperfect sensory systems, making them relatively impervious to changes in their 
environments.  Furthermore, because of breakdowns in internal communication and 
difficulties in mobilising their constituents, organisations can be slow to respond.   
 
Organisations attempting to withdraw from a losing course of action must also 
contend with political forces.  Not only will those who are directly related to the 
project will resist its dismantling, but so too will units interdependent or politically 
aligned with the venture.  This can become a special problem when projects are 
important or central enough to have political support on governing bodies and budget 
committees charged with their fate.  
 
 
1.4 Sunk Costs in Financial Markets 
 
In financial markets there exists an analogous phenomenon to the sunk cost effect: the 
disposition effect.  It is a descriptive theory based upon the selling behaviour of 
investors in stock markets.  In such an environment, individuals demonstrate 
systematic propensity to sell recently purchased shares that have appreciated relative 
to the purchase price and a reluctance to sell shares that have depreciated in price 
since they were purchased.  Such behaviour violates the efficient market hypothesis, 
which assumes investors are “rational traders”.  The availability of account-level 
 Chapter 1: Introduction   
 14
transaction data has made the disposition effect a widely documented empirical 
regularity: subsequent to the seminal paper by Odean (1998), several studies find 
investors reluctant to unload assets at a loss relative to the price they purchased the 
asset. 
 
The empirical evidence demonstrates that the effect transcends all levels of investor 
sophistication.  Specifically even professional traders to some degree embrace the 
disposition effect.  Locke and Mann (2005) analyse the trading behavior of 
professional futures traders and find that while all traders hold losers longer than 
winners, the least successful traders hold losers the longest, while the most successful 
traders hold losers for the shortest time. Coval and Shumway (2005) report evidence 
of behavioral biases among professional market makers at the Chicago Board of 
Trade with the most compelling evidence concentrating in morning-loser traders. 
Shapira and Venezia (2001) find evidence of the disposition effect among 
professional investors in Israel while results in Wermers (2003) show that managers 
of losing funds appear reluctant to sell their losing stocks, which is consistent with 
their being disposition-prone. 
 
 
1.5 Justification of Research Topic 
 
1.5.1 Identification of Problem 
 
 
Despite the proliferation of experiments investigating individual decision making 
behaviour, both in psychology and economics, there is a lack of quantitative results 
examining the effect of sunk costs which are intrinsically attached to an investment in 
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dynamic environments. The areas under examination are two fold: the effect of 
discrete sunk costs in interactive bargaining contexts, and the effect of unanticipated 
brokerage fees in an equity market. 
 
This dissertation examines these effects (see research questions below) by examining 
the implementation of three distinct experiments (see proposed solution below) on 
undergraduate and postgraduate students.  
 
 
 1.5.2 Research Questions 
 
This dissertation addresses the following three research questions: 
 
1 When faced with a sunk cost that consists of a larger investment decision, is the 
sunk cost ignored? 
 
2 Do opponents sunk costs affect one’s own future investments? (The transmission 
of sunk costs across investors) 
 
3 Do unanticipated external costs affect the disposition effect in financial markets? 
 
These effectively reduce to questions about whether sunk costs can be strategically 
advantageous to investment behaviour in certain environments. (First and second 
question) and examining investment behaviour with implicit and explicit costs.  
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1.5.3 Proposed Solution 
 
In order to answer the research questions stated in Section 1.5.2, the development of 
three experiments which support the ideas surrounding the research question are 
proposed.   These experiments include the following two central motivations: 
 
1 The experiments would be interactive, maintaining a high degree verisimilitude 
and with real monetary payoffs.  A main tenet of this goal would be to present 
dynamic experiments that engaged the students and to make the experiments as 
replicable to the real world as is possible.    
 
2 The experiments would be implemented in two versions the sunk cost version 
and a conditional environment in which subjects invest without the presence of 
sunk costs.  This provides a direct comparison in which to evaluate the 
variability of the data. 
 
 
1.6 Overview of Results 
 
The overview is restricted to the key findings only.  A detailed analysis of the results 
is provided in Chapters Four and Five. 
 
 
1.6.1 Experiment I: Sunk Costs in a Mergers and Acquisition Context 
 
 
The aim of this study is to examine whether sunk costs affected decision making 
behaviour when they were peripheral to the investment.  Specifically, does the sunk 
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cost of a prior investment affect the investment strategy for a corporate acquisition?  
In a merger and acquisition negotiation context, the results illustrate subjects are 
influenced by peripheral sunk costs.  In a two round bidding process subjects make 
fewer concessions to their opponents in an issue that has a sunk cost attached. 
 
 
1.6.2 Experiment II: Sunk Costs in a First-price, Sealed-bid Auction 
 
This experiment provides novel findings to a relatively untouched area of the sunk 
cost literature: sunk costs across individuals.  Specifically, do the sunk costs of 
opposing bidders influence one’s own bid?  Subjects were externally influenced by 
the sunk costs of competing bidders and subjects increased their bids in the direction 
of the sunk costs.  The findings reinforce a previous study that demonstrates sunk 
costs transmit across from buyers to sellers in an experimental housing market. 
(Diekmann et al. 1996). 
 
 
1.6.3 Experiment III: The Disposition Effect in Financial Markets 
 
This examination of the disposition effect in financial markets bridges the domains of 
experimental economics and behavioural finance.  Subjects initiate a brokerage fee 
from their portfolio selection, and are then allowed to trade in a virtual stock market.  
The brokerage fee affects behaviour.  With a prior brokerage fee the disposition effect 
is diminished as subjects exhibit behaviour counter to the phenomenon.  i.e. subjects 
sell more “losers” than “winners”   
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1.7 Overview of Dissertation 
 
This section contains a brief outline of the contents of each of the following chapters 
of this dissertation.  Chapter 2 provides a survey of the literature.  The chapter 
proceeds with a detailed literature review into the arena of sunk costs and entrapment 
focusing on the main psychological mechanisms driving these phenomena coupled 
with key experiments and findings.    
 
Chapter 3 provides a historical review of experimental economics and examines the 
key findings that have contributed to the rapid ascent of this discipline in economics 
research.  In addition it examines questions raised against experimentation in the past 
and posits evidence to suggest these questions are unfounded.   Previous studies have 
displayed sunk cost accounting at an aggregate level and the general trend is that 
individuals indulge in the phenomenon but it does not apply to everyone.  The 
experiments aim to examine sunk cost effects at the individual level and it is 
hypothesised that attitude to risk may be a determining variable in the analysis.  
Therefore explanatory theories of attitudes to risk and methods of assessment are 
explored with the aim being to propose a purposeful methodology of eliciting risk in 
the experiments. 
 
Sunk costs in corporate investments and the functionality of the sunk cost within this 
setting are the main themes in Chapter 4.  Following the review of the literature, little 
research into how individuals respond to sunk costs in variant contexts has been 
conducted, or more specifically how individuals respond to a sunk cost that is 
“mixed” with four other investment decisions and how individuals respond to the 
sunk costs of others.  The chapter reports two experiments, the first of which 
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examines the influence of sunk costs in multi-issue negotiations within a corporate 
acquisition context. Virtually all experimental analyses of the relationship between 
sunk costs and persistence in a losing course of action involve single-issue individual 
decision-making. The experiment has three purposes: to examine the sunk cost - 
persistence relationship within a negotiation or bargaining environment; to determine 
whether sunk costs attached to one bargaining issue “spillover” into bargaining 
behaviour on other issues and to establish whether sunk costs of one party influence 
others’ bargaining behaviour. Econometric data indicates individuals commit greater 
resources to the sunk cost decision within the group of five decisions.  The second 
experiment extends the corporate finance scenario to a sealed-bid, first-price, 
common-value auction. Traditional experimentation into sunk cost accounting has 
focused upon sunk costs as a within person process.  This experiment directs the 
research towards sunk costs as an inter-person context, namely, if one’s opponent has 
a sunk cost is it strategically advantageous to at least acknowledge the opponent’s 
sunk cost. Results suggest subjects are influenced by the sunk costs of opposing 
bidders. 
 
Chapter 5 examines the disposition effect in financial markets.  Using a virtual stock 
market, the experiment seeks to determine how individuals will treat an up-front 
brokerage fee in an experimental stock market.  Two groups one with a brokerage fee 
and one without are compared and their trading behaviour analysed.  Subjects with 
the brokerage fee trade less frequently throughout the experiment and exhibit less of a 
propensity to sell “winning” shares than “losing” shares.  Subjects without the 
brokerage fee observe the disposition effect i.e. selling a greater majority of “winning 
shares” than “losing shares.”     
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Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation providing conclusions to the findings and how 
these contribute to the existing body of literature.  Furthermore potential strategies to 
diminish the phenomenon of sunk cost accounting are explored with references to 
“real world” examples.  The chapter culminates with a guide to future work.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 2: Theoretical Analysis and Literature Survey 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: 
Theoretical Analysis and Literature 
Survey 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the domain of sunk cost accounting, experimentation has proved an extremely 
desirable instrument for the elucidation of investment behaviour.  As a consequence a 
significant portion of the sunk cost literature is expressed using this technique and the 
subsequent sections of this chapter will assemble a review of this experimental 
literature. 
 
Since the 1970s an expanding literature emanating from economics and social 
psychology has been investigating the phenomenon of sunk cost accounting under the 
direction of escalation of commitment (Garland, 1990, Keil, 1995; Newman and 
Sabherwal, 1996; Ross and Staw, 1986, 1993; Staw and Ross, 1987) and entrapment 
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(Brockner, Rubin, and Lang, 1981; Fox and Staw, 1979).2  An entrapment situation 
may be characterised by “repeated (rather than one-shot) decision making under 
uncertainty in the face of negative feedback about prior decisions and choice about 
whether to continue.” (Zuchel, 2001, pg.11)  Escalation of commitment can be 
conceptualised as situations in which decision makers choosing between 
discontinuing an unproductive line of behaviour and investing additional resources to 
make that course of action work adhere to or “persist with” (Brockner, 1992) the 
failing course of action.  Keil (1995) considers project escalation “to occur when there 
is continued commitment and negative information” (Keil, 1995, pg. 422).  Although 
escalation involves resource commitment in the face of negative interim outcomes, 
the eventual outcomes may or may not be negative (Brockner, 1992). Moreover, 
escalation involves the allocation of additional resources, but not necessarily at an 
increasing rate.  
 
The effect has also been examined in non human animals and is labelled the Concorde 
Fallacy (Arkes and Ayton, 1999).  The authors found no traces of the Concorde 
Fallacy and suggested that non human animals may not fall prey to this behavioural 
bias because they fail to follow norms or rules present in human decision making. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 navigates through 
the theoretical background providing a critical analysis of the relevant mechanisms 
which are frequently referenced in the literature. Section 2.3 seeks to advance the 
                                                 
2  There is greater depth to the literature than detailed in this paragraph.  These citations provide an 
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understanding of entrapment and sunk cost accounting in investment decision making 
along four directions: to examine the effects of three broad types of determinants; to 
examine changes in their effects over time; to examine if there is evidence of sunk 
cost accounting and to determine whether there is a single feature of sunk cost 
accounting that encourages an individual to increase commitment to an investment 
decision.   
 
 
2.2 Mechanisms of Sunk Cost Accounting 
 
Over the last three decades, non-exclusive theories explaining sunk cost accounting 
and entrapment have exhibited rapid growth.  Whilst some theories explain the 
phenomena in terms of economic rationality (Tang, 1988), the most plausible 
explanations have concentrated on psychological rationality (Brockner and Rubin, 
1985; Brockner, 1992; Staw and Fox, 1977; Staw and Ross, 1987; Tegar, 1980).  The 
majority of these explanations are based upon the following three mechanisms: Self-
Justification Theory, Prospect Theory and Regret Theory. 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Self-Justification Theory 
 
The seminal theory of entrapment entitled “self-justification theory” has been a 
widely adopted mechanism in explaining situations of escalating commitment (Rubin 
                                                                                                                                            
abridged list of the significant expositions in this particular field of endeavour.   
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and Brockner, 1975; Staw, 1976; and Tegar, 1980). Embedded originally in 
Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance,3 this viewpoint posits individuals 
may become entrapped by their past investments or previous course of action, mainly 
because of their unwillingness to admit previous expenditures do not produce the 
desired outcomes.  The crucial element with this behaviour is the individual’s pre-
disposition to exhibit rational behaviour not just to himself but also equally as 
important to appear rational to others. The underlying motive is simply no one likes to 
admit one was wrong.  “Amongst the criteria by which rationality might be defined, 
as are consistency and coherence, but the evidence from research studies on 
entrapment and sunk costs confirm these criteria are frequently and systematically 
violated.” (Wilson, 2001, pg. 4)  
 
Economists view rationality as acting optimally in any given situation i.e. considering 
all the available information and selecting the course of action that produces the 
optimal result.  Therefore, theory dictates individuals should always be striving to 
achieve this optimum state.   As Chapter 1 demonstrated in the real world decision 
making does not always expose the most rational choice and the outcomes reflect this.  
Thus, decision making in the real world and a normative model of decision making 
can yield different outcomes. 
 
                                                 
3 According to cognitive dissonance theory, there is a tendency for individuals to seek consistency 
among their cognitions (i.e., beliefs, opinions).  When there is an inconsistency between attitudes or 
behaviours (dissonance), something must change to eliminate the dissonance.  In the case of a 
discrepancy between attitudes or behaviour, it is most likely that the attitude will change to 
accommodate the behaviour. 
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A more useful definition would be to substitute rationality with the word competence.  
Individuals desire to exhibit an image of competence.  This could be achieved in 
several ways.  For example, some individuals focus on justifying decisions made 
earlier, whereas others align their positions with the course of action that appears to be 
most successful.  The way in which people maintain their images is dependent on the 
individual characteristics of the decision makers.  Whilst it has yet to be demonstrated 
empirically, Rao and Monk (1999) believe these characteristics are related to 
personality factors. 
 
 Self-justification theory indicates that the joint presence of: negative feedback 
concerning the outcomes of initial resource allocation, and a strong desire to justify 
the correctness of the initial allocation of resources should lead to the greatest 
likelihood of escalation (Brockner, 1992).  In addition, Staw and Ross (1978), 
emphasise five variables which may intensify a self-justification effect: 
 
The major theoretical contribution of a self-justification mechanism is that it posits a 
form of what Staw and Ross (1978) describe as “retrospective rationality” as opposed 
to prospective rationality.  Essentially, the individual, instead of considering only 
incremental costs and benefits (rational economic behaviour) that would lead to 
alternative courses of action, focuses upon alternatives that will correct or reduce the 
loss resulting from a previous error. 
 
                     Chapter 2: Theoretical Analysis and Literature Survey 
 
 26
The theory is essentially applied to explain cognitive rationalisation or behavioural 
inaction (Staw and Ross, 1978), although, it could also apply to situations in which 
decision-makers have encountered a set-back but still have an opportunity to recoup 
their losses. Whilst the theory is a suitable mechanism in the domain of losses, it is 
inappropriate in the domain of gains. Specifically, individuals are not required to 
justify their successful actions to themselves. 
 
Self-justification notions have provided explanatory power in some circumstances.  
However, it would be misleading to suggest that self-justification theory is robust 
enough to explain the majority of entrapment situations.  In fact this dissertation 
counters self-justification as nothing more than an auxiliary theory in explaining 
individuals’ motives to escalate commitment.  In the spirit of the above statement 
Bowen (1987) argues, “prior escalation studies, having not met the criteria for 
demonstrating the phenomenon, should be questioned regarding the theoretical value 
of the reported results.” (Bowen, 1987, pg. 54)  He postulates entrapment/escalating 
commitment can stem from any one of the following motives: (a) economic 
considerations; (b) curiosity; (c) the need to see whether greater effort will bring the 
project to fruition, (d) the desire to learn about the phenomenon. 
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Variables Description 
Visible Responsibility for Negative 
Consequences 
In one of the earliest escalation 
experiments, Staw (1976) demonstrated 
individuals may commit resources to a 
losing course of action so as to justify or 
rationalise their previous behaviour.  He 
suggested that being personally 
responsible for losses is an important 
factor in becoming locked in a course of 
action. 
Public Advocacy of a Losing Course of 
Action 
Individuals want to appear competent and 
not admit their errors to others even if 
they are in a losing course of action.  This 
is known as a “face-saving” effect. 
Side Bets Individuals with side-bets are more likely 
to remain investing in the project as the 
act has specific importance to the 
individual, thus rendering the investment 
a difficult one to terminate. 
Political Vulnerability Organisations/Individuals attempting to 
withdraw from a losing course of action 
must also contend with political forces.  
Not only those who are directly involved 
with a project will resist its dismantling, 
but so too will units interdependent or 
politically aligned with the venture.  
“This can become a special problem 
when projects are important or central 
enough to have political support on 
governing bodies.” (Staw and Ross, 1989, 
pg. 4,) 
Individual Differences Individual social identity may become 
externally bound by their actions with 
respect to a project.  In fact, it is expected 
decision-makers to be most closely 
identified with a project when their 
advocacy of it has been public and 
explicit. 
Table 2.1: Staw and Ross (1978) Enhancement Variables of Self Justification 
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So, if self-justification is not the unique driver of escalation of commitment then what 
is?  For resolution on this issue several other theories will be examined.  These 
include prospect theory and regret theory. 
 
 
2.2.2 Prospect Theory 
 
As stated in Section 1.32, prospect theory explains individuals’ risk taking 
propensities under conditions of uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  In 
addition, it has been widely implemented to explain the phenomenon of entrapment.  
Whyte (1986) promotes this theory as a more compelling explanation of escalating 
commitment than self-justification.  The theory posits that individuals code outcomes 
as positive or negative relative to a neutral reference point.  The outcome of a choice 
will be coded as a gain when it is above the reference point and as a loss when it is 
below the reference point.  Studies by, inter alia, Tversky and Kahneman (1981), 
McNeil et al. (1982), and Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) support this view. For 
example, what is the degree of insight and awareness we have regarding our own 
thinking when engaged in decision-making?  Subjects are much more likely to 
identify factors other than framing to justify their choices, which makes one wonder 
how much freedom of choice people have if they are susceptible to manipulation via 
framing. 
 
Sutherland (1992) noted “it cannot be rational to make different decisions on the same 
problem depending on how it is posed” (Sutherland, 1992, pg. 223-4).  He 
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conjectured that, whilst some satisfaction will be obtained by making a certain gain, 
the additional satisfaction which might accrue by making a larger but uncertain gain 
may not be sufficient to compensate for the sense of disappointment in making no 
gain at all if the gamble does not come off.  This raises the likelihood of the individual 
regretting his/her choice.  “In the case of losses, if he/she opts for taking a certain loss, 
that in itself will cause dismay: hence the actor may think it worth risking a larger loss 
with the compensating chance of avoiding any loss at all and therefore avoiding any 
dismay” (Sutherland, 1992, pg. 224).   
 
One of the earliest papers on prospect theory, by Bazerman (1982), tested whether 
individuals treat the prospect of gains differently than the prospect of losses.  Subjects 
were asked to make a decision about a large car manufacturing company that was in 
decline.  The vice president had produced two plans.  Half the subjects used plans 
denoted Set 1. 
 
 Plan A: This plan will save one of the three plants and 2000 jobs. 
 Plan B:  This plan has a 1/3 probability of saving all three plants and 
6000 jobs, but has a 2/3 probability of saving no plants and jobs. 
 
For the other half of the subjects the two plans were Set 2: 
 
 Plan C: This plan will result in the loss of two of the three plants and 
4000 jobs. 
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 Plan D: This plan has a 2/3 probability of resulting in the loss of all 
three plants and all 6000 jobs, but has a 1/3 probability of losing no 
plants and no jobs. 
 
The two plans in each set yield identical payoffs to the subjects but Set 1 is framed in 
the domain of gains while Set 2 in the domain of losses.  In Set 1, more than 80% of 
the subjects opted for Plan A.  In Set 2, more than 80% of the subjects opted for Plan 
D.  The behaviour observed was described as the “reflection effect”: “The reflection 
of prospects around (the origin) reverses the preference order.  Note that the reflection 
effect implies that risk aversion in the positive domain is accompanied by risk seeking 
in the negative domain.”(Bazerman, 1982, pg. 268)  The theory claims that people 
perceive outcomes as gains and losses, rather than the final states of wealth and 
welfare.  Therefore, the carriers of utility are changes of wealth from the previous 
reference point, rather than final asset positions that include current wealth.  The key 
observation is whether the movement from the reference point is in the positive (gains) 
or negative (losses) direction.  Moreover, because of diminishing marginal value the 
utility function is generally concave for gains and convex for losses, as shown in 
Figure 2.1.   
 
Essentially this means “that the difference in value between a gain of 100 and a gain 
of 200 appears to be greater than the difference between a gain of 1100 and a gain of 
1200.” (Bazerman, 1982, pg. 278) Figure 2.1 clearly illustrates that the value function 
is steeper for losses than for gains. Therefore, individuals are commonly risk-averse in 
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the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. Specifically, a decision 
maker given the option of additional loss or complete recovery of the investment will 
prefer additional investment to withdrawal.    
 
 
Figure 2.1: A hypothetical value function.  (Adapted from Kahneman and Tversky, 1982, pg. 342) 
 
Whilst prospect theory cannot explain entrapment alone, it provides a more lucid 
explanation of why individuals escalate commitment than self-justification theory.  
The likelihood of individuals conforming to this theory is captured by the adage that 
one may as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb. 
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2.2.3 Regret Theory 
 
“Regret is an emotional feeling associated with the ex post knowledge that a different 
past decision would have fared better than the one chosen.” (Shefrin and Statman , 
1985, pg. 781) Regret theory is a motivational theory of decision-making.  The 
underlying assumption is that individuals are concerned with how the outcome of the 
decision is going to make them feel about the decision itself.  In contrast, the 
traditional expectancy value theories such as prospect theory and expected utility 
theory emphasises that decisions are a function of probabilities and values or utilities 
of outcomes alone.  Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) couple regret with 
the expected utility framework.   To capture regret, a two attribute utility function u(x, 
y) is used, where x denotes final assets and, this is the novel feature, y denotes 
foregone assets.  Regret, then stems from the particular shape of the utility function.  
As an example, consider the functional form suggested by Bell (1982). 
 
u (x,y) = g(x) + f (g(x) – g(y))                                                       (2.1) 
 
Where g and f are increasing functions. Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) 
stated their theories for choice between two gambles.  In that case foregone assets 
simply means the level of assets in a given state of the world that would have been 
obtained had the individual chosen the foregone gamble.  It is not clear how to 
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generalise this to the case of choices between more than two alternatives which is the 
case confronting an investor contemplating adjustments of his/her portfolio.  But 
suppose an investor who holds an asset is simply considering the two alternatives to 
hold or to sell (and hold the cash).  So does regret theory imply the disposition effect 
under any circumstances? 
The answer is unlikely.  For a disposition effect, current decisions need to be some 
way linked to whether there are prior gains or losses. Regret theory offers no such link 
and consequently no disposition effect.  To see this more formally, suppose the 
investor holds n units of a risky asset with current price Pt and risky future price Pt+1 
and suppose the investor uses mental accounting, i.e. he or she thinks about his or her 
investments at the level of the individual asset rather than at the portfolio level.  
Maximisation of expected utility then implies that the investor will continue to hold 
the asset whenever E [u (n Pt+1, n Pt)] > E [u (n Pt, n Pt+1)] and sell when E [u (n Pt+1, n 
Pt)] < E [u (n Pt, n Pt+1)].  Assuming no autocorrelation of asset returns, these 
inequalities and hence behaviour are unaffected by past prices so there is no scope for 
the disposition effect.  Thus expected regret does not explain the disposition effect. 
 
To counter the argument, Shefrin and Statman (1985) conjecture regret as an 
underlying explanation of the disposition effect: Investors might feel regret when they 
realise a loss, and conversely feel pride when they realise a paper gain.  So it is not 
losses per se, but rather the realisation of losses that brings about regret.  Conversely, 
it is not gains but the realisation of gains that brings about pride.  In this case, 
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investors might display the disposition effect.  They might sell winners to rejoice over 
their past decision and they might refrain from selling losers to avoid feeling the 
regret over their initial purchase.  The disposition effect here stems not so much from 
regret and pride but rather from the failure to understand that paper gains and losses 
are as real as realised gains and losses.  Why realising a loss should cause regret is 
unclear.  After all any gain or loss is there irrespective of whether or not it is realised.  
The only difference selling makes is the resulting portfolio composition (ignoring 
transaction costs and taxes). According to the definition by Shefrin and Statman 
(1985) quoted above regret is caused by the knowledge that a different past decision 
would have fared better, not by the act of realising a loss. 
 
This is not to argue that there are no investors who fail to understand that paper gains 
and losses are just as realised as gains and losses, but simply that such a failure may 
not be relevant for all investors who display the disposition effect.  For example it 
seems unlikely that the professional futures traders whose livelihood depends on 
trading success should fail to take unrealised gains or losses for real.  Nevertheless 
such investors do display the disposition effect (Coval and Shumway, 2005; Locke 
and Mann, 2005; and Heisler, 1994). 
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The mechanisms detailed above have typically explained one or more situations of 
entrapment/escalating commitment.  Other mechanisms such as expectancy theory4 
fail to capture the motivation behind this phenomenon. Whilst none of them can 
exclusively lay claim to explaining entrapment, elements of these mechanisms do 
feature in the process of entrapment.   However, from the previous analysis prospect 
theory is the best singular description of how individuals react to losing courses of 
action.  Self-justification under certain circumstances is an appropriate analysis of 
entrapment but is nothing more than an auxiliary theory.   
 
 
2.3 Literature Survey – Methodology 
 
Several factors influencing escalation of commitment have been drawn from the 
above theories.   Moreover, a typology of these factors will be implemented for the 
review based upon a typology that has been used by several authors. (e.g., Ross and 
Staw, 1986, 1993)  It includes three broad types of influencing factors: (a) 
psychological factors, which characterize the individual participants in the process; (b) 
social factors, which pertain to the various groups involved; and (c). project factors, 
which are attributes of the project.  These categories will be reviewed systematically 
                                                 
4 Designed to supplement self-justification theory, expectancy theory postulates decision makers will 
assess the probability as well as the value of goal attainment for the alternatives available to them and 
choose that course of action which has the greatest subjective expected utility.  According to this 
theory, investment decision-makers, focus on the future outcomes and the probability of achieving 
them with future behaviour even if exposed to setbacks in the past.   
This mechanism is most relevant to entrapment when there is a possibility of recouping one’s losses 
through future course of action.  However, expectancy theory, while providing an examination of 
sources of future utility in explaining the actions of decision makers, does not offer the content 
necessary for predicting the occurrence of entrapment/escalating commitment. 
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focusing on the key journals in the field to assist in answering two of the key issues of 
this paper: Is there evidence of sunk cost accounting? And whether there is a single 
feature that induces individuals to account for sunk costs? 
 
The data search was carried out systematically which involved a computer search of 
the literature using four key words (i.e. entrapment, escalation, sunk costs and 
commitment).5 
 
 
2.3.1 Psychological Factors Affecting Sunk–Cost Accounting 
 
The literature in this group focuses on the suitability of the self-justification theory, 
and prospect theory.  The review focuses on two variables:  personal responsibility 
and framing of the project status.  A decision maker who has a high personal 
responsibility is expected to display greater commitment to the continuation of the 
project than one who is not.  Personal responsibility may come from supporting the 
project, identifying with it, and unwillingness to admit that the previous decision to 
continue was wrong.   
 
As already discussed in Section 2.2.2, according to prospect theory, individuals are 
risk seeking when choosing between two losing options but risk averse when 
                                                 
5 The Computer search involved the following electronic journals: Journal Storage (JSTOR), Expanded 
Academic (ASAP), Psychology Literature (Psychlitt), Google Scholar  and Economics Literature 
(Econlitt).  
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choosing between two winning options.  Consequently, the decision to invest 
additional resources depends on how the problem is framed.   
 
 
2.3.1.1 Effects of Internal Justification “Accepting Incurred Losses” 
 
The following experiments acknowledge self-justification theory through studying the   
behaviour of decision makers when their initial investments have failed.  Specifically 
how do they act when they incur a loss?  Whilst much of the literature in this section 
supports self-justification theory there are a number of paradigms that depreciate the 
value of the theory as a valid mechanism in explaining sunk cost accounting. 
 
 In an early study by Staw (1976) negative feedback and the need to justify were 
manipulated orthogonally.  The case utilised “Adams & Smith Company” which over 
the years has emerged as the classical paradigm for the field.   Subjects played the role 
of a company’s financial vice president who had to decide how much money to 
allocate for continued research and development in one of the company’s operating 
divisions.  In all instances, a certain amount of money had been allocated to a 
particular operating division five years earlier.  Prior to making the second resource 
allocation decision, subjects received feedback about the outcome of the initial 
allocation of funds.  Half of the subjects were led to believe that the prior commitment 
of funds had proved to be financially successful to the corporation (positive feedback 
condition) whereas the other half was told just the opposite (negative feedback 
condition).  In addition, half of the participants had made the initial resource 
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allocation decision (personal responsibility condition). Presumably, those in the 
personal responsibility condition felt more of a need to justify the initial resource 
allocation than did those in the no responsibility condition who had been informed 
that “their predecessors in the organisation” had made the initial decision.   As 
predicted by self-justification theory, the mean amount allocated to the previous 
course of action was higher in the negative feedback/personal responsibility condition 
than in all other groups. However, a caveat was that the subjects did not have 
sufficient information to make an economically sound decision.  One could rationally 
justify investment in either project.  This lack of information was ignored in the study. 
 
Staw and Fox (1977) in a later study tested the duration of commitment over time.  
They again utilised the “Adams and Smith” case with the difference that this time 
negative consequences were allowed to persist over three time periods.  The results 
verified the authors prediction that commitment would persist through time, but also 
showed that subjects in both high and low responsibility conditions and in the 
presence of negative feedback, changed the direction of their commitment at each 
period (e.g. Period 1: high commitment, than Period 2: lower commitment and Period 
3; again high commitment and vice versa).  The authors took this behaviour as a sign 
of active processing of information by the subjects in the search for a way out of the 
dead-end.  
 
This inconsistency in the commitment of the subjects led to the experiment conducted 
by Staw and Ross (1978), where the processing of information following negative 
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versus positive feedback was studied.  In this research, subjects were asked to act as 
an assistant director of the World Bank, with the duty of making decisions on the 
allocation of funds for projects in developing nations.  In the first investment decision, 
regarding the location of a hydroelectric dam in Nigeria, the subjects chose between 
three possible sites.  However, this time feedback was in all cases negative with half 
the subjects receiving information that failure was due to an exogenous cause 
(unusual amount of rain) while for the other half the cause of the failure was 
endogenous (a different one for each of the three locations).  The third decision was 
about the resources that would be further allocated in a Kenya project (from $0 to $70 
million dollars).  This decision initiated the dependent variable: the subjects’ 
commitment to a previously chosen course of action.  Results showed that “the least 
amount of resources was committed by subjects who had experienced a prior failure 
and who faced an exogenous setback.”(Staw and Ross, 1978, pg. 54)  Therefore, 
“…overall, a tendency to escalate can be broken by clear cut negative results 
attributed to an endogenous cause.  However, individuals can continue to invest when 
provided an external justification of failure.”(Staw and Ross, 1978, pg. 60)    As the 
authors rightly point out, in a real world context feedback is so mixed that it is hard to 
distinguish purely endogenous factors contributing to failure.  Moreover, since 
participants reacted to causal information about the nature of the setback, self-
justification was not fully supported (according to the theory, the nature of the cause 
is irrelevant).  However, the High/Low Personal Responsibility conditions had yielded 
results fully supportive of sunk cost effects. 
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Conlon and Parks (1987) replicated the conditions of Staw (1976) to test the 
hypothesis that self-justification pressures give rise to retrospective focusing and sunk 
cost accounting.  “Retrospective focusing occurs partly because justification and 
exoneration require a plausible explanation of how or why a setback occurred.” 
(Conlon and Parks, 1987, pg. 344)  The authors again used “Adams & Smith co.”, but 
in addition this time subjects were offered two sets of information concerning the 
feedback, of which they could choose to view only one.  The results of the study were 
striking. The data displayed a very significant difference between the Personal 
Responsibility-Negative Feedback condition and the three others.  75% of the subjects 
in these conditions selected to see the Retrospective information, whereas across all 
the other conditions this happened with fewer than 20% of the subjects. 
 
 
2.3.1.2 Psychological Effects of Framing 
 
Prospect theory has been shown to be a pre-cursor to a significant proportion of the 
research on framing of information.  Consequently, the literature concentrates on 
utilising this mechanism. 
 
Brockner et al. (1984) utilized a funding decision case, in which the “financial vice 
president at the ABC University” had to choose between two available funding 
options.  All the subjects received negative feedback concerning the first decision.  
However, this feedback was positively framed for half the subjects and negatively for 
the rest.  In view of sunk costs of the magnitude of $20 million, subjects had to decide 
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whether they would deescalate or adopt the alternative option of investing an 
additional $20 million in the previously chosen project with a 50-50 chance of 
recouping the losses or losing all $40 million.  This set of options was framed 
negatively for subjects in the initial negative frame of the feedback condition and 
positively for the subjects in the positive frame of feedback condition.  In accordance 
with the prediction of prospect theory, 73% of the subjects in the Negative frame 
condition chose to persist with the project in sharp contrast with the mere 33% of 
subjects in the positive frame condition.  
 
When conducting experiments in framing effects, one must consider whether there is 
an element of artificiality involved when subjects are presented with contrived 
dilemmas requiring them to choose what they consider to be the best option. The role 
of language in the social construction of reality (including our experience of specific 
decision-making dilemmas) is important in the context of framing.  Forms of wording 
can be chosen to encourage subjects to perceive decision dilemmas in particular ways. 
 
Phillips et al. (1991) explored a slightly different aspect of prospect theory.    Their 
focus was on the transparency of the frame.  The level of transparency represents how 
obvious the costs and benefits appear to the individual.   The authors argue that the 
greater the transparency of the frame the more likely is the decision maker to behave 
in accordance with economic theory.  “In particular, if a sunk cost has a transparent 
frame, it is likely to be ignored.  Direct, out of pocket expenses are generally more 
transparent as losses than indirect, opportunity costs.  As a result, opportunity costs, 
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which may be sunk, are often valued as smaller losses relative to equivalent direct 
costs.”  (Phillips et al. 1991, pg. 113)  To test this rationale, the authors designed an 
experiment to determine whether decision makers ignore sunk costs in selected 
contexts, and whether or not implicit opportunity costs are perceived as equivalent 
direct costs. Three experiments were conducted. The first two were lottery 
experiments and results showed that when the problem was more transparent to the 
subjects they were more likely to ignore a sunk cost.   An auction experiment was the 
setting for the third experiment and confronted the issue of the nature of the cost.  
Subjects participated in an auction and had the option of participating in parallel 
auction for a certain cost.  This cost was a direct entry fee for half of the subjects and 
an indirect fee for the rest.  The findings were as the authors had predicted the nature 
of the cost did influence the subjects’ decisions.  “Individuals were much more likely 
to participate in the optional market when the cost was an implicit, opportunity cost 
rather than an explicit direct payment.  That is, the opportunity costs were 
undervalued relative to the direct costs by the participants.” (Phillips et al. 1991, pg. 
127) Overall the transparency both of the problem and of the sunk costs were found to 
have a significant effect on sunk cost accounting and subsequently on individuals’ 
deviation from rational economic behaviour. 
 
 
2.3.2 Effects of External Justification: A Social Factor 
 
Social determinants are considered to inhibit the individual from deviating from the 
initial course of action, even at the expense of their own beliefs.  Fox and Staw (1979) 
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demonstrated that external justification processes could also produce escalation.  They 
tested whether political and social variables enhanced the self-justification process 
and, therefore, sunk cost accounting and escalation of commitment.  The variables 
employed were Job Insecurity (High/Low) and Resistance to the subjects’ policies 
(High/Low).   The study again utilized the “Adams & Smith” decision case, requiring 
of the subjects to make an R&D funding allocation and defend it.  All of the subjects 
received negative feedback plus both support and resistance to their views from the 
Board and then were asked to make a second funding decision. Results showed 
commitment of resources in the failing cause (sunk cost effect) was highest in the 
High Job Insecurity – High Resistance condition and lowest in the Low Job Insecurity 
– Low Resistance condition:  “As predicted, under high job insecurity, subjects 
committed more money than under low job insecurity and high resistance resulted in 
greater commitment than low resistance.”(Fox and Staw, 1979, pg. 461)  This takes 
on special significance in public life, where political opposition and investigative 
reporting is likely.  Naturally, if public officials anticipate their opposition will attack 
them and they risk loss of office if their actions are regarded as a failure, they will 
make every effort to suggest that success is just around the corner. 
 
Brockner et al. (1981) tested whether the degree of entrapment was mediated by face 
saving variables. Subjects decided how much (0 to $5.00) of their initial stake they 
would bet in a counter game that could win them in a jackpot ($3.00).   The 
researchers initially split the subjects in High and Low Social Anxiety according to 
their scores on an anxiety scale.  The subjects then received advice on how to play the 
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game, half being encouraged to bet a good portion of their stake (Risky condition), 
while the other half was told the “smart thing” would be to invest a small portion of 
their stake (Cautious condition).  Furthermore, half of the subjects were playing in the 
presence of one experimenter (Small audience condition), while the other half were 
playingin the presence of two (Large audience condition). All the hypotheses were 
accepted.  First the effect of the Risk-Caution manipulation was indeed more 
pronounced in the High Social Anxiety-Large Audience condition, indicating that, 
individuals concerned with their social image followed the advice of the 
experimenter.  Second, the same effect was least influential in the Low-Social 
Anxiety-Small Audience condition.  Thus verifying that high social pressures can 
heighten sunk cost accounting. 
 
 
2.3.2.1 Cultural Variance 
 
The concept of cultural differences has been operationalised in many ways (inter alia: 
Hofstede, 1980, 1991; Brislin, 1983; Triandis, 1984; Schein , 1985).  However, the 
taxonomy presented by Hofstede (1980 and 1991) is considered amongst social 
science academics as the most accurate and representative in this field of endeavour.  
A major advantage of Hofstede’s (1980) approach is that is disaggregates culture into 
several component dimensions, thus enabling the formulation of hypotheses based 
upon these more focused cultural characteristics. 
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Based on a survey of over 116,000 workers in 40 countries for a large international 
firm, Hofstede (1980) identified the following five cultural dimensions: 
Individualism; Masculinity; Power Distance; Confucian Dynamism; and Uncertainty 
Avoidance.  Of these five dimensions, “Individualism is most directly related to the 
escalation phenomenon.”(Hofstede, pg. 351, 1980) According to Hofstede (1980, pg. 
51, 1980), “Individualism pertains to societies in which … everyone is expected to 
look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family.  Countering this is 
Collectivism, which describes societies containing strong cohesive units of 
individuals.  These units are established from birth.  As a result of a collective 
culture’s need for group affiliation, its members are very concerned with maintaining 
face.  Ho (1976) explains: “A person’s “face” is assessed in terms of what others think 
of him…  Face may be lost when conduct or performance falls below the minimum 
level considered acceptable.”  Further, “face is always attached to status…. At stake is 
nothing less than the effective maintenance of one’s standing in society. (Ho 1976, pg. 
876, 871) 
 
In contrast, in individualistic cultures people are supposed to look after themselves.  
Hofstede (1980) and Triandis (1989) observe that as a result, an individual’s self-
respect can be preserved regardless of what other people think about his or her 
performance. 
 
Chow et al. (1997) explored the effects of national culture upon individual’s choice 
between continuance and abandonment of unprofitable projects.  The experiment 
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consisted of 192 American and Chinese undergraduate accountants.  The decision 
making task placed each subject in the role of a company’s senior project manager.  
His/her primary job responsibility was to oversee the company’s investments in 
product research and development projects. Subjects were provided with both 
retrospective and prospective information in a concrete decision-making context.  
They were also given probabilistic information about future performance expectations 
for each alternative.  The results displayed a significant cross-national difference.  The 
mean decision of the Chinese sample was to continue the project, while that of the US 
was discontinuance.  The much greater escalation tendency among the Chinese 
subjects was consistent with their greater concern with maintaining “face”.  In a 
culture that emphasizes “face” preservation, approaches that cause the loss “face”, 
such as publicly announcing project outcomes, may increase rather than reduce 
escalation tendencies. 
 
Brandts et al. (2002) document behaviour across four countries (Japan, Netherlands, 
Spain and U.S.A) in public goods experiments with linear voluntary contribution 
mechanism.  Their contribution function design allowed them to obtain a view of 
subjects’ behaviour from two complementary points of view.  Their results illustrated 
two important findings that counter findings documented in previous cultural studies: 
 
Firstly, differences across countries were found to be “minor” “When people play the 
same game they behave similarly”   (Brandts et al. 2002, pg. 1).  Their results give 
support to the notion that when people from different countries play the game they 
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behave similarly.  In fact unlike previous studies where Japanese subjects were found 
to display spiteful behaviour this experiment showed no evidence of such a trait 
amongst their Japanese subjects.  Secondly, for all four countries the data are 
inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion and 
cooperation is a stronger motivating force than spite. 
 
 
2.3.3 Project Determinants 
 
 Project determinants are the objective attributes of a project, the project's benefits and 
costs (Brockner, 1992). Factors such as proximity to the goal and project completion 
effects have been found to enhance entrapment and sunk cost accounting. 
 
Rubin and Brockner (1975), conducted an experiment designed to investigate the 
effects of reward value, awareness of costs and goal proximity.  Subjects were able to 
win large amounts of money, which diminished over time.  For half of the players, the 
rate of decrement was high (High Decrement condition) whereas for the other half it 
was low (Low Decrement Condition).  This condition was introduced so as to test the 
experimenters’ hypothesis that the lower the rate of decrement, the greater the 
temptation to continue and the sunk cost effects.  In order to win the jackpot, the 
participants had to solve a series of crossword puzzles. However, players could 
request a dictionary for puzzles they deemed difficult.  However, they were warned 
that only one dictionary was available and so they might have to wait in line in order 
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to use it.   In fact, the dictionary was never available.  Half the subjects, after asking 
for the dictionary, were given a card telling them that they were first in line for its use 
(High Proximity condition), whereas the other half were informed that they were third 
in line (Low Proximity condition).  The researcher’s prediction was that subjects in the 
High Proximity condition would exhibit greater entrapment.  It was hypothesised if 
people became more focused on costs, entrapment would be reduced.  To test this, 
half of the subjects were provided with a chart indicating costs and benefits at various 
time periods during the game (High Salience Condition), while half were not (Low 
salience Condition).  Entrapment was measured by the amount of time the subjects 
spent staying in the game, as they were given the option to quit but their payoff in this 
case would be significantly smaller than if they had not participated at all, since 
participation in the game meant a reduction in their initial stake at each time period.  
The results confirmed all three hypotheses.   Namely, the rate of decrement of the 
reward and cost salience is inversely related to the magnitude of sunk costs, while 
proximity to the goal is positively related to sunk cost effects.  
 
In fact, examining goal proximity in entrapment situations has been the focus of many 
experiments. Arkes and Blumer (1985, Experiments 3, 4 and 5) found that subjects 
faced with a decision to invest that same amount of funds to start up with the same R 
& D projects.  The authors also tested to see whether this decision was owed to the 
fact that subjects falling prey to sunk costs spend despite high probability of failure or 
because they do not perceive the situation as a lost cause.  The first hypothesis 
displayed only face saving concerns, but the second verified the existence of sunk cost 
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effects, since the latter are supposed to distort the decision makers’ judgement.  
Therefore, the findings verified the second hypothesis as the greater the proximity to 
the goal, which in this case also meant higher sunk costs, the more “irrationally” 
confident were the decision makers about the success of the project. 
 
Garland (1990) tested the functional relationship between sunk costs and the decision 
to continue investment in an R & D project (based on the original design of Arkes and 
Blumer, 1985).  Subjects were asked to take the role of president in the Aero-Flite 
Corporation and decided whether to commit additional resources to a partly 
completed project.  Five stages of prior spending and project completion were 
considered – 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 million dollars had been spent and the project was 10%, 
30%, 50%, 70% and 90% completed, respectively.  The overall budget for the project 
was $10 million dollars.  Subjects were asked to comment on how likely is it that: a) 
they would decide to use the last x million dollars to complete the project? b) they 
would authorise the next million to continue with the project? c) if the project was 
completed,  the company would realize a profit?  The findings illustrated that project 
completion or goal proximity is an important factor in decision-making.  Subjects’ 
willingness to authorise additional resources for a threatened R & D project was both 
positively and linearly related to the proportion of budget that had already been 
expended.  As a consequence, project completion effects may not be important in the 
presence of small sunk costs and in the initial stages of the projects but become very 
influential later on. Surprisingly enough, however, although the subjects generally 
considered the continuation of the project more likely than the abandonment of it, 
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they were far less confident about the probability of the project turning out to be 
profitable.  This contradicts Arkes and Blumer’s (1985) assumption that individuals 
continue because of “irrational” expectations concerning the success of the project.  
Note however, that both findings could be interpreted by self-justification or prospect 
theory but do not conform to “rational” economic behaviour. Indeed Garland (1990) 
noted the individuals’ propensity to invest further in the project was independent of 
previous incremental costs (on average).  
 
Although sunk costs and project completion may be highly correlated in many 
situations, they are conceptually distinct variables, worthy of separation in 
experimental studies in order to uncover any separate or combined effects they may 
have on escalation behaviour.  In two studies with undergraduate business students, 
Conlon and Garland (1993) found that when sunk costs and project completion 
information were manipulated independently, there was no evidence of sunk cost 
effects, even in a series of control conditions where no information was presented 
regarding the degree of project completion. There was, however, considerable 
evidence of project completion effects, where the closer the project was to 
completion, the greater the likelihood that decision makers would continue to invest in 
the project. These project-completion effects occurred under varying budget 
conditions, with the amount of money remaining in a project budget unknown, held 
constant, or inversely related to the amount that had been spent.  Finally project 
completion effects occurred whether or not subjects were personally responsible for 
the initial investment in the project.    
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Conlon and Garland (1998), extend the notion explored in their 1993 paper, that what 
had been labelled a sunk cost effect might actually be a goal substitution effect.  The 
studies allowed them to examine the effects of sunk costs and project completion in a 
scenario that investigates students’ willingness to continue investment in projects that 
were already underway.  In studies with experienced bank managers, Chinese 
graduate students and advanced MBA students they found overwhelming support for 
the importance of project completion an investment intention with no indication of 
typical sunk cost effects.  The results reinforce a goal substitution escalation for many 
escalation phenomena where, as progress moves forward on a project, completion of 
the project itself takes an increasing precedence over other goals (e.g., economic 
profit) that may have been more salient at the time project was initiated. 
 
Diekmann, et al. (1996) explored whether the amount sellers previously paid for their 
property affects both buyers and sellers engaged in a real estate negotiation.  Study 1 
demonstrated that buyers base their initial and highest offers on the seller’s previous 
purchase price.  This finding extends the sunk cost literature to a negotiation context 
and suggests that sunk costs extend beyond the focal actor to one’s opponent and to 
the negotiated outcome. Study 2 demonstrated that sellers base their lowest acceptable 
offers on their previous purchase price. This is consistent with the negotiation 
framework developed by Raiffa (1982) who argues for an asymmetrical 
prescriptive/descriptive approach.  This approach suggests that the best prescription 
for a negotiator should be based on a description of the likely decisions of the 
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opponent negotiator.  In contrast to game theory approaches, Raiffa (1982) explicitly 
acknowledges that the actual behaviour of the opponent may fall far short of 
rationality.  Study 3 reveals that the seller’s previous purchase price affects not only 
the buyers’ and sellers’ offers and expectations, but also the final negotiated outcome.  
The integration of these studies suggests that sunk costs do transmit across players, 
and that while the consideration of one’s own sunk costs may be irrational from an 
economic perspective, the consideration of one’s opponent’s sunk costs may be 
strategically rational if such consideration provides a descriptive analysis of one’s 
opponent’s actions. 
  
Overall it is quite apparent that factors associated with the project influence escalation 
of commitment but not in the way “rational” economists would argue.  Most 
researchers believe individuals’ motives for task completion alter during the course of 
a project.  At the outset, economic decisions are dominant.  As additional resources 
are poured into the investment, economic concerns are mixed with psychological 
motives.  There is an increasing tendency to withdraw from the project due to 
increasing costs accompanied by an increasing tendency to escalate further.  Later on, 
the psychological component becomes stronger as now the decision maker’s decisions 
reflect the need to appear consistent, save face and justify previous expenditures.  
Whilst these statements appear consistent with human behaviour in investment 
projects, it poses the question: at what stage of a project do economic considerations 
become psychological motives for task completion?    If there is a visible boundary, is 
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it uniform or does it depend on the individual’s personality?    It is certainly worthy of 
future research.  
 
 
2.4 The Reverse Sunk Cost Effect 
 
The central theme of this chapter has been to document the “apparently instinctive 
tendency of human decision makers, affected by what has been committed to date, 
towards deeper or continued involvement (“escalation”) rather than rational 
withdrawal.” (Johnstone, 2003, pg. 210).  However, there are studies that testify 
towards the opposite behaviour, i.e. a reverse sunk cost effect.   
 
Heath (1995) determines that the sunk cost effect is dependent upon two factors.  
Specifically, individuals who are reluctant to disengage themselves from an 
investment do so because either they fail to set a mental account of their spending or 
because of a failure to maintain an account of aggregate expenditure.  Heath’s (1995) 
findings promote features of de-escalation from subjects who adopt either of the 
above characteristics. Their ability to withdraw from an investment is a function of 
recognising when aggregate sunk costs equal or exceed their self-imposed budget.  
This cognitive process is independent of when continued investment may appear 
“rational”.  Such behaviour can be often observed in stockbrokers or traders.  They 
will adopt a “sell-price” at which the computer will automatically sell the asset at a 
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pre-specified price.  This precludes traders from falling prey to emotional phenomena 
such as sunk cost accounting and escalation of commitment. 
 
These findings are based upon “a theory of mental budgeting” of which there are two 
principal components.  First, individuals set a budget and second, they track their 
ongoing expenses against the budget. 
 
Within the process of implementing a budget, Heath (1995) assumes individuals will 
assess the expected benefits of a new investment opportunity and then mentally 
allocate the necessary resources required to achieve those benefits.  After the budget 
has been set, individuals will track their investments against the budget.  Heath states 
the success rate of tracking investments is a function of two processes: “(1) 
investments must first be noticed and (2) then assigned to their proper accounts.  An 
investment will have no impact on the budget if either process fails.” (Heath, 1995, 
pg. 43)  When subjects were confronted with an investment decision that was difficult 
to budget, individuals escalated commitment. 6    
 
With such evidence Heath (1995) raises external validity questions about experiments 
that omit information about expected benefits.  The budgeting model offers a new 
dimension to the sunk cost literature but questioning the validity of previous 
experiments that fail to offer subjects the opportunity to learn about the benefits of an 
investment is unnecessary.   One of the many appealing aspects about decision-
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making is that there is ambiguity. This feature pertains to the core research into sunk 
costs and entrapment.   Investment decisions are rarely observed as “black and white” 
and as a consequence setting mental budgets can be difficult.  In such situations 
posited by Heath (1995) where mental budgets can be implemented then de-escalation 
is likely to occur. 
 
 
2.5 Direction of Dissertation 
 
The theme of this chapter has been to demonstrate the importance of experimentation 
in contemporary economic research and more specifically provide an overview of the 
sunk cost accounting phenomenon focusing on the psychological and economic 
motivations for pursuing this course of action.  By examining the evidence it is 
possible to elicit the following stylised facts pertaining to sunk cost accounting and 
entrapment. 
 
1. Sunk cost accounting (as a within person process) is a robust phenomenon in 
the real world. 
2. Sunk cost accounting decreases with the transparency of the sunk cost. 
3. Repeated violations of sunk cost accounting increases the probability of 
entrapment and escalation of commitment. 
                                                                                                                                            
6 The investment decision was difficult to budget for because the expected benefits were omitted from 
the experimental scenario. 
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4. Goal proximity and magnitude of prior costs increase the degree of 
entrapment and escalation of commitment. 
 
As prior work has clearly highlighted the existence of sunk cost accounting and 
certain conditions under which the occurrence is prevalent further work should 
concentrate on how individuals regard the sunk costs of others i.e. a departure away 
from sunk costs as a within person process towards an interpersonal approach of the 
phenomenon.  Further, how do individuals treat sunk costs when they are incorporated 
into a series of several costs?  Previous literature has failed to explore how sunk costs 
are treated when integrated into a group of other costs.  In real world activities, 
individuals will respond to sunk costs and other costs simultaneously so it is 
important to understand what effect this phenomenon will have in such a setting.  
Finally, sunk costs are pervasive across decision making environments one of which 
is in financial markets. This provides an interesting domain to test how sunk costs 
affect investment strategies and whether unanticipated brokerage fees ameliorate the 
sunk cost effect. 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The sunk cost effect is a robust phenomenon and can be captured under controlled 
laboratory conditions.  This chapter has identified three mechanisms that drive the 
phenomenon but has failed to detect one over-riding  psychological strategy.  In terms 
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of importance, prospect theory is a powerful explanation of sunk cost accounting but 
it fails to explain all instances.  Whilst self-justification and regret deserve merit they 
serve as auxiliary roles in determining how individuals respond to the phenomenon. 
However, in the findings of a large proportion of experiments subjects exhibit an 
amalgam of all three mechanisms, which suggests the sunk cost effect is driven 
simultaneously by these three processes. 
 
The literature has demonstrated that sunk cost accounting is common in the real 
world, which violates the axioms of expected utility theory.  In particular, this effect is 
enhanced with proximity to goal and magnitude of resources expended.  However, 
mental budgeting can result in individuals disengaging from an investment even in the 
face of large sunk costs. 
 
The literature review has identified areas of importance to the domains of business, 
finance and politics that have yet to be explored and the spirit of this dissertation is in 
accordance with the above statement.  Specifically subsequent chapters will provide 
the design, implementation and economic analysis of three experiments that will 
explore sunk costs in three directions:  Firstly, sunk costs in a corporate acquisition 
process hidden amongst a “bundle” of other costs:  secondly, sunk costs as an inter-
person process in corporate acquisitions: and thirdly, sunk costs in volatile, dynamic 
markets, i.e. sunk costs in financial markets. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 identified the key themes in the sunk cost accounting and entrapment 
literature. Most of these findings were examined using the technique of 
experimentation. This relatively new area of economic analysis has emerged to 
challenge the traditional axioms of the discipline.   Specifically it is the application of 
experimental methods to evaluate aspects of economic behaviour with reference to the 
theoretical predictions. In fact, as a discipline, economics shares many features with 
those in the natural sciences in the sense that economists are able to observe naturally 
occurring events, devise theories to explain their observations and evaluate their 
theories in light of additional evidence. 
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Experimentation has developed into a valuable instrument because it allows the 
isolation of specific variables.  This permits economists to “untangle” interrelated 
variables of interest that would be otherwise problematic using data from existing 
natural markets.  This is because “natural data often fail to allow “critical tests” of 
theoretical propositions…For example, predictions are often based on very subtle 
behavioural assumptions for which there is little practical possibility of obtaining 
evidence from naturally occurring markets.”  (Davis and Holt, 1993, pg. 3) 
 
One of the principal benefactors of experimental analysis has been in the area of 
decision-making under uncertainty and more specifically sunk cost accounting.  As 
this dissertation concerns itself with experimental designs to test the sunk cost 
accounting phenomenon this chapter has two main objectives.  The first is to 
demonstrate the ubiquitous nature of experimental work in economics, highlighting its 
importance in contemporary analysis.  Section 3.2-3.4 navigates through the major 
studies that have characterised experimental economics with reference to its historical 
development and to methodological issues and to discuss some of the objections and 
failings to experimentation, as well as some of the principal lessons that have been 
learned. 
 
The second objective is to determine how attitudes to risk (a critical component of 
experiments in this dissertation) are determined in economics and the practicalities of 
measuring them in the laboratory with references to previous experiments that have 
sought to identify a subject’s risk posture. 
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3.2 Development of Experimental Economics 
 
The historical evolution of experimental economics dates back to the mid-twentieth 
century and since that time a series of themes  have emerged that remain important in 
contemporary experimental analysis. The most important findings have occurred 
through experiments in the following areas: (1) markets, (2) public goods, (3) 
individual learning processes, and (4) game theory.  
 
 
3.2.1 Experiments on Markets 
 
A burgeoning number of studies have focused on experimental markets and several of 
the most recognised belong to this category.  Much of the research relates to the 
convergence of competitive markets and the establishment of a competitive 
equilibrium.  Academics were concerned with the dynamics of such equilibrium, i.e. 
do markets converge towards a competitive equilibrium and if they do what is the 
velocity of adjustment?  At a fairly early stage in the experimental investigation of 
such issues it was repeatedly observed that one particular trading mechanism, known 
as the double auction trading institution, was especially efficient at attaining the 
competitive equilibrium and this attainment was rapid.  As a consequence much of the 
experimental literature is concerned with studying this mechanism and applying it in 
various contexts. The pioneers of these experiments were Chamberlain (1948) and 
later Smith (1962).  They reproduced the competitive market postulated by economic 
theory in a laboratory using a class of university students.  In a double auction, buyers 
are free to accept the price “ask” of sellers, or to propose alternative terms in the form 
of “bids.” Symmetrically, sellers may accept the bids proposed by buyers, or counter 
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with asks.  All bid and ask information is public, and is typically submitted under a 
bid/ask spread-reduction rule, or a condition that only proposals that improve upon 
the best standing terms are admissible.  
 
Outcomes in Smith’s double auction markets conform to competitive equilibrium 
predictions. 7  In fact, competitive predictions turn out to be remarkably robust in 
double-auction markets.  Competitive allocations are generated in experimental 
double auction markets under extreme structural conditions, and under unusual supply 
and demand configurations. For this reason the double auction has become a 
performance standard against which others are evaluated.  
 
 
 3.2.2 Public Goods Experiments 
 
Public goods experiments confront the principal issue of the free-riding problem.  
Generically, a public good possesses the following two distinctive characteristics.  
 
1. Its fundamental characteristic is non-rivalry in consumption. “Each 
individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any 
other individual’s consumption of that good.” (Samuelson, 1954, pg. 387)   
2. Exclusion from its consumption is difficult.   
Thus, when it comes to the financing of a public good by private arrangements, 
individuals face a monetary incentive to “free-ride” on the contribution of others.  
                                                 
7 Smith differed from Chamberlain in two procedural respects.  First, Smith used real financial 
incentives.  Second, Smith’s markets were repeated. 
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According to economic theory this leads to a Pareto inefficient provision of the public 
good. In other words, this strategy is sub-optimal. 
 
Such behaviour has inspired a series of experiments designed to investigate whether 
individuals actually pursue a free-riding strategy.  Whilst each experiment differs 
slightly in the methodology they mostly conform to the following generic design. 
 
 
3.2.2.1 The Generic Public Goods Experiment 
  
A group of n subjects are each endowed with a fixed number of tokens.  Subjects in 
such an experiment might well be told that the following rules apply.  Each token can 
be either traded for cash or contributed to a common pool.  The total contributions to a 
common pool will be multiplied by a factor α (α<1) and the resulting sum divided 
equally between the subjects.  Each subject must decide how many tokens to 
contribute to the pool and how many to trade for cash.  Under a game theoretic 
approach the dominant strategy for each player is to allocate his or her entire 
endowment to the private investment and nothing to the collective investment 
regardless of the other players’ investment decisions.  If the game is played a series of 
times by the same players, the game-theoretical solution is produced by backward 
induction.  In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game each player allocates in 
each round all of his or her tokens to the private investment and nothing to collective 
investment.  However, the profit of all players together is maximised if all the tokens 
are allocated to the collective investment. Thus, the group optimum is realised if, in 
each round, each player allocates all of his tokens to the collective investment. 
Chapter 3: Methodological Issues 
 63
 
 These rules are intended to create an experimental analogue of a public goods 
problem and this voluntary contributions mechanism design has stimulated substantial 
research.  Experiments along these lines have investigated a number of questions 
including the extent to which the contributions to the public good depend upon a 
variety of treatment variables such as: the manipulation factor; the number of subjects; 
whether or not the subjects are allowed to communicate; whether or not binding 
agreements are allowed and the composition of the subject pool (e.g. are they men or 
women, are they familiar with economic theory?) 
 
Voluntary Contributions to public goods is an area of great interest to experimental 
economists. Comprehensive surveys of the literature are presented by Ledyard (1995) 
and Davis and Holt (1993).  They conclude that in early rounds of the public goods 
game, subjects tend to make considerable contributions to the collective investment.  
The contribution level decreases, however, over time until it is almost zero by the 
final round.  Many experimental studies replicate these results but also show that the 
average contribution level depends on several factors. These factors might be 
parameters of the model or other factors that are irrelevant with respect to the game 
theoretic prediction.  These so-called treatment effects in voluntary contributions 
experiments are illustrated by models that incorporate generalised preferences, 8 noisy 
decision making, evolution and adaptation, or cooperation and signalling. 
   
 
                                                 
8 A generalised preference function is a compound of egotistic and altruistic preferences. 
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3.2.3 The Experiments on Individual Learning Processes 
 
The seminal experiment in this field conducted by Thurstone (1931) sought to 
empirically determine the shape of an indifference curve.  Subjects selected several 
(hypothetical) baskets containing alternative quantities of hats and shoes.   This 
traditional model was critically commented citing the environment as too artificial, 
the choices hypothetical, and therefore, the experiment of little use. This is one of the 
major criticisms directed at experimental economics and will be discussed further in 
Section 3.3.3, as this opinion is quite widespread among economists. 
 
However, later studies by Allais (1953) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979), (1992) 
are more important to this line of enquiry.  They were developed after Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944) introduced the concept of expected utility theory. 
 
Through replication by other economists, these experiments have shown robust 
violations of the axioms of invariance, transitivity and dominance, which are central 
in expected utility theory.  The subjects use heuristic decision making rules and make 
systematic errors in their choices. 
 
The Allais (1953) procedure adopts a basic framework.  He used hypothetical 
questionnaires with no remuneration.  The subjects had to make two choices.  The 
first choice was between the alternatives A and B, the second one between the 
alternatives B and C.  Each alternative was characterised by a different outcome, 
certain or uncertain. A typical variation of the outcomes of the various alternatives 
were: 
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      Alternative (A)                  Alternative (B)    
 
                         
        
    100F      500F            100F                 0 
    (1)      (0.1)            (0.89)              (0.01) 
 
 
Alternative A yields with certainty a payoff of 100 Francs.  Alternative B yields a 
payoff of 500 Francs with probability of 0.1, a payoff of 100 Francs with probability 
of 0.89 and a payoff of 0 with probability of 0.01. 
 
 
          Alternative (C)                        Alternative (D) 
     
  
 
 100F           0     500F                                     0 
 (0.11)        (0.89)                        (0.1)                                    (0.9) 
 
Alternative C yields a payoff of 100 Francs with probability of 0.11 or a payoff of 0 
with probability of 0.89.  Alternative D yields a payoff of 500 Francs with probability 
of 0.1 or a payoff of 0 with probability 0.9. 
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According to expected utility theory, if a subject prefers A to B, he should also prefer 
C to D.  However, the experiment demonstrated that many subjects preferred A to B 
and D to C, thus contradicting the axiom of transitivity. 
 
As presented in chapter 2.2.2 Kahneman and Tvesrky (1979) synthesised the above 
evidence to develop a new theory: Prospect Theory.  Such a theory was consistent 
with the empirical evidence gathered.  Among the empirically gathered data included 
in the model, an important aspect concerns, for example, the propensity to risk.  In 
several contexts individuals are averse to losing more than the equivalent earnings 
attract them.  According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), for the subjects of the 
experiment the value of a little loss is almost twice as high as the value of an 
equivalent gain. 
 
Moreover, in Prospect Theory the expected utility function is replaced by a value 
function.  The results are weighed with decision-making weights that are a function of 
probabilities but are not probabilities. Outcomes of the choices are assessed by a 
reference point of the status quo.    
 
A further experiment by Starmer and Sugden (1991) where participants were 
presented with two 2 equivalent lottery pairs report that subjects did not view the 
lottery choices as equivalent.  Violations of this type are common.  This design is 
unique in the care that the authors used in controlling for rival behavioural 
motivations.  For example, unlike many studies of individual decision theory by 
psychologists, decisions are financially motivated.  Anomalous decisions of this type 
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may be mitigated somewhat by factors such as experience and increases in payoffs 
(Kagel et al. 1990).   
 
 
 
3.2.4 Experiments on Game Theory 
 
There are strong linkages between experimental economics and game theory.  Several 
authors maintain that the development of experimental methods in economics may be 
attributed to those researchers who have worked on game theory, since the models 
proposed by such a theory can be empirically tested immediately. 
 
A particularly important experiment was the one carried out by Flood (1952). Two 
subjects had to interact in the context which later became known as the prisoner’s 
dilemma.  The participants in the game interacted for many rounds under identical 
conditions and with the same partner.  Results reveal that the subjects selected 
cooperative behaviour instead of the opportunistic behaviour foreseen in the model. 
The experiments also confirmed the game theoretic prediction that the incentives for 
individuals to act in their own interest may in some circumstances make it difficult to 
achieve the gains available from co-operative action. The difference between the 
experimental and the theoretical outcomes was due to the fact that the subjects 
interacted for many rounds.  Such comment emphasised an important aspect on which 
subsequent attention has focused. 
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3.2.5 Ultimatum Bargaining 
 
Initial work on ultimatum bargaining focused on whether real bargainers (in contrast 
the ultimatum game two players must divide a pie (π), which in most instances is a 
sum of money.  The first player, proposes a division in which he or she receives d1 = π 
– x, where x [ ]π,0∈ , and the second player, receives d2 = x. If Player 2 accepts the 
offer, then π is split according to the proposal; if Player 2 rejects the offer neither 
player receives anything.  Denoting the proposed allocation d = (d1, d2), the subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium proposal for the ultimatum game is d = (π –ε, ε).  This 
solution follows from the following three assumptions: The first of these (A1) is that 
each player prefers a payoff of α to β whenever α > β.  Assumption 2 (A2) states both 
players are aware of (A1).  Finally, Assumption 3 (A3) states Player 1 can calculate 
the optimal offer. 
 
Since by A1, Player 2 prefers any positive payoff to a payoff of 0 and player 1 knows 
this by A2, Player 1 can use backward induction (A3) to arrive at the subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium (π –ε, ε). 
 
Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982) pioneered work on ultimatum bargaining 
and discovered unique behaviour from their subjects which violated subgame perfect 
predictions (detailed above).  In the early condition subjects played two rounds of 
ultimatum bargaining separated by one week against different opponents with π from 
DM4 to DM10.  Of the 21 proposals in the 1st round, only two were consistent with 
the game theoretic prediction, and of these only one was accepted.  More than a 
quarter (6 of 21) of player 1’s offered a 50:50 division.  None of these offers were 
rejected.  The second round outcomes were significantly different from the first, 
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though the rejection rate was slightly higher.  Intra-individual ultimatum bargaining 
behaviour was also examined.  Using π = DM7, 37 subjects gave both their demands 
d1 and minimum acceptable offer.  A large number of the subjects, 17, offered more 
than their minimum acceptable offer (d1> Minimum acceptable offer), five offered 
less (d1 < Minimum acceptable offer), and 15 gave offers consistent with their own 
minimum (d1 = Minimum acceptable offer).  Again, the results were inconsistent with 
game theoretic predictions.  Only two subjects demanded nearly all of π for 
themselves and only two were willing to accept very small offers (Minimum 
acceptable offer ≤ DM10).  This evidence implies subjects frequently anchor to what 
they perceive as a “fair” result.  This is further reinforced, as subjects do not hesitate 
to punish opponents for requesting “too much”.  This conclusion from the early 
ultimatum game results stimulated a whole industry of research on bargaining 
behaviour. 
 
Sceptical of the failure of game-theoretic predictions in ultimatum bargaining, 
Binmore et al. (1985) implemented a two-period ultimatum game in which first 
period rejection led to a game in which the size of π was reduced to a δπ in Period 2 
where δ = 0.25.  The authors found that in the second game, in which Player 2 of the 
first game played the role of Pplayer 1, the first period offers were close to 
equilibrium, which in this game is 0.75π, whereas the modal first period offers in the 
first game were around 0.5π.  The authors claimed that the one-period ultimatum 
game is a special and dangerous case from which to draw strong conclusions, and the 
two-period game has the proper virtues needed to truly test the predictive accuracy of 
game theory. 
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Further studies to examine the effect of δ on ultimatum bargaining behaviour have 
been conducted by Güth and Teitz (1987, 1988) and Ochs and Roth (1989) who 
discovered one of the most informative regularities in ultimatum bargaining literature: 
Player 2 rejections are always followed by demands that give player 2 less than he/she 
rejected. 
 
Generically, the early ultimatum bargaining experiments pinned down the following 
conclusions: individuals dislike unfairness; especially, when it is perpetrated against 
them:  subjects offered less when they felt they could do so and get away with it: and 
subjects made disadvantageous counterproposals to avoid being treated unfairly – i.e., 
to avoid getting a substantially lower payoff than their opponent.  Continually Player 
1s attempt to exploit their strategic position when they can, and Player 2s try to avoid 
being exploited, even if doing is economically disadvantageous. 
 
To summarise, experiments have provided economists with pertinent information 
regarding markets, public goods, individual learning and game theory that would 
otherwise be undetected from traditional theoretical models.  In the context of markets, 
experimentation has supported the models postulated by economic theory i.e. 
experimental double auction markets conform to competitive equilibrium predictions.  
Furthermore, competitive allocations are generated in double auction markets under 
extreme structural conditions, and under unusual supply and demand configurations.  
However, experimentation does not always indicate findings that are analogous to 
economic theory.  Experiments on individual decision making under risk illustrated 
that expected utility theory failed to explain the behaviour of individuals when 
confronted with binary decision making options.  Consequently, Kahneman and 
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Tversky (1979) developed a more accurate and powerful theory of this behaviour: 
prospect theory.  In ultimatum bargaining experiments the subgame perfect conditions 
from game theory does not explain the bargaining behaviour of subjects.  This does 
not suggest when experimentation does not concur with theory that the 
experimentation is incorrect.  However, despite these findings experimentation lends 
itself to criticism such as this and much more besides. 
 
 
3.3 Problems with Experiments 
 
Since its inception, experimentation has proven to be a useful instrument in 
examining economic theory.  However, there are of course legitimate reasons for 
avoiding this method of enquiry in specific contexts.  For example, experimentation is 
unlikely to provide information about the values of specific factors outside the 
laboratory, parameters such as the average costs of a firm or an individual’s bequest 
motive.  Ceteris Paribus accurately designed and implemented experiments can 
generate pertinent data to a diverse array of situations.  Although experiments have 
been broadly applied to a variety of experimentation there are a number of 
reservations regarding the use of experiments, which have inhibited its progression.    
These objections can fall into two classes.  The first category stems from the 
perception that the logical status of theory makes experimentation unnecessary.  The 
second class regards misgivings about the way experiments are conducted. 9   
 
 
 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that these views are not necessarily the opinion of the author but rather a generic 
synopsis of concerns raised by economists. 
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3.3.1 Theory is Logically Correct 
 
There is a school of thought that believes experimentation is unnecessary because a 
theory is “correct” as long as it is internally consistent.  However, theories should 
offer more than just mathematical elegance.  Internal consistency is only a first step.  
Economic theories should have some explanatory power as well. 
 
Economic theories are based on two kinds of assumptions, behavioural and structural.  
The principal objective of experimentation is to appraise behavioural assumptions.   If 
humans don’t correspond with the theoretical behavioural presumptions, then the 
theory is incorrect, and it must be altered despite its internal consistency. 
 
For example with reference to the ultimatum bargaining problem described in Section 
3.2.5, the results found in the majority of experiments suggest players fail to conform 
to a sub-game perfect equilibrium as determined by Rubenstein (1985).  Does this 
inherent lack of correlation between experimental and theoretical results correspond 
to the failure of experiments to capture bargaining behaviour or is it indicative of a 
theoretical model failing to prescribe the human element of bargaining?  Should the 
latter be true, then it confers a compelling case for modification of this theory.   
 
Critically, humans cannot be perceived as stupid or foolish if they fail to make the 
decisions predicted by theory, and it is generally undesirable to inform the 
participants how to behave in such instances.  If behavioural suggestions of this type 
are enforced, it degenerates an experimental test of theory into a simulation of theory.  
This is not to denigrate the importance of simulations as an analytic tool.  The 
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objective is to distinguish experimental investigation, an empirical technique, from 
simulation, which is a theoretical device for extending the range of application for 
theories that do not have analytic solutions.  Simulations impose both behavioural and 
structural assumptions on parameterised versions of a model, and then rely on a 
computer algorithm to generate outcomes.  Experiments are a means of evaluating 
human behavioural assumptions. 
 
 
3.3.2 Theory is Normative 
 
In many instances economic theory imposes restrictions on models by specifying 
variables that should not enter the analysis.  Hey (1991) suggests, “consider, the 
typical methodology adopted by economists.  First, an area of study is defined and 
delineated: second, a set of assumptions concerning the “rules of the game” and the 
objective functions of the players are proposed; third, a set of conclusions is deduced 
from these assumptions, usually using mathematical logic.” (Hey, 1991, pg. 7)  
Problems arise when the theory is applied to empirical testing.  Data from an 
“abstracted world” is deemed acceptable to predict events in the real world.  Under 
inspection there would appear a gap between the world of theory and the world of the 
data used to test that theory.  This gap is often bridged by the introduction of 
stochastic variables which represent the additional impact on the dependent variables 
of those factors that were assumed to be constant in the world of the theory, but were 
not in fact constant in the world of the data.  These stochastic variables are typically 
not part of the original economic theory but an ad hoc appendage. 
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 For example this dissertation is concerned with the pervasive influence of sunk costs 
in future investments, which economic theory typically labels “irrational”, and which 
should never enter the decision making strategy of the individual.  The fact is theory 
in certain environments can promote a false view on how individuals actually behave 
in the real world. 
 
 
3.3.3 Laboratories are Unable to Replicate the “Real World” 
 
The third reservation regards the way experiments are conducted.  The world is a 
complicated arena, filled with complex, multi dimensional interactions.  In stark 
contrast, laboratory environments examine human decisions in simple and finite 
surroundings.  How can decisions made under such simple, streamlined conditions 
hope to inform economists of anything useful?  As a consequence there is a 
propensity by some individuals to concede that decisions made under simple, 
streamlined conditions are unlikely to inform economists of anything valuable.  Some 
of the foremost misgivings concern the following. 
 
 
3.3.3.1 Financial Incentives  
 
From a methodological perspective, using financial incentives in experiments has 
been a contentious issue.  Economists conjecture that experiments devoid of financial 
rewards offer the subjects little or no incentive to think hard or to get the “right” 
answer.   The counter argument posited by psychologists is that the subjects’ 
behaviour will not be affected by financial incentives, as “intrinsic motivation is 
Chapter 3: Methodological Issues 
 75
usually high enough to produce steady effort even in the absence of financial 
rewards.”  (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999, pg. 8).     
 
There is agreement among experimentalists that greater financial incentives typically 
reduce the behavioural variance (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).  Grether and Plott 
(1979) replicated Lichtenstein and Slovic’s (1971) experiment on the preference 
reversal phenomenon with and without incentives.  They discovered preference 
reversals were somewhat stronger when financial incentives were used, which 
provoked Falk and Fehr (2003) to state, “at higher stake levels, subjects become more 
focused.” (Falk and Fehr, 2003, pg. 11)  However, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) 
surveyed 74 experiments in which the level of financial incentive varies. They 
concluded that central behaviour was not affected by financial incentives, and in some 
instances financial incentives can “impair” individual behaviour. 10 
 
However, Holt and Laury (2002) found subjects are significantly more risk averse 
when the average earnings in a lottery – choice experiment increased from 
approximately $70 to $230.  In contrast in the context of fairness preferences, 
increases in the stake level have little or no impact in the incidence of fair responses.  
(Cameron, 1999; Slonim and Roth, 1998;and  Fehr and Tougareva, 1995). 
 
It can be concluded that in the domain of games, auctions and risky choices, financial 
incentives fail to significantly alter decision making.  These results reinforce the 
viewpoints of experimental psychologists who believe subjects are intrinsically 
                                                 
10 “In the kinds of tasks economists are most interested in, like trading in markets, bargaining in 
games and choosing among gambles, the overwhelming finding is that increased incentives do not 
change average behavior  substantively.”   (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999, pg. 8)     
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motivated to perform and monetary reward is insignificant.  In fact, incentives can 
hinder subject performance in complex problems or in situations where intuition and 
habit provides the optimal answer and thinking harder makes things worse. 
 
 
3.3.3.2 Learning 
 
This statement is derived from the position that experiments do not offer the subjects 
the opportunity to learn.  Thaler (1986) conjectures there is no reason to believe the 
real world facilitates learning and this can only be considered as accurate when the 
individual receives pertinent feedback.  For example, golfers may consistently “miss” 
putts on a specific side of the hole but they rarely learn and adjust their aim 
accordingly.   Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) showed many repetitive decision making 
tasks do not provide this type of learning opportunity.  Subjects in many contexts 
have displayed overconfidence which is a well-documented decision making failing.  
Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) have shown that in decision making tasks in which the 
decision maker usually succeeds, such as selecting students for admission into a 
highly selective college with a very attractive applicant pool, experience will tend to 
increase confidence regardless of the ability of the decision maker to discriminate 
good from bad applicants.  Therefore, experience does not necessarily lead to learning. 
 
Upon reflection, it should be clear that this reservation is a criticism of economic 
theory as much as it is a criticism of experimentation.  Theories are necessarily 
extremely simplified characterisations of the complicated natural world.  If the 
complications of the natural world are expected to systematically affect outcomes, 
then a more complex theory should be evaluated.  Moreover, this evaluation process 
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should ideally begin, not in the domain of the complex natural world where numerous 
confounding events may impinge on variables of interest, but strictly on the domain of 
the theory, where all structural assumptions can be implemented.  The laboratory is an 
ideal and unique environment for evaluating a theory on its own domain. Of course, 
observation of the theory “working” in the laboratory does not imply that it explains 
behaviour in the natural world.  But the failure of a theory under the “best shot” 
circumstances of the laboratory suggests that the theory is not a good explainer of 
behaviour.  It is perhaps in this role of theory rejection that experimentation is most 
useful. 
 
Importantly, it is not the view of experimentalists that other empirical methods, 
particularly econometrics, are without merit.  Econometrics very usefully allows to be 
evaluated in light of data from the natural world, via the use of a series of auxiliary 
assumptions.  Experimentation allows more direct evaluation of theory in a simplified 
environment, but without the need of auxiliary assumptions. 
 
 
3.3.3.3 Deception  
 
The use of deception in economic experiments has long been regarded as a 
methodological “taboo” amongst researchers.  A definition of deception has proved 
difficult to pin-down.  However, there is agreement amongst most academics that 
premeditated falsification of the purpose of an experiment or any element of it 
constitutes deception.  Hey (1998) conceptualises deception as the following: “There 
is a world of difference between not telling subjects things and telling them the wrong 
things.  The latter is deception, the former is not”   (Hey, 1998, pg. 397).   So why is 
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such an experimental technique treated with so much distain?  Economists conjecture 
two main points of concern over the use of deception.  Firstly, deception will directly 
alter the behaviour of the subjects as subjects who suspect they are being deceived 
will shift their behaviour towards  “second-guessing” what the experimenter is 
actually attempting to elicit from them.  Subjects who have been deceived in the past 
by experiments may expect further deception in future experiments.  (Beins, 1993; 
Christensen, 1977; and Krupat and Garonzik, 1994).  However, Bonetti (1998) argues 
“the mere anticipation of deception does not by itself cause or establish the existence 
of behaviour on the basis of that apprehension.” (Bonetti, 1998, pg. 381)  A series of 
experiments in the spirit of this conjecture how anticipated deception alters behaviour 
in the following experimental settings:  obedience and conformity, attribution and 
social dilemmas.   Within these domains the conclusion is that there are no significant 
deviations away from measured behaviour 
 
The second problem concerning deception is entrenched in population effects.  More 
specifically, the acknowledgement of deception during experimental debriefing 
distorts the population of subjects for later experiments.  Whilst economists have 
openly aired their concerns, the experimental evidence offers little justification for 
this.  West and Gunn (1978) are proponents of this view, finding a non-significant 
increase in the proportion of students over time that are classified as “suspicious” of 
experiments.  Such evidence appears understandable and as a consequence the 
following hypotheses are formulated. Firstly, it is not always necessary to host a 
debriefing session.  So long as experimenters conform to the promise of monetary 
incentives, subjects will not be affected by the absence of feedback.  If no feedback is 
presented, subjects will continue to participate in experiments under no illusion of 
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deception.  Secondly, the concern for distorting future pools of subjects is unlikely as 
the majority of university populations turnover every three years or if using 
postgraduate students, every year.  This rapid turnover would limit contamination of 
deception across subject pools. 
 
In psychology, deception plays a much more prominent role in experimental studies 
and its methodological position within this domain has rarely been challenged.  For 
instance, Kahneman and Tversky’s (1974) study of “anchoring” involves an aspect of 
deception.  Subjects are invited to spin a wheel containing the numbers 1-100 and 
then requested whether this number is greater or smaller than the percentage of 
African countries in the United Nations.  The wheel was manipulated by Kahneman 
and Tversky so that the values 10 or 65 were generated.  The results are widely 
accepted in the domains of social and cognitive sciences as indicative of subjects 
exhibiting anchoring effects and have served as a pre-cursor to a series of experiments 
investigating the effect of anchors (for example: Neale and Bazerman, 1985, 1991; 
and  Diekmann et al. 1996).  If the use of deception in certain contexts is beneficial to 
the experiment, then economists should be prepared to adopt this principle as a tool 
for further investigating human behaviour. 
 
According to Bonetti (1998) deception can “enhance experimental control and ensure 
validity” (Bonetti, 1998, pg. 389).  The justification of this is as follows.  Experiments 
should not offer control to the subjects.  In the same spirit, experiments should not 
instruct subjects how to behave or inform subjects of the experimental hypothesis as 
such a strategy may induce subjects to purposefully confirm or purposefully 
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contradict it.  The selective use of deception can assist the experimenter, so long as 
the deception is plausible to the subject (Walster et al., 1967; and Bonetti 1998) 
 
 
3.3.4 Subject Sophistication 
 
The final reservation regards the subjects typically used in laboratory research.  Even 
if it is desirable to evaluate a theoretical prediction in a very simple environment, the 
critic may contend that the environment is inappropriate because the laboratory 
decision makers are less sophisticated than the decision makers in the relevant natural 
environment. 
 
This is not an objection per se, but rather an objection as to the way economists 
conduct experiments. Recruiting students as subjects is a convenient method as they 
are easy to recruit, have a quick understanding of the rules of the experiment, and 
have rather low opportunity costs.  However, there is no reason to exclude other 
subject pools and certainly if “relevant” professionals behave differently from student 
subjects, then the appropriate subject pool should be composed of relevant 
professionals.  Furthermore, it is possible to elucidate behavioural differences across 
subject pools in a precise way.  Cooper et al. (1999) examined the ratchet effect 
arising from price rate incentives with Chinese students and Chinese middle managers 
as experimental participants. They observed behaviour slowly converged both with 
managers and students towards the pooling equilibrium.  Thus the behavioural 
differences across subject pools vanished over time.  In the early periods of their 
experiments they observed some subject pool differences, however.  If the 
experimental instructions were formulated in an abstract context-free language that 
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was removed from the daily context in which the managers’ decisions took place, 
student behaviour converged more quickly toward the equilibrium than the managers’ 
behaviour.  In contrast, if the instructions made explicit reference to the interactions 
between planners and managers, the managers’ behaviour converged more quickly 
towards the equilibrium.  Fehr and List (2003) recruited CEO’s to study the extent to 
which CEO’s use explicit incentives and how they respond to these incentives.  They 
were particularly interested in the question as to what extent certain kinds of 
incentives are counterproductive and, if so, whether students and CEO’s use such 
counterproductive incentives.  Results indicated differences in the behaviour of 
CEO’s and students.  CEO’s were found to be trustworthier than students.  However, 
both subject pools predominantly used the available explicit incentive, even though 
this had strong negative side effects and decreased their earnings 
 
These examples suggest subject pool differences may be a real issue.  However, the 
studies show that the different subject pools do not behave in fundamentally different 
ways.  After some time students’ and managers’ behaviour was very similar in the 
Cooper et al., (1999) study and similarly Fehr and List (2004) studied subjects and 
managers exhibiting trusting behaviour, which should be absent if all players are 
assumed to be selfish.  In addition both subject pools exhibited a lot of non-selfish, 
reciprocally fair, behaviour.  Thus, although there were some quantitative subject pool 
effects, the qualitative effects of behaviour were rather similar across the different 
pools.   This pattern of behaviour is not exclusive. Traders, for example, tend to 
generate speculative price bubbles, as do college students. (Smith et al. 1988)  
Similarly building contractors are as susceptible to a winner’s curse as college 
students (Dyer et al. 1989) and one group of ecologically conscious environmentalists 
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were observed to free ride in a manner very similar to college students (Mestelman 
and Feeny, 1988) 
 
While the subject pool is a matter that must be addressed on an experiment-by-
experiment basis, it is interesting to note that in a variety of instances where the 
laboratory behaviour of both students and relevant professionals has been examined, 
performance has generally not varied substantially across subject pools.  
 
 In summary there are a number of reasons for not doing experiments.  Although some 
of these claims are not without merit they do not outweigh the critical advantages of 
replication and control allowed by careful experimental investigation.  For these 
reasons, the use of experimentation as a means of evaluating economic theory 
propositions has not only grown but should also continue to grow. 
 
 
3.4 What has been Learned? 
 
What has experimentation told the economic world? Below are key findings from 
experimental literature over the last 40 years.  These findings are taken from 
experiments featured in this chapter.   
 
a) In at least some markets, competitive predictions are remarkably robust.  
Markets organised under double-auction rules generate competitive 
predictions so pervasively that any design that generates deviation is 
publishable.  This finding is illustrated with the double auction market session  
(refer to Section 3.24) 
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b) Institutions matter.  Performance in markets organized under posted-offer 
trading rules, for example, can be markedly different from performance in 
double-auction markets similar in all respects except for the institution.  The 
specification of the institutional rules parallels work in the “new” game 
theoretic industrial organization.  For this reason, there has been a lot of 
interest in experimental work among both game and industrial organization 
theorists.  
c) Some of the predictions of game theory work.  In general, participants appear 
drawn to Nash equilibria when they exist, particularly in static games. 
d) In instances anomalies are observed: the assumptions of those theories just 
seem to fail to work.  This problem is particularly noticeable in individual 
decision-making experiments, as illustrated by results of the Starmer and 
Sugden (1991) experiment.  Such anomalies call for further investigation to 
determine their pervasiveness, as well as for a consideration of alternative 
theories. 
 
Over the last 40 years, experimentalists have cultivated the capacity to exploit the 
control allowed by the laboratory to evaluate economic theory precisely in its own 
domain.  Analogous data is unavailable from the natural world and the importance of 
such data will undoubtedly appreciate in value as the new, institution specific theories 
become more refined. 
 
Naturally, there are anomalies and inconsistencies in laboratory work but this is only 
problematic to the extent that we expect actual behaviour to conform to all of the 
elegance and precision of the theoretical models shown in textbooks and journals. 
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Much of the scepticism surrounding the discipline is unfounded and based around 
false assertions.  Moreover experimentation has taught economists a great deal and 
enhanced their understanding of several microeconomic issues including game theory 
and competitive markets and will certainly continue to play a prominent role in 
contemporary economic analysis. 
 
 
 3.5 The Role of Risk in Experimental Decision Making 
 
Chapter 2 identified sunk costs as a robust phenomenon and the following stylised 
feature of previous sunk cost research is: 
 
At the aggregate level, the sunk cost effect is a widely observed and robust 
phenomenon. 
 
However, what has failed to be identified thus far is why some individuals fail to 
observe the sunk cost effect.  This dissertation hypothesises the sunk cost effect is 
linked to a subject’s attitude to risk.  To support the experiments this dissertation 
encompasses, an attitude to risk model was designed and implemented to examine 
individual’s propensity to risk and how this affects decision-making behaviour. 
 
Decision making can be considered an action and actions are inherently “risky” 
endeavours.  They are “risky” in the sense that the outcome form any given action 
may vary according to the state of nature.  Whether the action is choosing between 
black and red on the roulette table or investing money in a current account or an 
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investment fund it is a salient and ubiquitous feature of everyday life. Furthermore, 
attitudes to risk are central to economic decision-making. 
 
A widely accepted understanding of genetics courtesy of Charles Darwin is that all 
individuals are unique.  This finding can be extended to the individual treatment of 
risk.  As a direct consequence, research into risk, focusing on determinants affecting 
an individual’s attitude to risk and how one measures risk have burgeoned in recent 
years.       
 
The following sections provide a synoptic account of attitudes to risk and how it is 
measured.  This is considered through descriptive theories of risk aversion and 
experimental studies.  Its direct relevance to experimental studies on investment 
decision-making will be studied. 
 
 
 3.6 Propensity to Risk 
 
Classic decision theory describes risk as a function of the variation in the distribution 
of possible outcomes, the associated outcome probabilities and their subjective values, 
with the decision choice entailing risk and expected reward trade-offs (March and 
Shapira, 1987).   In the context of sunk cost accounting in investment decision making, 
the effect of prior outcomes on subsequent choice has been the subject of several 
empirical studies.  The nature of these studies reveals that results are often conflicting.  
For example, prior losses have at times been found to increase risk-taking and at times 
to decrease risk-taking. Thaler and Johnson (1990) reinforce the opinion of most 
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academics that generic risky decisions are not based exclusively on rational 
calculations (Bromiley and Curley, 1992).  Consequently, a stream of research has 
emerged which examines the effects of psychological processes on decision-making.   
The confluence of this research supports the notion that risk taking is a pre-meditated 
endeavour rather than simply situational.   (Jackson et al. 1972; and Plax and 
Rosenfeld, 1976), and on strong evidence for a general propensity for risk taking 
(Jackson et al., 1972) 
 
 
3.7 A Taxonomy of Risk 
 
 
In defining the risk attitude of individuals, economists allocate one of three “labels” to 
characterise risk using the following economic nomenclature:  Risk averse, risk 
neutral and risk seeking.  A risk averse individual prefers to receive the expected 
value of an uncertain alternative for certain rather than the uncertain alternative.  A 
risk neutral individual finds receiving the expected value for certain to be equally 
preferred to the alternative and a risk seeking individual prefers to receive the 
alternative rather than the expected value for certain. 
 
Deriving an agent’s attitude to risk can be calculated using an individual’s utility 
function U(z).  This technique has been the principal method employed by economists 
and the underlying mathematics will be detailed in this section. 
 
Friedman and Savage (1948) conceptualised the term “univariate” risk aversion, 
which alludes to the propensity of individuals when faced with choices of comparable 
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returns to choose the less risky option.  This is emphasised in Figure 3.1 Consider a 
random variable z which can bare on two values, {z1, z2}, and let P be the probability 
that z1 happens and (1-P) the probability that z2 happens. Consequently, expected 
outcome, is: 
 
21 )1()( zPPzzE −+=                                                    (3.1) 
 
This is represented in Figure 3.1 on the horizontal axis as the convex combination of 
z1 and z2.   Intuitively, expected utility is therefore: 
 
)()1()()( 21 zuPzPuuE −+=                                          (3.2) 
 
 This is represented in figure 3.1 by point E on the chord connecting A = {z1, u(z1)} 
and B = {z2, u(z2)}. Naturally, the position of E on the chord depends on the 
probabilities p, (1-P). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Univariate Risk Aversion 
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Focusing on points D and E in Figure 3.1 the concavity of the elementary utility 
function implies that the utility of expected income, u[E(z)] is greater than expected 
utility E(u), i.e. 
 
u[Pz1 + (1-P)z2] > Pu(z1) + (1-P)u(z2)                                      (3.3) 
 
This represents the utility-decreasing aspects of pure risk-bearing. It can be thought of 
in the following way. Two lotteries exist, one that pays E(z) with certainty and 
another that pays z1 or z2 with probabilities (P, 1-P) respectively. Using von 
Neumann-Morgenstern notation, the utility of the first lottery is U(E(z)) = u(E(z)) as 
E(z) is received with certainty; the utility of the second lottery is U(z1, z2; P, 1-P) = 
Pu(z1) + (1-P)u(z2). The expected income in both lotteries is the same, yet it is 
obvious that if an agent is generally averse to risk they would prefer E(z) with 
certainty than E(z) with uncertainty, i.e. they would choose the first lottery over the 
second. This is what is captured in Figure 3.1 as u[E(z)] > E(u). 
 
Another way to capture this effect is by finding the “certainty-equivalent”. Essentially 
consider a third lottery which yields the income C(z) with certainty. As is intuitively 
evident from Figure 3.1, the utility of this allocation equates to the expected utility of 
the random prospect, i.e. u(C(z)) = E(u). Thus, lottery C(z) with certainty is known as 
the certainty-equivalent lottery, i.e. the sure-thing lottery which yields the same utility 
as the random lottery. However, notice that the income C(z) is less than the expected 
income, C(z) < E(z). However, an agent would be indifferent between receiving C(z) 
with certainty and E(z) with uncertainty. This difference, denoted p (z) = E(z) - C(z), 
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is known as the risk-premium, i.e. the maximum amount of income that an agent is 
willing to forego in order to obtain an allocation without risk (Pratt, 1964). 
 
Turning to generalities, letting u: R → R be an elementary utility function, z be a 
random variable with cumulative distribution function Fz, so Fz(x) = P{z ≤ x}. The set 
of all random variables is denoted by M. For a particular random variable z ∈  M, the 
expected z is E(z) = ∫ R x dFz(x) and the expected utility is E(u(z)) = ∫ Ru(x) dFz(x). Let 
Cu(z) denote the certainty-equivalent allocation, i.e. Cu(z) ~h z and the risk premium as 
π u(z) = E(z) - Cu(z) - where the superscript "u" is a reminder that certainty 
equivalence and risk-premium are dependent on the form of the elementary utility 
function. Thus risk propensity can be defined as follows: 
 
Risk-Aversion: an agent is risk-averse if Cu(z)≤  E(z) or π u(z) ≥  0 for all z ∈  M. 
Risk-Neutral: an agent is risk-neutral if Cu(z) = E(z) or π u(z) = 0 for all z ∈  M. 
Risk-Seeking: an agent is risk-seeking (or is "risk-loving") if Cu(z) > E(z) or π u(z) < 0 
for all z ∈  M. 
 
 
3.7.1 Expected Utility Theory 
 
Expected Utility is a normative theory of decision-making relating to how individuals 
should make decisions under uncertainty. It is a simple and elegant explanation that 
enables economists to model risk aversion because the utility function over wealth is 
concave. This diminishing marginal utility of wealth theory of risk aversion is 
psychologically intuitive, and assists the explanation of individuals’ aversion to large 
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scale risk:  Individuals dislike vast uncertainty in lifetime wealth because a pound that 
helps avoid poverty is more valuable than a pound that helps individuals to become 
rich.   
 
This theory also implies that people are approximately risk neutral when stakes are 
small.  Arrow (1971) illustrates that an expected-utility maximiser with a 
differentiable utility function will always want to take a sufficiently small stake in any 
positive expected-value bet.  That is, expected-utility maximisers are arbitrarily close 
to risk-neutral when stakes are arbitrarily small.    This also applies to quite sizeable 
and economically important stakes.  Economists often invoke expected utility theory 
to explain substantial (observed or posited) risk aversion over stakes where the theory 
actually predicts virtual risk neutrality. 
 
Whilst not broadly appreciated, the inability of expected-utility theory to provide a 
plausible account of risk aversion over modest stakes has become oral tradition 
among some subsets of researchers, and has been illustrated in writing in a variety of 
different contexts using standard utility functions.  Rabin (2000) provides a theorem 
that calibrates a relationship between risk attitudes over small and large stakes. The 
theorem illustrates that, within the expected-utility model, anything but virtual risk 
neutrality over modest stakes implies manifestly unrealistic risk aversion over large 
stakes.  As the theorem is exclusively “nonparametric”, it assumes only the utility 
function being concave. The intuition behind the theorem is that within the expected-
utility framework, turning down a modest-stakes gamble implies that the marginal 
utility of money must diminish very quickly for small changes in wealth.  For 
example if an individual rejects a 50-50 lose £10/gain £11 gamble because of 
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diminishing marginal utility, it must be that the individual values the eleventh pound 
above his current wealth by at most (10/11) as much as he valued the tenth-to-last 
pound of his current wealth.  Iterating this observation, taking on the same gamble 
with an increase in wealth, demonstrates a decreasing rate of the value of money.  
Essentially, the theorem is just an algebraic articulation of how implausible it is that 
the consumption value of a pound changes significantly as a function of whether the 
lifetime wealth is £10, £100, or even £1000 higher or lower.  From such observations 
one can conclude that aversion to modest stakes risk has nothing to do with the 
diminishing marginal utility of wealth. 
 
 
3.7.2 Loss Aversion Theory 
 
Loss aversion is a more purposeful and accurate account of modest-scale risk attitude 
and can reconcile substantial risk aversion over modest stakes and non-ridiculous risk 
aversion over large stakes. 
 
Loss aversion is conceptualised by individuals who are significantly more averse to 
losses relative to the status quo than they are attracted to gains, and more generally 
that people’s utilities are determined by changes in wealth rather than absolute levels.  
Preferences incorporating loss aversion can reconcile significant modest scale risk 
aversion with reasonable degree of large-scale risk aversion.  A loss averse person 
may, for instance, turn down one 50/50 lose $100/gain $200 gamble but would surely 
accept one hundred such gambles pooled together. 
 
                     Chapter 3: Attitudes to Risk and Determining Methods 
 92
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), and Benartzi and Thaler (1995) note that an additional 
departure from standard assumption is implicated in many risk attitudes.  Individuals 
tend to assess risky choices in isolation and as a result behave differently than if they 
assessed these risks jointly. One might reject one equal probability lose $100/gain 
$200 gamble on each of 100 days, but accept all these gambles if they are offered at 
the same time. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that a related type of myopia is an 
explanation of the “Equity Premium Puzzle”- the mystery about the curiously large 
premium on return that investors seem to demand as compensation for the risk 
associated with investing in stock.  Such risk aversion can be explained with plausible 
loss aversion preferences- if investors are assumed to assess gain and losses over a 
short run horizon rather than the longer-term horizon for which they are actually 
investing.  This is one example of how recognising that the expected utility model is 
fundamentally flawed and calibration deficiency can lead to the consideration of 
behaviourally realistic alternatives that permit us to improve economic analysis. 
 
 
3.8 Evaluating Risk 
   
Although risk aversion is a fundamental element in standard theories of lottery choice, 
asset valuation, contracts and insurance, experimental research has provided little 
guidance as to how risk aversion should be modelled. This section is in the spirit of 
the above statement.  Principal methods to elicit risk preferences will be examined 
with reference to the results emphasising the diversity of the findings.  
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One such method of evaluating risk preferences is by eliciting the certainty-equivalent 
of a given lottery using open-ended valuation procedures as demonstrated by the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure (Harrison, 1986; and Kachelmeir and Shehata, 
1992). 11   The other method is by observing choices that subjects make over lotteries 
that vary probabilities of winning different prizes (e.g., Binswanger, 1980, 1981).  A 
structured variant of the latter approach devised by Holt and Laury (2002) has been 
the method of choice in contemporary laboratory experiments and involves measuring 
risk aversion through a multiple price listing (MPL). 
 
 
3.8.1 Risk Aversion and Common Ratio Tests of Expected Utility Theory 
 
The most popular test of expected utility theory relies on observed choices by 
individuals over pairs of lotteries.   The first lottery choice is used to infer the subjects 
risk attitude, and the second choice to test expected utility theory, conditional on the 
risk attitude of the subject.  Therefore preferences have to be elicited over two pairs of 
lotteries for there to be a test of Expected Utility Theory at all. 
 
Harrison, et al. (2003) state three problems when confronting subjects to present two 
“real responses” in laboratory settings.  Firstly subjects may incur wealth effects or 
expected wealth effects, when the earnings from one lottery affect the valuations from 
the second lottery.  Secondly, if one choice is selected at random to pay the subject, 
                                                 
11  The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism is a common method for eliciting an 
individual’s willingness to pay for an item.  Under the BDM, an individual reports a bid for an item; 
the items cost is randomly drawn.  If the bid is above the cost, the individual receives the good and 
pays the drawn cost.  If the bid is below the cost, the individual does not receive the good and pays 
nothing. 
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then this assumes independence axiom of Expected Utility Theory is correct.12  If it is 
not, then this random payoff device can generate inconsistent preferences even if the 
underlying preferences are consistent.  Thirdly, there could be order effects, although 
these can be controlled for with sufficient randomisation. 
 
A method developed by Conslik (1989) and Cubitt, et al. (1998) circumvents the 
above problems by imposing subjects to elicit a one choice response, and 
consequently to assume that different subjects have on average the same preference 
structures. However, this does require large subject samples, so that randomisation 
over the characteristics that drive differences in preferences is enough to ensure that 
on average there is no bias in favour of one lottery or another.  This approach nicely 
solves the problem of wealth effects and having to assume the validity of the random 
lottery device. 
 
 
3.8.2 Preference Reversal Choice Tasks 
 
 
Preference reversals are initiated when an individual confronted with choice 
alternatives selects a course of action but subsequently attaches a higher value to the 
rejected option.  Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) provide evidence for the preference 
reversal phenomenon.   Subjects were presented with pairs of gambles, or “bets,” of 
roughly equal expected value.  One of the bets, termed “P-bet,” had a higher 
probability of winning a smaller amount; the other, labeled “$-bet,” had a lower 
                                                 
12 The independence axiom of expected utility theory is a normative account of how individuals 
analyse risky prospects.  For example, an individual weakly prefers risky prospect A over risky 
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probability of winning a larger amount. Subjects selected which bet they would prefer 
to play and were presented sequentially with the bets and invited to determine a price 
on each. They developed three experiments to test the preference reversal.  In 
Experiment 1, subjects determined the minimum price for which they would be 
willing to sell the right to play the bet. In Experiment 2, subjects determined the 
maximum price they would be willing to pay in order to buy the right to play the bet. 
In Experiment 3, the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism was used to elicit prices, 
and subjects played for real money. The authors predicted that when the P-bet was 
chosen, the $-bet would often be priced higher.  Such reversals were termed 
“predicted.” Reversals in which the $-bet is chosen but the P-bet is priced higher were 
termed “unpredicted.” The results conformed to the experimenters’ expectations. In 
Experiment 1: 73% priced the $-bet higher every time they chose the P-bet. 
Unpredicted reversals were uncommon. However; 83% of the subjects never 
exhibited an unpredicted reversal. In Experiment 2, 74 subjects were presented with 
49 pairs of bets. The proportion of predicted reversals was somewhat lower than in 
Experiment 1, and the proportion of unpredicted reversals somewhat higher. In 
Experiment 3, 14 subjects were presented with six pairs of bets. Eleven subjects 
exhibited reversals, and six reversed their preference every time they chose the P-bet. 
Meanwhile, there were few unpredicted reversals. Thus, a significant proportion of 
subjects exhibited reversals, and there was a clear asymmetry in the kind of reversals 
exhibited; predicted reversals were much more common than unpredicted ones.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
prospect B if and only if a p:(1-p) chance of A and C respectively is weakly preferred to a p:(1-p) 
chance of B or C for arbitrary positive probability p and risky prospects A, B, and C. 
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The preference reversal phenomenon has been demonstrated in a number of other 
studies. Lichtenstein and Slovic (1973) replicated the results at a Las Vegas casino, 
where a croupier served as experimenter, professional gamblers served as subjects, 
and winnings and losses were paid in real money. The economists Grether and Plott 
(1979) set out with the explicit intention to “discredit the psychologists’ works as 
applied to economics” (Grether and Plott, 1979, pg. 623), but to their evident surprise 
merely confirmed the original results. Others have demonstrated reversals in different 
cultures, when subjects are more carefully informed, when incentives are increased, 
when expected values of the gambles are negative as well as positive, and when 
diverse elicitation mechanisms are employed. Though some studies succeed in 
decreasing the frequency of reversals (Bostic, et al. 1990), or even eliminating them 
(Chu and Chu, 1990), the phenomenon appears on the whole both common and robust. 
Preference reversals are often considered evidence that expected utility theory is 
descriptively inadequate, and that irrationality is systematic and widespread. 
According to Slovic, et al. (1990), for example, phenomena like preference reversals 
“represent deep and sweeping violations of classical rationality,” and therefore “it 
may not be possible to construct a theory of choice that is both normatively acceptable 
and descriptively adequate” (Slovic, et al., 1990, pg. 26). Some have gone so far as to 
argue that subjects in these studies do not act on the basis of underlying beliefs and 
preferences at all. 
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3.8.3 Multiple Price Listing 
 
The Multiple Price Listing is a relatively simple yet elegant framework for eliciting 
values from a subject.  Its principal application is in the context of eliciting risk 
attitudes: Binswanger (1980) (1981) although it has been utilised in eliciting 
willingness to pay amongst subjects (Kahneman, et al., 1990) and eliciting individual 
discount rates (Harrison, et al., 2002).   In the context of eliciting risk attitudes, it 
confronts the subject with an array of ordered risky choices in a table, two per row, 
and asks the subject in each row to accept one of the risky choices.  The experimenter 
chooses one of the rows at random which will represent the payout to the subject. 
 
There are disadvantages to the MPL.  Firstly, it is restricted to eliciting interval 
responses as opposed to point valuations.  Secondly, the layout of the MPL enables 
subjects to switch back and forth across rows, implying potentially inconsistent 
preferences.  Finally, the MPL could be exposed to framing effects as subjects could 
be drawn to the middle of the table, irrespective of their true values. 
 
Holt and Laury (2002) present subjects with a menu of choices that permits 
measurement of the degree of risk aversion, and also estimation of its functional form.  
In addition the behaviour under real and hypothetical incentives for lotteries ranging 
from several dollars to several hundred dollars is examined.  This study will be 
adopted to illustrate the MPL in an experimental setting. 
 
Each subject is confronted with a choice between two lotteries A or B.  Table 3.1 
displays the basic payoff matrix presented to the subjects.  The first row displays 
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Lottery A offered a 10% chance of receiving $2 and a 90% chance of receiving $1.60.  
The expected value of this lottery is shown in the third-last column as $1.64, although 
the expected value columns were not presented to the subjects.  Similarly, Lottery B 
in the first row has chances of payoffs of $3.85 and $0.10, for an expected value $0.48.  
Thus the two lotteries have a relatively large difference in expected values in this case 
$1.17.  As one proceeds down the matrix, the expected value of both lotteries 
increases, but the expected value of Lottery B becomes greater than the expected 
value of Lottery A. 
 
The logic behind this test for risk aversion is that only risk loving subjects would take 
Lottery B in the first row and only risk averse subjects would take Lottery A in the 
second last row.  The last row is simply a test that the subject understood the 
instructions, and has no relevance for risk aversion at all.  A risk neutral subject 
should switch from choosing A to B when the expected value of each is about the 
same, so a risk neutral subject would choose A for the first 4 rows and B thereafter. 
 
          Lottery A           Lottery B EVA EVB Difference
p($2) p($1.60) p($3.85) p($0.10)  
0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 $1.64 $0.48 $1.17 
0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 $1.68 $0.85 $0.83 
0.3 0.7 0.3 0.7 $1.72 $1.23 $0.49 
0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 $1.76 $1.60 $0.16 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 $1.80 $1.98 -$0.17 
0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 $1.84 $2.35 -$0.51 
0.7 0.3 0.7 0.3 $1.88 $2.73 -$0.84 
0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2 $1.92 $3.10 -$1.18 
0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 $1.96 $3.48 -$1.52 
1.0 0 1.0 0 $2.00 $3.85 -1.85 
 
Table 3.1: Payoff Matrix in the Holt and Laury (2002) Risk Aversion Experiments 
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 These data may be analysed using a variety of statistical models.  Each subject made 
10 responses.  The responses can be reduced to a scalar if one looks at the lowest row 
in Table 3.1 at which the subject “switched” over from Lottery A to Lottery B.  This 
reduces the response to a scalar for each subject and task but a scalar that takes on 
integer values between 0 and 10.  Alternatively, one could study the effects of 
experimental conditions in terms of constant relative risk version (CRRA) and 
constant relative risk aversion characterisation employing an interval regression 
model.  The dependent variable is the CRRA interval that subjects implicitly choose 
when they switch from Lottery A to Lottery B.  For each row of panel A in Table 3.1, 
the implied bounds on the CRRA coefficient can be calculated and are reported by 
Holt and Laury (2002).  These intervals are shown in the final column of Table 3.1.  
Thus, for example, a subject that made five safe choices and then switched to the risky 
alternatives would have revealed a CRRA interval between 0.14 and 0.41, and a 
subject that made seven safe choices would have revealed a CRRA interval between 
0.68 and 0.97 and so on. 
 
Holt and Laury (2002) examined two principal treatments with their subjects. They 
measured the degree of risk aversion over a wide range of payoffs, ranging from 
several dollars to several hundred dollars and compared behaviour under real and 
hypothetical incentives.   
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3.9 Experimental Findings  
 
3.9.1 Experimental Elicitation with Monetary Incentives 
 
A much-debated question at the heart of individual behaviour concerns whether actual 
monetary incentives are necessary to induce truthful preference revelation.  Using 
lottery choice data from a field experiment, Binswanger (1980) evaluated the choices 
of farmers in India among several lotteries of varying risk for both low and very high 
actual rewards.  He concluded that most farmers exhibit a significant amount of risk 
aversion that tends to increase as payoffs are increased. Alternatively, risk aversion 
can be inferred from bidding and pricing tasks.  In auctions, overbidding relative to 
Nash predictions has been attributed to risk aversion by some and to noisy decision 
making-making by others, since the payoff consequences of such overbidding tend to 
be small (Harrison, 1989).  Smith and Walker (1993) assess the effects of noise and 
decision cost by dramatically scaling up auction payoffs.  They find little support for 
the noise hypothesis, reporting that there is an insignificant increase in overbidding in 
private value auctions as payoffs are scaled up by factors of 5, 10, and 20.  Another 
way to infer risk aversion is to elicit buying and/or selling prices for simple lotteries.  
Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) elicited certainty equivalents for a series of lotteries 
and reported a significant increase in risk aversion (or, more precisely, a decrease in 
risk seeking behaviour) as the prize value is increased.  However, they also obtain 
dramatically different results depending on whether the choice task involves buying or 
selling, since subjects tend to put a high selling price on something they “own” and a 
lower buying price on something they do not, which implies risk seeking behaviour in 
one case and risk aversion in the other.  Independent of the method used to elicit a 
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measure of risk aversion, there is widespread belief that the degree of risk aversion 
needed to explain behaviour in low-payoff settings would imply absurd levels of risk 
aversion in high payoff settings.  The upshot of this is that risk aversion effects are 
controversial and often ignored in the laboratory analysis of data.  This general 
approach has caused little concern because most theorists are used to bypassing risk 
aversion issues by assuming the payoffs for a game are already measured as utilities. 
 
  The nature of risk aversion is ultimately an empirical issue, and additional laboratory 
experiments can produce useful evidence that complements field observations by 
providing careful controls of probabilities and payoffs.  However, even many of those 
economists who admit that risk aversion may be important have asserted that decision 
makers should be approximately risk neural for the low payoff decisions (involving 
several pounds) that are typically encountered in the laboratory.  The implication that 
“low” laboratory incentives may be unrealistic and, therefore, not useful in measuring 
attitudes toward “real-world” risks, is echoed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). They 
prescribe the following alternative: 
 
“Experimental studies typically involve contrived gambles for small stakes, 
and a large number of repetitions of very similar problems.  These features 
of laboratory gambling complicate the interpretation of results and restrict 
their generality.  By default, the method of hypothetical choice emerges as 
the simplest procedure by which a large number of theoretical questions can 
be investigated.  The use of the method relies of the assumption that people 
often know how they would behave in actual situations of choice, and on the 
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further situation that the subjects have no special reason to disguise their 
true preferences.”  (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, pg. 265) 
 
Holt and Laury (2002) discovered that at the low payoff level when all prizes were 
below $4, approximately two thirds of the subjects exhibited risk aversion.  With real 
payoffs, risk aversion increased sharply to when payoffs were scaled up by factors of 
20, 50 and 90.  The results were quantitatively similar to that reported by 
Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) and Smith and Walker (1993) in different choice 
environments.  An implication of the findings was that contrary to Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1979) supposition, subjects facing hypothetical choices could not imagine 
how they would actually behave under high incentive conditions.  Moreover these 
differences are not symmetric: subjects typically under estimate the extent to which 
they will avoid risk.  Second the clear evidence for risk aversion even with low stakes 
suggests the potential danger of analysing behaviour under the simplifying 
assumption of risk neutrality. 
 
This procedure has been widely employed in the laboratory (inter alia. Harrison, et al., 
2003).  It has also been employed by some field experiments to indicate experiments 
that use laboratory procedures and commodities with field subjects in an artificial 
setting.  For example Harrison et al. (2004) examine the behaviour of Danish citizens 
confronted with an extension of the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure.  They find 
evidence of risk aversion in general, and considerable heterogeneity associated with 
observable characteristics of the sample. 
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3.9.2 Instantaneous Decision Making Models 
 
A relatively untouched approach for estimating risk aversion examines an 
instantaneous decision for measuring risk.  One of the benefits of utilising this method 
is that it reduces the bias resulting from approximation methods. 
 
Eisenhauer and Ventura (2003) used survey data from the Bank of Italy to estimate 
risk aversion and prudence for a broad cross-section of households.  They asked the 
following question as a means to estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion: 
 
You are offered the opportunity of acquiring a security permitting you 
with the same probabilities, either to gain 10 million Lire or to lose all 
the capital invested.  What is the most you are prepared to pay for this 
security? 
 
However, within this question lies some ambiguity as the 10 million Lire could be 
interpreted as either a gross gain (ignoring the purchase price) or a net gain (gross 
gain minus the purchase price).  This problem was addressed by estimating both the 
gross gain and net gain models and using the upper and lower bounds for each 
parameter. 
 
For the entire sample, the averages for absolute risk aversion ranged from 0.13 to 0.19 
for those with health insurance.  Greater variability was displayed in the poor health 
group ranging from 4.5 to 13.84 due to the wide dispersion of socio-demographic 
groups.  The comparison of relative risk aversion across groups were dominated by 
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differences in income e.g. men exhibited less absolute risk aversion than women, but 
their higher average income gave males greater relative risk aversion. 
 
In absolute terms, the most risk averse groups were those in poor health and those 
with only an elementary school education; conversely the least risk averse were the 
college educated and those with health insurance.  Individuals holding risky assets 
(foreign or domestic stocks, loans or managed savings) displayed less absolute risk 
aversion than those with risky assets. 
 
Movements in prudence appear to track movements in risk aversion quite closely.  
Absolute risk aversion and absolute prudence are found to be decreasing in education, 
financial wealth, tangible wealth and income. Conversely relative risk aversion and 
relative prudence on the other hand are strictly increasing in education, financial 
wealth, income, household size and the holding of risky assets.  
 
In the net gain model the average length of risk aversion and prudence were 
approximately 10%-20% lower than the corresponding value of the gross gain model.  
Otherwise, the patterns observed in the gross model are essentially replicated in the 
net gain model.  
 
Fellner and Maciejovsky (2002) study the relationship between individual risk 
attitudes, as inferred by the procedures of certainty equivalents and lottery choices, 
and market behaviour on an experimental asset market.  As the results of elicitation 
methods are not positively correlated with each other, the two methods yield no 
unambiguous classifications.  Kirchler et al. (2001) report findings of an experimental 
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asset market showing that the higher the degree of risk aversion, the lower the total 
number of contracts concluded, irrespective of the risk elicitation method.  In general, 
the correspondence of certainty equivalents and binary lottery choices was weak, 
however.  Exploring the effect of the binary lottery procedure in an auction, Rietz 
(1993) shows that observed behaviour does not follow the predictions of expected 
utility theory.  Davis and Holt (1993), and Roth (1995) doubt the usefulness of 
individual certainty equivalents as meaningful indicators of individual risk attitude, 
and Selten et al. (1999) call into question the usefulness of the binary lottery 
mechanism to induce risk neutrality. Binary lotteries perform even worse in this 
respect.  El-Sehity et al. (2002) examined (i) the stability of individual risk attitude 
over a time horizon of four weeks and (ii) the correspondence of differential 
experimental risk elicitation methods.  They found that subjects were less inclined to 
engage in risk-seeking behaviour as measured by certainty equivalents but more 
inclined to exhibit risk averse behaviour as measured by lottery choices.  Thus, in 
experiments with delayed or no profits at all an increasing degree of “gambling 
behaviour” can be expected to occur, possibly generating misleading inferences about 
risk preferences if generalised.  Even more fundamentally the results suggest that 
there is almost no correspondence between the two risk elicitation methods of 
certainty equivalents and lottery choices, indicating that different elicitation methods 
yield different risk classifications.  This does not only violate the procedural axiom of 
normative theory, but also questions the general validity of measuring attitudes 
towards the risk.  If so, empirical findings concerning risk behaviour may suffer from 
the shortcoming of being moderated by the method employed. 
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3.10 Conclusion and Links to Experimental Design 
 
Against a backdrop of criticism, experimental economics has provided research with a 
powerful instrument to obtain and discover novel findings about economics that 
would be otherwise unavailable in the natural world such as the double-auction 
trading institution.  Naturally there are anomalies and inconsistencies in laboratory 
work but this is only problematic to the extent that actual behaviour is expected to 
conform to the inelastic framework of theoretical models.  However, much of the 
criticism is unfounded and based around false assertions.  Certainly in individual 
decision making contexts, experimentation has proved to be the instrument of choice 
for academics and the findings have revolutionised investment decision making 
contexts, especially in the sunk cost accounting and entrapment literature.  
 
A potential determinant of evaluating investment behaviour under uncertainty is the 
individual’s ability to govern risk.  This chapter has sought to explain the individual’s 
attitude to risk and how it can be elicited with the aim to integrate an assessment of a 
subject’s risk propensity for the experiments that encompass this dissertation. 
 
The thread of the research demonstrates the absence of a definitive, robust 
methodology to elicit attitudes to risk.   These methods include survey questions that 
aim to elicit a direct measurement of individual attitudes; however, as these are 
hypothetical questions, there is no guarantee hypothetical behaviour will mimic 
natural behaviour.    Other methods include the MPL, which has become the method 
of choice amongst economists for eliciting risk as it provides a definitive segregation 
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of an individual’s attitude to risk. However, even this method can provide 
inconsistencies in eliciting risk. 
 
First and foremost the experiments in this dissertation concern the effects of sunk 
costs upon investment decision making.  Thus it is desirable that subjects are able to 
focus on this principal component of the experiments and not be distracted by time 
consuming attitudes to risk exercises.  Under such a parameter, implementing an MPL 
mechanism would be undesirable for the above reason.  A second parameter is that the 
experiments only require a broad segregation of a subject’s attitude to risk: risk averse 
and “less risk averse”.  If risk is proven to be a heavily impacted variable upon 
investment behaviour then a refinement of the risk attitudes may be necessary but for 
these initial experiments, a broad segregation is adequate.  Following this guideline a 
binary decision making mechanism is suitable.  Not only does it provide a simple A or 
B answer to the question but it also facilitates an elegant approach of incorporating the 
sunk cost for Experiment I into the attitude to risk exercise. 
 
The proposition is to compose a binary decision making problem for subjects where 
they are instructed to invest in one of two oil sites.  They are presented with the 
potential payoffs coupled with the probabilities.  The payoffs and probabilities will be 
manipulated so that the expected return of A is equal to the expected return of B.  
However, the variance of B will be greater than A.  Thus it is hypothesised that risk 
averse individuals will select A and less risk averse subjects will nominate B.  
Whichever option is selected that option will become the sunk cost for subjects in the 
sunk cost group in Experiment I.  It will become the sunk cost because they will be 
informed that the decision they made incurred a loss.  Thus they enter the sunk cost 
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component of the experiment with a prior loss.  Subjects will then be reintroduced to 
the same oil site in the experiment, as it is one of the issues which must be negotiated 
over in the acquisition of the target company. 
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Chapter 4:  
Impact of Sunk Costs on Corporate 
Acquisition Strategies 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In 1998, Blackburn Rovers paid a club record £7.25 million for Kevin Davies.  He 
was considered one of the brightest prospects in English football and a future England 
player.  However, his performances never lived up to the potential. Despite pressure 
from Blackburn Rovers fans and the media for Davies to be dropped, Blackburn 
Rovers relied on their sunk costs and escalated their commitment to the player. They 
included him in the team for much more playing time than his performance justified.  
After 1 goal in 26 appearances Kevin Davies was sold in a part-exchange deal to 
Southampton with Egil Ǿstenstad moving to Blackburn Rovers.  Ǿstenstad performed 
extremely well for Blackburn Rovers guiding them to promotion.  Davies continued 
             Chapter 4: Impact of Sunk Costs on Corporate Acquisition Strategies 
 110
with lacklustre performances for his new team.  Southampton’s decision to exchange 
the player was a poor one.  Why then did it do so?  The answer may focus on the 
transmission of the sunk costs associated with Davies’s transfer fee to Blackburn and 
then through to Southampton. 
 
The literature survey presented in Chapter 2 emphasised the inability of decision 
makers to segregate sunk costs from future investment strategies.  These strategies are 
entrenched in cognitive processes including justification (Festinger, 1957; and Staw, 
1976), risk seeking in the domain of losses (Bazerman, 1984; Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; and Whyte, 1986), loss aversion (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Kahneman, 1992; 
and Tetlock and Boettger, 1994), and anchoring on past data (Neale and Bazerman, 
1991; and Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
 
These studies contribute to the proposition that contrary to economic theory, the sunk 
cost phenomenon as a within person operation is pervasive across human decision-
making. Beyond this operation, the literature has failed to address how individuals are 
affected (if at all!) by the sunk costs of others. For example, in the negotiation of a 
used car, do the vendor’s sunk costs influence the buyer’s offer?  In this context, is the 
heuristic that sunk cost accounting is irrational and should be ignored correct? 
Intuitively, in the negotiation of an asset, if the vendor’s sunk costs were included in 
the purchase price, then such information would be pertinent to the buyer’s valuation 
of the asset. 
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Secondly, in identifying the sunk cost phenomenon, the generic format has been to 
position individuals in a decision making situation where subjects may be influenced 
by sunk costs. Subject behaviour is then observed as the experimenter manipulates the 
situation.  So far, the literature has failed to address how sunk costs are treated when 
individuals have to make several decisions simultaneously.  Does the sunk cost have 
the same impact? If it does is the sunk cost investment “spillover” into the other 
decisions? For example, in the allocation of future drilling expenditure for five oil 
sites subject to a budget constraint, assuming all five produce analogous outputs, if 
one site features a sunk cost, is this sunk cost acknowledged? If so, does this site 
attract a disproportionate share of the budget compared to the other four, i.e. is there a 
“spillover” effect? 
 
Thirdly, the literature examines environments where on average subjects exhibit sunk 
cost accounting.  Whilst the literature has documented evidence, (Heath, 1995; 
Johnstone, 2003) which suggest sunk costs can promote de-escalation, it has not 
examined the effect of one sunk cost on another.  In other words can an unexpected 
sunk cost from one decision affect investment behaviour when encountering further 
sunk costs? 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 are in the spirit of the previous three paragraphs.  They develop three 
experiments that contribute a novel dimension to the current sunk cost accounting 
literature. Chapter 4 develops two experiments which examine (1) the “spillover” 
effect in a multi-issue negotiation context and (2) the transmission of sunk costs 
across bidders in a common value first price-sealed bid auction. The objective of these 
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experiments is to examine how sunk costs affect the bargaining strategy of individuals 
in corporate acquisitions and how third parties react to the sunk costs of others.   
Chapter 5 develops an experiment where unanticipated portfolio sunk costs affect 
trading behaviour in an experimental equity market. 
 
Preceding each experiment will be an account of the experimental decision making 
context.  Thus, in this chapter the study of merger and acquisitions will be discussed 
with reference to the significance of examining sunk costs in such a framework.  This 
is intended to provide the reader with a flavour of the experimental setting and an 
appreciation of the motivations for studying it. 
 
 
4.2 The St Andrews Bargaining Championships 
 
As already emphasised in section 4.1, this chapter is concerned with the reporting of 
two experiments that involve sunk costs in a merger and acquisition process and in a 
first price, sealed bid auction.  These experiments formed the “St Andrews Bargaining 
Championships” (refer to Appendix A, for details of the event).  Subjects were invited 
to participate in an interactive bargaining tournament through email with monetary 
prizes being awarded.  The first round of the competition was the merger and 
acquisition experiment, which for simplicity will be referred to from this point as 
Experiment I and for the same reason, the auction experiment will be coded 
Experiment II.     
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4.3 Experiment I: Multi-isuue Negotiations in Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
4.3.1 The Merger and Acquisition Environment 
 
 
The academic literature surrounding mergers and acquisitions has mushroomed in the 
last ten years to support the rapid expansion of global activity in this domain.   The 
thread of research mainly aims to identify organisational motives for the pursuit of 
such a strategy.  It is widely accepted the underlying key principle of acquiring 
another company is to create shareholder value greater than that of the sum of the 
companies as a separate entity.  Other motivations are concerned with increasing or 
protecting market share, improving shareholder value, deriving cost savings, 
improving economies of scale or generating new cross-selling opportunities. 
 
 
In the current financial environment, characterised by buoyant global equity markets, 
the merger and acquisitions phenomenon indicates no sign of ending.  This is 
surprising given the significant volume of empirical and anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that over half of mergers and acquisitions result in failure and an even greater 
proportion fail to create value. An investigation into merger and acquisitions by 
Mercer Management Consulting in 1997 demonstrated that 48% of mergers 
underperform the norm/average of their industry after three years.  The obvious 
question is why? The literature concerns itself with theoretical descriptions of these 
events but little attention has been focused on the decision makers themselves, i.e. the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO).  Roll (1986) conjectures the decision making of 
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CEO’s could be a key determinant in understanding the significant failure rate of 
mergers and acquisitions. 
 
 
“Economists disregard the evidence on individual decision making because it usually 
has little predictive content for market behaviour.  Corporate takeovers are, I believe, 
one area of research in which this usually valid reaction of economists should be 
abandoned, takeovers reflect individual decisions.”  (Roll, 1986, pg. 1999) 
 
Thus, the motivation for pursuing the role of sunk costs in Mergers and Acquisitions 
is as follows.  CEO decision-making strategies could be subject to psychological 
biases that affect the average individual.   More specifically, these psychological 
biases may promote sunk cost accounting. 
 
CEO tenure has been negatively correlated to poor corporate performance (Parrino, 
1997; and Warner, et al. 1988).   Several studies postulate that CEO’s become 
entrenched during their tenure and a corollary of this is poor corporate performance 
(Morck et al. 1988; and Hill and Phan, 1991).  An alternative theory for the low 
turnover rate is that is takes time to learn about the CEO’s true ability (Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1998).  They believe the variance of expected performance diminishes as the 
board receives signals about the CEO’s real ability.  This is reinforced by Allgood and 
Farrell (2000) who postulate down-side performances are tolerable in the CEO’s early 
tenure, but these become unacceptable later in his/her tenure.  If CEO’s become 
entrenched then it is possible they could fall prey to sunk cost accounting and 
entrapment.  Certainly the anecdotal evidence presented in Chapter 1 supports this 
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notion.13  Thus whilst the principle aim of this experiment is to extend the sunk cost 
literature it could also facilitate the corporate finance literature by documenting the 
influence of sunk costs in CEO decision making.  The intuition is that current CEO’s 
become exposed to sunk cost accounting which generates entrapment and escalation 
of commitment, thus rendering the CEO with a myopic perspective of the firm.   
 
 
4.3.2 Experimental Design 
 
 
This experiment examines an M&A process in the laboratory based on the simplest 
case of sequential decision-making: a sequence of decisions in two successive 
periods.  More specifically decision making in the face of sunk costs. A contextually 
rich scenario is implemented to enhance the verisimilitude of the experiment with the 
aim of facilitating the decision making process as realistic as possible subject to 
experimentation confines.  Many experimental economists believe experiments should 
be designed within a simple framework.  In many contexts such as establishing the 
general presence of sunk cost accounting in a decision making context it is an 
appropriate strategy but what these experiments lack is the verisimilitude of natural 
world experiments. This is one of the principle reasons for experimentation.  
Laboratory results are trivial (at best!) if they cannot be extended beyond this artificial 
environment.   To generate findings that understand how CEO’s behave it is important 
to design an experiment that is compelling to the subject and engages behaviour that 
is as realistic as possible to that of an actual CEO. Therefore, all the experiments in 
this dissertation involve contextually rich scenarios that maintain the necessary 
                                                 
13 For example, the demise of Enron. 
             Chapter 4: Impact of Sunk Costs on Corporate Acquisition Strategies 
 116
control and are engaging investment situations for the subject.  This kind of setting is 
what Hey (1991) believes should be the future of experimentation in economics.  “We 
need to move to more complex decision problems…plunge into the sea of ill-defined 
experiments….  Well-defined experiments constrain economics to operate within the 
straitjacket of well-defined worlds, in which the only admissible reason for 
suboptimal behaviour is poor decision-making ability on the part of economic 
agents”. (Hey, 1991, pg. 228,)    
 
The experiment including all previous and prior communication was conducted 
through an email interface. The experiment was split into two sections (the 
experimental structure is illustrated in table 4.1).    Section 1 involved an attitude to 
risk assessment through a simple binary decision game and in section 2, subjects were 
invited to play the part of a CEO and asked to submit a takeover bid for a rival 
company subject to a budget constraint.14  The bid is a function of five issues:  Share 
Price, R&D (Venture A), R&D (Venture B), Level of Debt and Number of Overseas 
Offices to Close.  One of the issues has a sunk cost attached to it and the aim of the 
experiment was to determine how the sunk cost issue affects the bidding of the other 
issues. Specifically did the sunk cost “spillover” into the other issues?  To address this 
question the bidding behaviour of subjects with sunk costs was compared against a 
group of subjects without sunk costs.  In addition, to establish the impact attitudes to 
                                                 
14 It should be noted that both experiment I and II conform to an auction environment, i.e. there are n 
bidders who are asked to place a value vi and submit a bid bi.  However, the objective of experiment I is 
to examine the nature of sunk costs in a negotiation setting and an M&A context permits this analysis 
whilst maintaining external validity.  The auction and its design is anticipated has no relevance to 
subject behaviour and they’re bid strategy so an analysis of auctions is deemed unnecessary. 
Phillips, Battalio and Kogut (1991) adopt a similar strategy when they address sunk costs in auctions. 
An account of auctions and theory will be presented in experiment II. 
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risk and budget constraint had on bidding behaviour two treatment variables were 
introduced, firstly, assessing subjects’ attitude to risk and secondly varying the 
magnitude of the budget constraint across subjects.  
 
Read Instructions 
Attitude to Risk Assessment Subjects select which investment 
opportunity (A or B) they will invest in 
Merger and Acquisition Round 1 Subjects submit a bid for the target 
company. 
Merger and Acquisition Round 2 Subjects are invited to modify their initial 
bid by one increment +/- in a maximum 
of three issues.  
The winning bidder is paid a payoff which is a non-linear function of the amount bid.  
Table 4.1: Structure of the Merger and Acquisition Experiment 
 
 
4.3.2.1 Attitudes to Risk and the Sunk Cost (Section 1) 
 
Section 1 of the experiment established the sunk cost and provided an estimate of the 
subject’s attitude to risk through an uncomplicated binary decision making game 
(refer to Chapter 3.92 for a detailed description).15  Subjects were endowed with an 
initial amount of money (£100,000) that they could invest in one of two investments 
(A or B) masqueraded as oil drilling sites.  Each site had three possible payoffs and the 
probabilities of these payoffs were displayed (refer to appendix C).  The expected 
return of the two sites is identical but B had a greater variance.   It was therefore 
hypothesised that risk averse subjects would choose A and less risk averse subjects 
would select B.  Although each investment offers the chance for subjects to make a 
profit, the investment outcome is manipulated so that all subjects break even or incur 
a £100,000 loss (net). 
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Measuring the attitude to risk permits the observation of risk effects in decision-
making contexts.  Furthermore, in this design it provides a succinct method of 
incorporating the sunk cost.  As subjects selected their preferred oil site they were also 
initiating their sunk cost.  These two oil sites are manifested as two of the issues in the 
experiment (R&D Venture A, and R&D Venture B). 
 
 
4.3.2.2 Break Even versus Loss Condition (Section 1) 
 
In the binary decision making game subjects were randomly assigned to the break-
even condition i.e. the £100,000 invested in an oil site generated a payoff of £100,000 
or the loss condition: the £100,000 invested generated no return.  In this case subjects 
started the game with £100,000 less. 
 
This treatment was introduced for two reasons:  Firstly, the experiment was concerned 
with searching for a sunk cost effect and therefore a control measure was required of a 
“no sunk cost” group to examine inter-investment behaviour.  Secondly, this 
manipulation permitted examination of how the change in endowment affects 
subjects’ risk taking behaviour during the experiment. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
15 As a robustness test this game was presented to a class of undergraduate economic students.  In a 
sample of 61 subjects, 39 selcted Option  A and the remaining 22 subjects selected  Option B. 
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4.3.2.3 Multi-Issue Negotiations (Section 2) 
 
In this experiment subjects played the role of a CEO in a multinational oil company 
who was considering a takeover bid for a rival company.  Subjects were endowed 
with £500,000.  For subjects who lost the £100,000 from section 1, they started 
section 2 with £400,000 (£500,000 – £100,000).  To negate the opportunity of 
subjects implementing the maximum amount possible across the five issues, subjects 
were informed that they would receive a real payoff which was negatively correlated 
with the price they acquired the company for. Thus, the cheaper the acquisition price 
the greater was the payoff. Secondly, subjects were informed of two rival bidders and 
the least competitive bid of the three from the 1st round of bidding would be 
eliminated and excluded from the 2nd round. In actual fact, subjects were not 
competing against other bidders.  The justification for adopting this rationale was two-
fold.  Firstly eliminating two-thirds of the subject pool after Round 1 would 
significantly reduce the power of Experiment II (in terms of volume of subjects).  
Secondly, it was important to the experimental validity that subjects believed they 
were competing against others because it was hypothesised that this precluded 
subjects from submitting the minimal bid across issues (i.e. the bid that generates the 
maximum payoff). From the subjects’ perspective this scenario was plausible as the 
majority of merger and acquisitions involve competing acquiring companies and the 
object of the experiment is to identify behaviour in such a process.  Furthermore, this 
kind of plausible deception is unlikely to be detected by subjects.  As Bonetti (1998) 
observes: “The typical experimental subject will always attend to cues, information 
and hunches about features of the experimental design. Deception is a way in which 
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the attention of the subjects can be effectively distracted, thus ensuring that the 
behaviour which is measured is more natural and spontaneous and less affected and 
contrived.”  (Bonetti, 1998, pg. 386) 
 
Under each issue, subjects were confronted with ten values from which they must 
select their offer.  In addition a description of each issue was presented and detailed 
the following information.  Figure 4.1 provides an example. 
 
Firstly, the strategy to maximise the subjects’ payoff.  Subjects were made aware of 
the optimal bid that would generate the largest payoff for them.  In all instances this 
was the lowest bid.  Secondly, the average decrease per concession. Subjects knew 
the average payoff decrease for every concession made and thirdly, the lower and 
upper bound limits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Example of information presented to subjects 
 
 
Issue 1: Future R&D expenditure (Tierra del Fuego). Negotiate future R&D 
expenditure for drilling at Tierra del Fuego .  This is the expenditure you will give 
to drilling for oil at this site should you take over the company. 
 
Your aim is to minimise the expenditure. Your payoff decreases on average by 
£2800 
. 
The expenditures start at £1.25 m and increase in £0.5 m increments to £5.75 m. 
You must make an offer on this issue between those amounts. 
 
1.25 m, 1.75 m, 2.25 m, 2.75 m, 3.25 m, 3.75 m, 4.25 m, 4.75 m, 5.25 m, 5.75 m. 
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Subjects were allocated 15 minutes to submit a bid. Unknown to participants   88% of 
all bids were accepted and there was no minimum requirement to proceed to the next 
round.16    A potential strategy would be to offer a high bid to qualify for the second 
round and then decrease the bid so as to incur a greater payoff if the bid is accepted.  
To preclude this behaviour in the second round of bidding, subjects were restricted to 
manipulating a maximum of three of the five issues by one increment plus or minus of 
the initial bid.   
 
 
4.3.3 Experimental Procedure 
 
The experiment was conducted at the University of St Andrews School of Economics 
and Finance. The subjects were 45 (16 female and 29 male) economics undergraduate 
students with a median age of 21 (mean = 20.6, standard deviation =1.1 years).  The 
experiment is a computer-based experiment via an instant messenger email interface.  
Subjects were recruited by offering them the opportunity to participate voluntarily in a 
paid experiment on decisions under risk.  The average time to complete the session 
was 37 minutes. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two treatments: 
Experimental (sunk cost treatment) and Conditional (no sunk cost treatment).   The 
selection of undergraduate economics students was considered (for both the mergers 
and acquisitions experiment and the subsequent auction experiment) an appropriate 
sample for the following reasons: 
 
                                                 
16 88% was chosen to ensure the subject pool was large enough to produce “meaningful” results from 
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1. Their interest and understanding of mergers and acquisitions could be 
expected to be greater than that of the average undergraduate student. 
2. Their knowledge of mergers and acquisitions could be expected to be 
reasonably uniform across the group.  Thus, their behaviour could be expected 
to follow rational economic utility optimisation. 
3. By incorporating performance in the exercise into financial rewards, 
meaningful rewards and punishments could be incorporated into the game. 
4. Their attention and continuous availability was reasonably assured. 
5. Their motivation could be confidently expected on the basis of the engaging 
tasks the subjects were required to carry out and the competitive spirit 
encouraged within the experiments. 
 
 
4.3.4 Competing Hypotheses 
 
 
This section emphasises the theoretical and experimental literature, which serve as a 
forecast for the outcomes of Experiment I. 
  
 
4.3.4.1 The Self-Justification Hypothesis 
 
A major explanation of escalation of commitment derived from cognitive dissonance 
theory is self-justification theory (Staw, 1976).  The self justification hypothesis states 
that individuals stick to a course of action because they feel the need or desire to 
                                                                                                                                            
experiment II. 
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justify or rationalise their initial decision in the face of losses.  “Put simply, people do 
not like to admit that their past decisions were incorrect, what better way to reaffirm 
the correctness of those earlier decisions than by becoming even more committed to 
them.” (Brockner, 1992, pg. 41) 
 
Under the self-justification hypothesis it is conjectured escalation of commitment 
would occur, i.e. increased risk taking following a loss, and it is expected escalation 
of commitment to be most pronounced in the less risk averse sunk cost treatment. 
 
In contrast to the other major proponent of escalation of commitment: prospect theory, 
the self-justification hypothesis predicts variable behaviour in the experimental and 
conditional treatments.  In the case of experimental treatments the investment decision 
is undertaken freely and with the understanding that adverse outcomes are possible.  
Such a condition is favourable to the creation of Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger, 
1957), which according to self-justification hypothesis promotes a preferential 
attachment with the initial decision later on.  In the case of the conditional treatment, 
the investment decision results in no sunk cost being incurred.  Essentially, in the 
conditional treatments there is no decision “to be justified” in later decisions. So in 
these treatments, the motive of self-justification should be absent.  If self-justification 
is the driving force behind escalation of commitment in this experiment, then it is 
projected any tendency towards escalation of commitment will be more pronounced in 
the experimental treatment.   
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Hypothesis 4.1: Self-Justification 
Escalation of commitment should be absent from the no-sunk cost treatment 
 
A direct consequence of escalation and self justification in this experiment would be 
for subjects to commit resources in the sunk cost issue to the extent that the 
surrounding issues are offset to compensate, i.e. the sunk costs of the issue “spillover” 
across the four remaining issues.   
 
Hypothesis 4.2: Self justification 
Self-justification will cause subjects to escalate commitment in the sunk cost issue, 
generating a “spillover” effect across the remaining four issues 
 
 
4.3.4.2 Escalation of Commitment 
 
Thaler and Johnson (1990) argue that a prior loss decreases an individual’s risk taking 
propensity.  There is, however, some evidence, experimental and otherwise, that 
indicates the opposite behaviour.  The psychological literature on escalation of 
commitment (e.g. Staw, 1997) studies repeated (rather than one-shot) decision making 
under uncertainty in the face of negative feedback about prior decisions.  It documents 
the tendency to stick to or even intensify risky courses of action (e.g. investment 
projects) following losses.  Contrary to the evidence in Thaler and Johnson (1990), 
escalation of commitment indicates greater risk taking after a loss than a gain. 
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One major explanation for escalation of commitment is based on the value function 
from prospect theory (e.g. Brockner, 1992).  Consider the case when subjects use the 
wealth they bring to the experiment plus any initial endowment in the experiment as 
the reference point.  In this case, any loss during the experiment will be perceived as a 
loss, not as a reduced gain.  The intuition is that due to the convex shape of the value 
function over losses, following a loss any further losses are not as intense as the initial 
loss and any gains are particularly welcome as they offset some or even all of the 
previous losses. 
 
Result 4.1: If initial wealth serves as a reference point in any decision of the 
sequence, maximisation of the expectation of an S-shaped value function, that is 
strictly convex for losses and strictly concave for gains, implies that risk taking after a 
loss is at least as great as initial risk taking. 
 
 
Hypothesis 4.3: Escalation of Commitment 
A rejected bid in the first period leads to an increase (or no change offer) in the sunk 
cost issue. 
 
4.3.4.3 Expected-Utility Theory 
 
Under expected utility maximisation prior gains and losses can affect risky choice 
because any prior outcome changes current wealth, which in turn determines risk 
aversion.  Increased risk taking following a gain is consistent with expected utility 
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maximisation if the utility function exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion.  
Increased risk taking following a loss is consistent with expected-utility maximisation 
if risk aversion is an increasing function of wealth.  If risk aversion is constant there is 
no prior effect of prior outcomes on risky choice. 
 
Without restrictions on the shape of the utility function, expected-utility maximisation 
is consistent with different kinds of behaviour within a single treatment.  Additional 
restrictions yield sharper predictions.  Suppose the following two modifications of the 
utility function.  Firstly a restriction is imposed so that the utility functions of the 
subjects are “reasonable” in the sense that they represent reasonable preferences over 
large-scale gambles.  Secondly, the utility function is differentiable. These restrictions 
imply subjects should go for maximum risk in every single decision, a point that is 
made forcefully in Rabin (2000).  This result is just an application of the local risk-
neutrality property of expected utility maximisation with a differentiable utility 
function (Arrow, 1971).  Local risk neutrality implies that subjects always take 
maximum risk in “small” gambles. 
 
Whilst the attitude to risk exercise in the experiment ultimately offers subjects a 
scenario of “breaking-even” on their £100,000 investment i.e. no gain can be accrued 
from this exercise in the first round, it should be assumed that only losses can affect 
risky choice in the second part of the experiment.  In this experiment, risky choice 
would be defined as conceding little to the opponent in the negotiation component of 
acquiring the target company.  Therefore a prior loss in the attitude to risk exercise 
changes the current wealth of the subject, which in turn determines risk aversion. 
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Hypothesis 4.4: Under expected utility maximisation, a prior loss outcome in the 
attitude to risk exercise will affect negotiation behaviour in the direction of fewer 
concessions to the subjects’ opponents. 
 
 
4.3.4.4 Prior Outcomes Influencing Risky Choice 
 
There is documented evidence to suggest that risk taking behaviour is a function of 
prior monetary gains or losses.   Demonstrating this behaviour, i.e. how prior gains 
and losses can affect an individual’s willingness to embrace risk, is the example from 
Thaler and Johnson (1990) 
 
1. You have just won $30.  Choose between: 
(a) A 50% chance to gain $9 and a 50% chance to lose $9 (82%) 
(b) No further gain or loss (18%) 
 
2. You have just lost $30.  Choose between: 
(a) A 50% chance to gain $9 and a 50% chance to lose $9 (36%) 
(b) No further gain or loss (64%) 
 
There is a clear influence of prior outcomes on risky choice.  Following a gain, a large 
percentage of subjects are risk-seeking.  The gains “desensitise” the individual to 
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future losses.  Conversely, after a loss the majority of subjects are sensitive to future 
investments of a similar magnitude and are risk averse.  Thaler and Johnson (1990) 
interpret their findings as indicating, “a prior gain can increase subjects’ willingness 
to accept gambles. …  In contrast, prior losses can decrease the willingness to take 
risks.” (Thaler and Johnson, 1990, pg.643-644). 
 
Thaler and Johnson (1990) coded the phenomenon that prior gains fuel risk taking the 
house-money effect.  This precept is so called the house-money effect because it 
captures the tendency of individuals to be more reckless with future bets with money 
they have just won in the casino.   Conversely, prior losses decrease the willingness to 
take risk translates into the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4.5: Increased sensitivity following a loss in the attitude to risk exercise 
propagates small (or zero) concessions in that issue during negotiation. 
  
A loss in the investment decision game leads to a simple hypothesis regarding the 
reference point that may explain such behaviour.  The initial endowment in the 
experiment decreases after the initial loss in the investment decision component.   
Thus subjects in the experimental treatments commence the negotiation component at 
a loss and subsequently positioned in the “loss part” i.e. the convex part of the value 
function.  This part assumes the mathematical function v(x) = -λ(-x)β  for x<0.  λ is a 
loss aversion parameter which is >1 to accentuate the negative aspect of losses.    In 
Experiment I it is conjectured subjects in the experimental treatment adopt this 
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principle and concede little to their opponents in the issue they have just lost money 
in. 
 
 
4.3.4.5 Gender Differences 
 
Recent work in experimental economics as well as in psychology and political 
science, suggests that gender is an important determinant of economic and strategic 
behaviour.  A dominant theme in the literature concerns how men and women behave 
when confronted with “risky” situations.  Women are believed to be more risk averse 
than their male counterparts in investment decision-making, which is illustrated in the 
findings of Jiankoplos and Bernasek (1998) and Grable and Lytton (1998).  A unified 
explanation for these differences in risk has yet to be elucidated but it has been 
postulated that the variation could be a result of genetic makeup, the social 
environment, or an amalgam of the two (Gutter et al. 2003)  
 
A derivative of propensity to risk between males and females is the level of altruism.  
Females in voluntary public goods games demonstrate this behavioural trait.  The 
evidence in the experimental literature suggests women are more un-selfish than men 
in the allocation of resources to a public good (Nowell and Tinkler, 1994; and 
Seguino et al., 1996).  In ultimatum bargaining Eckel and Grossman (2001) find 
women are prepared to offer greater capital and are more likely than men to accept a 
given offer.  Furthermore, Eckel and Grossman (1998) claim men accept lower offers 
from women than they do from men.  Solnick (2001) in contrast finds that players of 
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both sexes demand more from women than from men.  Both studies found that offers 
were lower to women than to men, and that offers from women and men were not 
significantly different. 
 
Other researchers have investigated gender effects in dictator games.17  Eckel and 
Grossman (1998a) found that women give more than men in these games, while 
Bolton and Katok (1995) found no significant difference.  Andreoni and Vesterlund 
(1998) compared gender behaviour in dictator games as the monetary value of the 
tokens was varied between the players.  They found that women gave more overall 
and demonstrated a greater propensity to divide the tokens more evenly despite 
different monetary values while men became less generous as the value of their tokens 
increased relative to the value of the responder’s tokens.  Finally, Eckel and Grossman 
(1996) examined gender differences in a punishment game, where subjects could 
choose to divide evenly a $10 or $12 pie with someone who had previously been 
ungenerous counterparts by choosing to divide the $8 pie. 
 
As Eckel and Grossman (1999) have observed, the findings regarding gender seem to 
be conditional on the level of risk present in the experiment.  In decisions where risk 
is involved, such as the proposer in ultimatum games, there appear to be no systematic 
differences in behaviour across genders.  However, for decisions involving no risk 
such as for dictators or “punishers” women tend to be more generous and socially 
orientated in their behaviour. 
                                                 
17 In the dictator game, one player, the allocator, is given a fixed amount of money to divide between 
himself and another player, the recipient.  The allocator chooses a division, and the money is divided as 
proposed.  This is not a game in a formal sense, but rather an individual decision problem. 
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In the context of corporate takeovers Cadsby and Maynes (2005) find no significant 
systematic tendency of females to tender more shares than males in the equal 
endowment and unequal endowment treatments.  Thus in the context of the 
acquisition experiments designed in this dissertation (Experiments I and II) it is 
predicted there will be no systematic differences in bids across genders. 
 
Hypothesis 4.6: There will be no systematic differences in patterns of behaviour or 
bargaining strategy across genders. 
 
 
4.3.5 Results 
 
Ordinary least squares regression analysis (OLS) is used to perform the statistical 
analysis and is presented in Table 4.2. The regression function is specialised as 
follows: 
 
BIDISSUEi = B0 + β1TREATMENT + β2 GENDER + β3 RISK + εi   (4.1) 
 
The dependent variable BIDISSUEi is the bid submitted in each issue and in both 
periods for every individual.  The three independent variables all contain qualitative 
data regarding the subjects and are hence dummy variables defined as follows: 
The TREATMENT variable is coded 1 if subjects are assigned to experimental 
treatment and 0 if assigned to the conditional treatment. GENDER variable is coded 1 
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for males and 0 for females.  The RISK variable is coded 1 for “less risk averse” 
subjects and 0 for risk averse subjects. 
 
 What is strikingly apparent is the strength of the risk and experimental variables on 
subjects own R&D issue. As expected attitude to risk affected subjects own R&D 
issue, which is the sunk cost issue. Furthermore, the experimental variable had a 
strong affect on subjects own R&D. Risk as an independent variable on subjects own 
R&D, Period1 (t = 3.37, P < 0.01); subjects own R&D, Period 2 (t = 3.27, P < 0.01); 
subjects other R&D Period 1 (t =-3.50, P < 0.01); and subjects other R&D, Period 2 (t 
= -3.83, P < 0.01). The Experimental variable was significant on subjects own R&D,  
Period 1 (t = 2.31, P < 0.05), own R&D, Period2 (t = -2.50, P < 0.05).  In addition, 
subject’s other R&D Period 2 was significantly influenced by the experimental 
variable at the 10% level (t = -1.55, P <0.10).  Gender effects were present in Closure 
of overseas offices issue, Period 1 (t = -2.35, P < 0.05) and in both periods of the debt 
issue (t = 2.16, P < 0.05) and (t = 2.16, P < 0.05).  Manipulation checks confirmed 
none of the independent variables had any effect on the remaining three issues.  In 
contrast to the predicted direction there was no spillover of the sunk cost into the 
other three conditions. 
 
To understand why there is such a strong experimental influence in subject’s own 
sunk costs the subject’s average valuation of every issue for each treatment is 
examined. 
 
 
             Chapter 4: Impact of Sunk Costs on Corporate Acquisition Strategies 
 133
 
 Independent Variables  
 Treatment Gender Risk Adjusted R-
Squared 
Price (1) 0.04 
(0.32) 
0.04 
(0.25) 
-0.04 
(-0.30) 
-0.07 
Price (2) 0.05 
(0.43) 
-0.02 
(-0.14) 
-0.18 
(-1.60) 
-0.01 
R&D Site A (1) 0.02 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.26) 
-0.15 
(-0.66) 
-0.06 
R&D Site A 
(2) 
0.08 
(0.30) 
0.05 
(0.18) 
-0.21 
(-0.81) 
-0.05 
Closure of 
Overseas Offices 
(1) 
-0.31 
(-0.97) 
-0.78 
(-2.35)** 
0.14 
(0.46) 
0.07 
Closure of 
Overseas Offices 
(2) 
0.12 
(0.35) 
-0.41 
(-1.16) 
0.39 
(1.16) 
-0.00 
R&D Site B (1) 0.26 
(1.42) 
0.22 
(1.18) 
0.27 
(1.51) 
0.05 
R&D Site B (2) 0.21 
(0.99) 
0.28 
(1.30) 
0.21 
(1.02) 
0.01 
Debt (1) 0.06 
(0.32) 
0.39 
(2.16)** 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.04 
Debt (2) -0.04 
(-0.25) 
0.40 
(2.16)** 
0.12 
(0.66) 
0.05 
Own R&D (1) 0.52 
(2.31)** 
0.37 
(1.58) 
0.75 
(3.37)*** 
0.26 
Own R&D (2) 0.55 
(2.50)** 
0.30 
(1.28) 
0.72 
(3.28)*** 
0.25 
Other R&D (1) -0.33 
(-1.98) 
0.11 
(0.46) 
-0.74 
(-3.50)*** 
0.21 
Other R&D (2) -0.45 
(-1.55)* 
0.05 
(0.24) 
-0.88 
(-3.83)*** 
0.27 
       
Table 4.2:  Ordinary Least Squares Regression Statistics for Experiment I 
 
Specified as follows:  BIDISSUEi =B0 +  β1TREATMENT + β2 GENDER + β3 RISK + εi 
 
This table displays ordinary least squares regression statistics for the experiment.  The statistics 
are calculated by regressing each of the 5 issues in Period 1 and Period 2 against three 
independent variables, which are dummy variables: gender treatment and risk.  For each 
independent variable, the coefficient, (t-statistic), and significance level is reported coupled with 
the adjusted R Square. 
 
*** = significant at 1% level 
**   = significant at 5% level 
*     = significant at 10% level. 
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Table 4.3 reports the average bid across issues in Periods 1 and 2 for subjects in the 
risk averse experimental treatment. In addition, the percentage increase in the bid 
across periods is also displayed coupled with its t-statistic. Figure 4.2 provides the 
average bids across issues represented as the concession ranking. It is strikingly 
apparent that subjects in their sunk cost issue (R&D, venture A) are prepared to 
concede much less to the vendor.  To recap, a concession ranking of 1 equates to the 
bid that generates the maximum payoff for a given issue, and 10 equals the bid that 
yields the minimum payoff, but is the largest bid.  Thus subjects require a greater 
payoff in this issue to offset the money lost in section 1 of the experiment.   In the 
other four issues, the general strategy is to submit a bid that is approximately around 
the mid-concession point (Concession Ranking 5) and to increase the bid up to 
concession ranking 6 in the second period.  Thus non-significant differences across 
these issues are observed. 
 
 
 R&D 
Venture A 
£(million) 
R&D 
Venture B 
£(million) 
Price/Share 
£ 
Number of 
Overseas Offices 
to Close 
Level of 
Debt 
£(million) 
Period 1 
Mean 
2.32 4.4 
 
1.80 
 
1.50 
 
2.63 
 
Period 2 
Mean 
2.56 
 
4.64 
 
2.00 
 
1.36 
 
2.70 
 
% Increase 9.23 5.52 11.11 -9.52 2.86 
t-statistic 0.92 1.05 1.31 0.35 0.37 
Table 4.3:  Statistics for Risk Averse/Experimental Treatment 
This table displays the mean bid in the experimental treatment across the five issues in Period 1 
and Period 2.  In addition its percentage (in brackets) of the maximum bid possible is illustrated.  
The percentage increase is the mean increase in each issue from Period 1 to Period 2 
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Aggregate Magnitude of Concessions in Risk Averse/ 
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Figure 4.2: Magnitude of Concessions in Risk Averse/Experimental Treatment 
This chart displays the magnitude of concessions of the Risk Averse/Experimental Treatment.  
For each issue, subject’s are confronted with ten concessions of which they must pick one to 
submit their bid.  The Magnitude axis illustrates how much of a concession the subject’s make in 
both periods.  The greater the magnitude the, the greater the concession, and thus the smaller the 
payoff. 
 
The differences in risk averse/conditional treatment are evident.   In this treatment 
subjects broke even on their investment from the attitude to risk exercise. Table 4.4 
reports subjects on average constructed a bid that was approximately the mid ranked 
concession in each issue.  This is certainly in line with theoretic predictions.  Subjects 
have engaged no sunk costs and therefore have no incentive to deviate away from the 
middle concession.  This confirms the findings from Table 4.4, which reports 
differences as significant.  As with the previous treatment, subjects increase their 
concessions from Period 1 to Period 2, which is in line with predictions.   
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 R&D 
Venture A 
£(million) 
R&D 
Venture B 
£(million) 
Price /Share 
£ 
Number of 
Overseas Offices 
to Close 
Level of Debt 
£(million) 
Period 1 
Mean 
3.02 3.91 
 
1.89 
 
1.73 
 
2.55 
 
Period 2 
Mean 
3.25 
 
4.24 
 
2.02 
 
1.18 
 
2.74 
 
% Increase 7.52 8.37 6.73 -50 7.50 
t-statistic 0.75 1.05 1.12 1.44 0.75 
Table 4.4: Statistics for Risk Averse/Condition Treatment 
This table displays the mean bid in the conditional treatment across the five issues in Period 1 
and Period 2.  In addition its percentage (in brackets) of the maximum bid possible is illustrated.  
The percentage increase is the mean increase in each issue from period 1 to period 2. 
 
Aggregate Magnitude of Concessions in Risk Averse/ 
Condition Treatment
0
2
4
6
8
R&D Venture
A
R&D Venture
B
Price Per
Share
Closure of
Divisions
Level of Debt
Issue
M
ag
ni
tu
de
Period 1 Period 2
Figure 4.3: Magnitude of Concessions in Risk Averse/Conditional Treatment 
This chart displays the magnitude of concessions of the Risk Averse/Conditional Treatment.  For 
each issue, subjects are confronted with ten concessions from which they must pick one to submit 
their bid.  The Magnitude axis illustrates how much of a concession the subject’s make in both 
periods.  The greater the magnitude, the greater the concession, and thus the smaller the payoff. 
 
Next consider the “less risk averse”/experimental treatment.    Analogous to the risk 
averse/experimental treatment, subjects “irrationally” concede less in their own sunk 
cost issue (R&D Venture B).    This is in accordance with expectations, i.e. subjects 
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require a greater payoff in this issue to recoup the loss from Section 1 of the 
experiment.  Likewise, with the risk averse/experimental treatment, subjects display 
non-significant deviations away from the mid-ranked concessions across the 
remaining four issues.  
 
 R&D 
Venture 
A £ 
(million) 
R&D 
Venture 
B £ 
(million)
Price per 
Share (£) 
Number of 
Overseas 
Offices to Close 
Level of 
Debt £ 
(million) 
Period 1 
Mean 
3.43 3.25 
 
1.98 
 
1.82 
 
2.58 
 
Period 2 
Mean 
3.75 
 
3.36 
 
2.00 
 
1.64 
 
2.77 
 
% Increase 9.27 3.35 0.92 -10.00 7.45 
t-statistic 0.98 0.37 9.22E-01 0.34 0.64 
Table 4.5: Statistics for “Less Risk Averse”/Experimental Treatment 
This table displays the mean bid in the experimental treatment across the five issues in period 1 
and period 2.  In addition its percentage (in brackets) of the maximum bid possible is illustrated.  
The percentage increase is the mean increase in each issue from period 1 to period 2. 
 
 
Table 4.6 reports the “Less Risk Averse”/Conditional Treatment.  These results are 
analogous to the risk averse/condition treatment.   Subjects submit a bid composed of 
concessions in the range of 4-6 (order of magnitude) across the five issues in 
accordance with theory as zero sunk costs have been initiated.  Magnitude of 
concessions increases across periods. 
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Figure 4.4: Magnitude of Concessions in Less Risk Averse/Experimental Treatment 
This chart displays the magnitude of concessions of the Less Risk Averse/Experimental 
Treatment.  For each issue, subjects are confronted with ten concessions from which they must 
pick one to submit their bid.  The Magnitude axis illustrates how much of a concession the 
subjects make in both periods.  The greater the magnitude the, the greater the concession, and 
thus the smaller the payoff. 
 
 
 R&D 
Venture A 
£ (million) 
R&D 
Venture 
B £ 
(million) 
Price per Share 
(£) 
Number of 
Overseas Offices 
to Close 
Level of Debt 
£ (million) 
Period 1 
Mean 
3.19 3.63 
 
1.80 
 
1.88 
 
2.54 
 
Period 2 
Mean 
3.25 
 
3.88 
 
1.85 
 
1.88 
 
2.67 
 
% Increase 1.96 2.74 2.78 0.00 5.17 
t-statistic 0.19 0.34 0.23 0.00 0.39 
Table 4.6: Statistics for “Less Risk Averse” Conditional Treatment 
This table displays the mean bid in the experimental treatment across the five issues in period 1 
and period 2.  In addition its percentage (in brackets) of the maximum bid possible is illustrated.  
The percentage increase is the mean increase in each issue from period 1 to period 2. 
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Figure 4.5: Magnitude of Concessions in Less Risk Averse/Conditional Treatment 
This chart displays the magnitude of concessions of the Less Risk Averse/Conditional Treatment.  
For each issue, subjects are confronted with ten concessions from which they must pick one to 
submit their bid.  The Magnitude axis illustrates how much of a concession the subjects make in 
both periods.  The greater the magnitude, the greater the concession, and thus, the smaller the 
payoff. 
 
 
 
 
4.3.5.1 Probit Model 
 
To evaluate the effects of independent variables upon concession ranking, a probit 
regression model was developed under the following equation: 
 
BIDISSUEi = B0 + β1TREATMENT + β2 GENDER + β3 RISK + εi            (4.2) 
 
This model incorporated identical independent variables as the ordinary least squares 
model (treatment, gender, risk and a constant error term) but the dependent variable 
which was BIDISSUEi was coded 1 for a bid that was in concession ranking (1-5) and 
a 0 for concession ranking 6-10.  Thus, the results are displayed in Table 4.7.  
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Findings suggest that subject’s own R&D issue in both periods was significantly 
influenced by the experimental variable (whether subjects were consigned to the no 
sunk cost group, or sunk cost group).  For subject’s own R&D, Period 1 (t = 2.24, P < 
0.05) and Period 2 (t = 2.67, P < 0.01). 
 
 Own R&D (1) Own R&D (2) Other R&D (1) Other R&D (2) 
Experimental 0.30 
(2.24)** 
0.37 
(2.67)*** 
0.02 
(1.07) 
-0.03 
(-0.29) 
Gender 0.19 
(1.33) 
0.23 
(1.53) 
-0.04 
(-0.35) 
-0.00 
(-0.04) 
Risk 0.08 
(0.58) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.11 
(-1.14) 
-0.06 
(-0.57) 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.08 0.12 -0.04 0.06 
Table: 4.7: Probit Regression Results  
This table displays probit  statistics for the experiment.  The statistics are calculated by 
regressing each of the 5 issues in period 1 and period 2 against three independent variables, two 
of which are dummy variables: experimental and risk.  For each independent variable, the 
coefficient, (t-statistic), and significance level is reported coupled with the adjusted R Square. 
 
*** = significant at 1% level 
**   = significant at 5% level 
*     = significant at 10% level. 
 
 
4.3.6 Discussion 
 
 
The experiment was designed to address two questions.  In a multiple issue 
negotiation context, do sunk costs from one issue “spillover” into others and if they 
do what factors influence this?  The experiment reports no “spillover” of the sunk cost 
into other issues but what is demonstrated is that subjects base their bid around the 
sunk cost issue by requiring a greater payoff in the sunk cost issue relative to the other 
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four. This strongly depends upon the attitude to risk of the individual and is 
independent of demographic information such as age and gender. 
 
Consistent with expectations, attitude to risk affected individual’s own R&D issue.  
Results show that risk averse subjects committed greater resources to their sunk cost 
issue than the “less risk averse” subjects.  On the face of it this behaviour would 
appear quite irrational.  Subjects were given similar information regarding each of the 
issues.  If the subjects ignored sunk costs, they should have made similar offers across 
all five issues.18  This pattern was only observed in three of them.  Subjects offered 
significantly lower bids in the sunk cost issue, suggesting the subjects were aware of 
the money they had lost in the preliminary game (Section 1) and this subsequently 
influenced their bidding strategy.   
 
The findings of this behaviour make sense in the light of the literature on escalation of 
commitment.  In the experimental treatments where the initial attitude to risk exercise 
is also an initiation of a sunk cost there is strong escalation of commitment by trying 
to acquire the firm with a “non-competitive” bid in the sunk cost issue which equates 
to a small concession to the subject’s opponent.  Furthermore, this escalation is 
reinforced by only a small average increase from Period 1 to Period 2.  In the 
conditional treatments where there is no sunk cost carried over to the negotiation 
stages of the game, there is no escalation of commitment.  
 
                                                 
18 Of course, subjects could display idiosyncratic preferences over one issue.  However, at the 
aggregate level it is hypothesised that these preferences would offset each other. 
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There are different explanations for escalation of commitment.  Most prominent are 
the self-justification hypothesis and framing effects based on prospect theory.  
However, escalation of commitment in this experiment does seem to be driven by the 
desire for self-justification rather than prospect theory. 
 
Although this behaviour can seem irrational it is consistent with self justification 
theory (Rubin and Brockner, 1975; Staw, 1976; and Tegar, 1980).  This theory 
acknowledges the desire of individuals to persevere in a chosen course of action when 
previous expenditures in the chosen decision have not produced the desired outcome.  
This theory is widely accepted and there is much evidence to suggest that it is 
ubiquitous in managerial decision-making (Rubin and Brockner, 1975; Staw, 1976; 
Tegar; 1980, Brockner, 1992; and  Monk, 1999). 
 
4.3.6.1 Alternative Explanations 
 
The results are open to alternative explanations.  Perhaps the behaviour in the 
experimental treatment reflects a belief that a loss in the investment decision game 
signals a “weak investment”.  Thus, when it comes to the negotiating component the 
behaviour is to concede little as they have already lost money in this venture and don’t 
want to bid high in this issue. 
 
Contrary to expectations no “spillover” effect was found across the issues.  There are 
several explanations that could account for this. One is that the sample size was not 
sufficiently large to detect such an effect.   Another could be to analyse the “spillover” 
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effect on issue-issue.  It is not inconceivable that the negative and positive 
“spillovers” cancelled themselves out producing a zero “spillover” effect.  As a 
redesign, the number of issues could be reduced to three, especially eliminating the 
closure of overseas offices issue.  This issue is contextually separate from the other 
four.19 
 
Whilst subjects were explicitly instructed to treat the five issues as components of one 
bid they may have isolated and evaluated each issue independent of the other four.  
This would certainly preclude the event of a “spillover” effect. 
 
 
4.3.6.2 Challenges 
 
The results can be challenged within the following parameters:  Firstly, there was no 
capacity for subjects to learn during the experiment, and secondly the experiment 
lacked the verisimilitude of “real” monetary losses.  
 
Subjects participated in only one sequence of two periods.  They were not given the 
opportunity to become acquainted to the experimental set-up and through trial rounds 
and there was no learning from “prior plays”.  Note that all experimental treatments 
are the same in this respect, but there may still be a concern to what extent behaviour 
in the experiment reflects deliberate choice or just confusion.   
 
                                                 
19 In the sense that the remaining four issues are concerned with monetary valuations. 
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Repetitions were precluded in the design so as to avoid tiring the subjects by asking 
the same (or very similar questions) over and over again.  This means however, that 
the data fails to permit analysis on the question of learning.  However, previous 
experimental work that has used similar set-ups with many repetitions concluded that 
there was non-significant behaviour from “early plays” to “late plays.”    
 
Finally, the experiment does not involve real losses in the sense that it was not 
possible that subjects do not encounter downside risk and thus it was impossible for 
subjects to leave the experiment at a loss.  It is plausible that risk-taking behaviour is 
influenced by whether real losses in this sense are possible. 
 
 
4.3.6.3 Relation to Pre-Existing Evidence 
 
This experiment demonstrates that sunk costs influence decision-making in multi-
issue negotiations and the extent of the escalation depends upon the individual’s 
propensity to risk.  As the statistics illustrate, the results are significant so there is a 
degree of confidence in the validity of results in the context of the experiment.   Using 
negotiations within a corporate acquisition context provides a novel and elegant 
approach to investment decision-making in the face of sunk costs and as a 
consequence there is little literature to directly compare findings.  Fundamentally 
subjects demonstrated sunk cost accounting, a phenomenon frequently documented in 
decision-making literature. So, to that extent subjects in this experiment were well 
calibrated relative to previous findings. 
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The experiment reinforces the entrenchment of CEO’s that fall prey to irrational 
decision-making.  From a policy perspective shareholders and board of directors 
should monitor the CEO and he or she should be made accountable for decisions that 
produce adverse performance.  This is particularly pertinent in the early stages of 
CEO tenure as irrational decision-making that isn’t criticised in the early stages is 
very likely to occur again at a future date.   
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4.4 Experiment II: First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction 
 
4.4.1 Experimental Design 
 
This study examines a simple case of bidding strategy within the framework of a first 
price sealed-bid common-value auction. First it is necessary to establish what an 
auction is.  “An auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining 
resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants.”    
(McAfee and McMillan, 1987, pg. 700).  In this arena a number of potential agents 
compete for a valuable asset. The agents’ bid is a function of public and private 
information about the asset. Potential buyers submit sealed bids and the highest bidder 
is awarded the item for the price he/she bid.  The study of auctions is highly desirable 
for their application to theoretical, empirical and practical work (Klemperer, 1999).  
Auctions provide a platform for the exchange of assets between buyers and sellers in a 
number of contexts. These include the sale of houses, cars, and livestock.  
Governments sell firms for pending privatisation as well as treasury bills and foreign 
exchange currency.  Finally, the release of companies for takeover is conducted by 
auctions.   
 
This study focuses on whether bidders’ strategies and decisions are based on their 
competing bidders’ sunk costs.  Identical to Experiment I, a contextually rich scenario 
to capture external validity was adopted.  Subjects are again invited to play the role of 
a CEO and asked to submit a bid for a rival company based upon information 
provided and a budget constraint.  A synopsis of the stages of the experiment are 
presented in Table 4.8 
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Read Instructions 
Pre-bidding question Subjects are offered the opportunity to 
purchase a more accurate valuation of the 
asset. 
Bid-submission Subjects invited to submit a bid for the 
asset. 
The winning bidder is paid according to the amount bid.  
Table 4.8: Overview of Experiment II 
 
Upon reading the description of the experiment subjects were offered a range estimate 
of what the target company is worth to them.20  Alternatively for £0.5million they 
could purchase a specific point value of what the target firm was worth.   
 
Subjects were made aware prior to bidding whether opposing bidders purchased the 
point valuation or not.  The area of interest is whether the purchase of the point 
valuation (the sunk cost) affects the bidding strategies of the subjects.  Specifically are 
sunk costs transmitted across bidders?  The transmission of sunk costs across 
individuals is an important concept to isolate for the following reasons: It could be a 
pertinent instrument in bargaining and negotiating contexts and in auction strategies if 
an agent is aware of their rivals’ sunk costs.  Symmetrically, it has benefits to the 
seller.   Making the buyer aware of your sunk costs may assist in raising revenue for 
the selling asset.  To address this, bidding behaviour was compared of subjects whose 
opposing bidders had purchased information against those who hadn’t. 
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4.4.1.1 Attitudes to Risk 
 
As all the subjects in Experiment II had participated in Experiment I, the subjects’ 
attitude to risk had already been determined.  Measuring the attitude to risk permitted 
observation of the effects of risk in a bidding context.    However, unlike experiment 
I, the subjects’ budget constraint for bidding was independent of the outcome of the 
attitude to risk exercise. 
 
 
4.4.1.2 Information versus No Information Condition 
 
In this experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to the information condition i.e. 
subjects opposing bidders would all purchase the information (information condition) 
or all reject it (no information condition).  The latter treatment was introduced 
because the experiment intended to examine the presence/absence of a sunk cost 
effect and therefore a control of a “no sunk cost” group to determine whether inter-
investment behaviour was required. 
 
 
4.4.1.3 The Sealed-Bid, First-Price Auction 
 
Subjects were presented with a scenario that positions them as the CEO of a 
multinational groceries company. This company is formulating a bid for the 
subsidiary of a rival company that has recently been forced into liquidation.   Subjects 
                                                                                                                                            
20 For example the company is worth £3.2-3.7 million. 
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were endowed with £5 million and were awarded a payoff, which was negatively 
correlated with the price they acquire the company for i.e. the cheaper the price, the 
greater the payoff.  If they didn’t win the auction they would receive nothing.  
Subjects were provided with information detailing the current ownership of the 
company and its financial uncertainty, hence it being a suitable takeover target 
coupled with a range estimate of  £0.4 million (for example £3.6-£4.0 million) of what 
the company was worth. 21  For an extra £0.5 million they could purchase information 
providing a single point valuation of the company.  It was important that some “less 
risk averse” subjects would perceive the £0.5 million as too costly and not purchase 
but at the same time it was hoped a proportion of the subject pool would invest in the 
information to achieve the broadest spectrum of behavioural findings possible. 
 
Subjects were allocated five minutes to read the information and to declare their 
intentions, i.e. whether they would or would not purchase the information.  Once this 
decision had been reached subjects were notified whether opposing bidders had 
purchased the information.  They were then allocated a further 5 minutes to table a bid.  
There was only one round of bidding. 
 
 
4.4.2 Experimental Procedure 
 
The experiment was conducted at the University of St Andrews School of Economics 
and Finance.  The subjects were 40 male and female undergraduates mostly majoring 
                                                 
21 For the experimental information please refer to appendix B. 
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in economics with an average age of 21.2 (standard deviation of 1.6).  The experiment 
is a computer-based experiment via an instant messenger email interface.  This 
experiment formed the 2nd round of the St Andrews Bargaining Championships.  
Successful students from the first experiment were permitted to compete in 
Experiment II. 
 
 
4.5 Competing Hypothesis 
 
4.5.1 Fundamental Auction Models 
 
 
Auctions assume several guises and the format of an auction is often dependent on the 
composition of the selling asset.  Traditionally an auction will conform to one of the 
following four formats: English auction, Dutch auction, sealed-bid, first-price and 
sealed-bid, second-price.  This experiment adopts a First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction.   
In such an auction the N > 1  (N = number of bidders) bidders submit a sealed bid.  
The asset is awarded to the highest sealed bid and the bidder is requested to pay a 
value equal to the submitted bid. 
 
There are two well-documented models in the auction literature: the independent 
private-value model and the common-value model.  In a private value model, the 
accepted definition is: “each bidder knows how much she values the object for sale, 
but her value is private information to herself.”  (Klemperer, 1999, pg. 233).  The 
common value auction assumes “the actual value is the same for everyone, but 
bidders have different private information about what that value actually 
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is.”(Klemperer, 1999, pg. 233).  The differences in the models represent the 
differences in the bidders’ valuation of an asset.  McAfee and McMillan (1987) 
mathematically illustrate the foregoing statement.  Firstly in the independent private 
value model, a bidder i, i =1, …, n,  will draw his/her valuation vi from a probability 
distribution Fi.  Only the bidder observes his/her valuation vi but all bidders are aware 
of the probability distribution Fi.  All the valuations are statistically independent from 
any other bidder’s valuation.  In the common-value model, the asset will have an 
objective value but bidders are unaware of what this value is and therefore speculate 
on the value.  Take V as the unobserved true value, then bidders’ perceived values vi,  
i =1, …, n, are independent draws from a probability function H(vi׀V).  All bidders are 
aware of the distribution H.   
 
 
4.5.2 Determining the Experimental Model 
 
In order to understand and hypothesise how subjects will behave in the auction 
experiment it is necessary to assign the theoretical model, which most closely 
corresponds to the experimental model.  The central feature of the experiment is the 
absence/presence of asymmetric information across bidders.  As there are two 
manipulations of the experimental design the subjects rival bidders will either (1) all 
purchase the extra information (sunk cost treatment) or (2) will all accept the basic, 
free information (condition treatment).  Therefore, as the subjects’ themselves have 
the option of purchasing the extra information within each manipulation treatment, 
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there are four possible configurations that a subject and his or her competing bidders 
will conform to.  These are illustrated in Table 4.9. 
 
In the spirit of the preceding statements, this experimental auction conforms to the 
common value auction or a derivative of it dependent upon the manipulation observed.  
In Manipulations (1) and (4), the auction will correspond to a pure common value 
auction as all bidders (the subjects and rival bidders) have access to identical 
information. In Manipulation (2), asymmetry of information exists across bidders as 
the subjects have purchased a more precise valuation.  In situations where small 
asymmetries exist between bidders the auction conforms to an almost common value 
model. (Klemperer, 1999)  This model assumes that with n + 1 bidders, n bidders have 
symmetrical information.  Thus, this derivative of the common value auction does not 
extend to an auction where there are n bidders and n-1 bidders have symmetrical 
information.  This situation characterises manipulation number (3).  As such there 
have been no prior explanatory mechanisms to document how one bidder will bid 
when all opponents have an information advantage.  
 
Manipulation Subject’s Option Rival’s Option 
1 Purchase Information Purchase Information 
2 Purchase Information No Purchase 
3 No Purchase Purchase Information 
4 No Purchase No Purchase 
      Table 4.9: Possible Permutations of Treatment Manipulation 
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This section will systematically present theoretical literature on the common value 
and almost common value auctions with a reference to the relation to the experimental 
auction design.  Experiment II is concerned exclusively with buyers’ strategies and as 
a consequence the theory and literature pertaining to selling strategies in auctions will 
be precluded from this dissertation.22 
 
4.5.2.1 The Common Value Auction 
 
The common-value auction involves firms bidding for an item of unknown common 
value.  Since the value of the item is unknown, the winner’s bid can exceed the value 
and thereby lose money.  A corollary of this is what has been described in the 
literature as the winner’s curse.  Originally used to explain offshore oil valuations in 
the 1950’s, it is today frequently used to explain bidders’ behaviour in initial public 
offerings (IPOs).  The winner’s curse occurs if the winners of auctions systematically 
bid above the actual value of the objects and thereby systematically incur losses.  The 
phenomenon has been observed in the bidding for natural resources such as mineral 
rights where the value of the mineral is unknown but each firm has an estimate of the 
value.  In addition observations have been cited in auctions for book publication rights 
(Dessauer, 1981), and professional baseball’s free agency market (Cassing and 
Douglas, 1980; and Blecherman and Camerer, 1998).  Roll (1986), links the winner’s 
curse to takeover attempts in corporate acquisitions, posting decision makers in 
acquiring firms pay too much for their targets on average.  However, due to the 
reliability of field data, economists fail to acknowledge the existence of the winner’s 
curse exclusively upon these observations. 
                                                 
22 For a review on the literature of sellers strategies, refer to McAfee and McMillan (1987) 
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The inherent ambiguity of field data provided the motivation for experimental studies 
of the winner’s curse.  Early experiments confirmed the presence of the winner’s 
curse (Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983; Kagel and Levin, 1986; and Kagel et al., 
1989).  In fact the winner’s curse has been such a pervasive phenomenon in the 
laboratory that most of these initial experiments have focused on its robustness and 
the features of the environment that might attenuate its effects.   
 
Bazerman and Samuelson (1983) present the seminal experimental analysis of the 
winner’s curse.  Using MBA students, subjects were invited to value a series of four 
jars, each containing goods exclusive to that jar.  Unknown to the subjects, each of the 
jars was valued at $8.00.  In addition to the valuation, subjects were requested to 
provide a best estimate of the value of the goods coupled with a 90% confidence 
interval bound around these estimates. 
 
Results exhibited an average value of $5.13 ($2.87 lower than the true value).  In 
contrast the average winning bid was $10.01 ($2.01 greater than the true value).  
Further winning bids were higher than the true value in approximately half of all the 
auctions. 
 
At the individual level, bids were positively related to individual estimates 
conforming to an adverse selection problem.23  Regression analysis of the average 
winning bid generated the result that winning bids were positively and significantly 
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related to the number of bidders in the auction and winning bidders are more 
aggressive than other bidders. 
 
The results explained the winner’s curse could be easily observed in an experimental 
setting.  However, economists have questioned the external validity of the results 
objecting to subjects with no prior experience and no feedback regarding outcome of 
decision. 
 
Kagel and Levin (1986) sought to reconcile these objections by implementing a series 
of auction experiments incorporating feedback regarding outcomes.  Bidders were 
given a cash balance from which losses and profits could be subtracted/added.  In 
contrast to Bazerman and Samuelson (1983), Kagel and Levin (1986) opted to control 
for uncertainty as opposed to observing it.  This was implemented by randomly 
choosing a variable x0, from a distribution of ],[
_
xx
−
. 
 
Under the assumption of symmetric information each bidder observes a private signal 
x which is independently drawn from a distribution over the interval ],[ 00 εε +− xx  
where ε  is a known positive number set by the experimenter.  In a first-price, sealed 
bid auction bids are ranked from highest to lowest with the high bidder paying the 
amount bid and earning profits equal to x0 – b1, where b1 is the highest bid.  Losing 
bidders receive zero. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
23 Adverse selection describes the market process in which bad results occur due to information 
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In this design the strategy of bidding, max ],[
−
− xx ε , is a risk free strategy that fully 
protects the bidder from negative earnings since it is the lower bound estimate of x0  
which was computed for subjects along with an upper bound estimate of x0, 
(min ]).,[
_
xx ε+    Following each auction bidders were provided with the complete set 
of bids, listed from highest to lowest, along with the corresponding signal values, the 
value of x0 and the earnings of the high bidder. 
 
 
 
4.5.2.2 Theoretical Considerations 
 
Wilson (1977) was the first to develop the Nash equilibrium solution for the first-
price common-value auctions and Milgrom and Weber (1982) provide significant 
extensions and generalisations of the Wilson model.  The following analysis is 
restricted to signals over the interval ][
_
_
εε −〉〈+ xxx  where the bulk of the 
observations lie.  Within this region, bidders have no end point information to help in 
calculating the expected value of the item. 
 
For risk neutral bidders the symmetric risk neutral Nash Equilibrium bid function ă(x) 
is given by 
 
     ă(x) = x - ε  + h(x)                                                                                                (4.3) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
asymmetries between buyers and sellers. 
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h(x) = −+ exp[])1(
2[
n
ε ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ )(
2 _
εε xx
n ]                                                             (4.4) 
 
In common value auctions bidders usually win the item when they have the highest or 
one of the highest estimates of value.   
 
oxE[ | X=x1n] to be the expected value of the item conditional on having x1n, the 
highest among n signal values.  For signals in this region: 
 
oxE[ | X=x1n] = ε⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+
−
1
1
n
n                                         (4.5) 
 
This provides a convenient measure of the extent to which bidders suffer from the 
winner’s curse since auctions in which the high signal holder always wins the item, as 
bidding above oxE[ | X=x1n] result in negative expected profit.  Further  with zero 
correlation between bids and signal values, if everyone else bids above oxE[ | X=x1n], 
bidding above oxE[ | X=x1n] results in negative profit as well.  As such, if the high 
signal holder frequently wins the auction, or a reasonably large number of rivals are 
bidding above oxE[ | X=x1n], bidding above oxE[ | X=x1n] is likely to earn negative 
expected profit. 
 
Recall that within this region, (x - ε ) is the smallest possible value for x0, and that x  is 
the unconditional expected value of x0 (the expected value, independent of winning 
the item), so that the expected value conditional on winning must be in-between (x - 
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ε ) and x.  Thus from equation 4.5 it is clear that the amount bids ought to be reduced, 
relative to signal values (the “bid” factor), just to correct for the adverse selection 
effect from winning the auction, is quite large relative to the range of sensible 
corrections ε : with n = 4 the bid factor is 60% of ε  and with n = 75% of ε .  Put 
another way, for signals in the region 2 the risk neutral Nash equilibrium function is 
well approximated by ă(x) = x - ε  (the negative exponential term h(x) in equation 4.4, 
approaches zero rapidly as x moves beyond +
_
x ε ).  Thus the bid factor required just 
to avoid losing money, on average, represents 60% of the total bid factor with n = 4, 
and 75% with n = 7.  Equation 4.5 also makes it is clear that the correction for the 
adverse selection effect is relatively large and increasing with increases in the number 
of bidders. 
 
Strategic considerations account for the rest of the bid factor, 
)1(
2
+n
ε .    The strategic 
element results from the fact that if just correcting for the adverse selection effect, the 
winner would earn zero expected profits, which is not a very attractive outcome.  As 
such, a bidder would find it profitable to lower her bid from this hypothetical 
benchmark (Equation 4.5) since zero expected surplus is lost by doing so even if this 
causes her not to win the item, and strictly positive expected surplus is awarded 
should she win the item with the lower price.  The interplay of these strategic 
considerations between different bidders results in the additional discounting of bids 
relative to signal values beyond equation 4.5.  
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In Manipulation Treatment 4,   (where no subject or rival bidder purchases the point 
estimate information, the auction conforms to a pure common value auction) at the 
aggregate level, subjects should bid higher than the range estimate valuation as they 
observe the winner’s curse: a characteristic feature of common-value auctions. 
 
Hypothesis 4.7: In manipulation (1) and (4), subjects display the winner’s curse in 
the environment of the rejection of the point estimate across all bidders and subjects. 
 
 
 
4.5.2.4 The Almost Common Value Auction 
 
The pure common value auction is a precursor of the almost common value auction 
and has been widely adapted to model small asymmetries across bidders.  Such 
asymmetries may arise in corporate acquisitions when the target company has greater 
synergy with one of the bidders (Klemperer, 1999).  The academic literature has 
demonstrated that these small asymmetries can affect who wins and at what price.  In 
standard ascending auctions for common value objects, small advantages can improve 
the bidder’s probability of winning the auction and simultaneously reduces the price 
he/she pays.  The intuition is giving a bidder a slightly higher value when he/she wins 
makes him/her slightly more aggressive.   This result whilst small, in a common value 
auction has a potentially much larger effect in an almost common value auction.  The 
bidder’s competitors face an increased “winner’s curse”.  The logic follows: the 
bidder’s competitors will have to bid higher to win the auction against aggressive 
bidders, so these bidders will have to bid more conservatively.  Thus, the advantaged 
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bidder has a reduced winner’s curse and can subsequently intensify this bid even 
more, and so on.  This translates to almost a “snowballing” effect for one bidder, as 
what at first is recognised as a minor advantage becomes a distinct strategic advantage 
in an ascending common values auction. 
 
Klemperer (1999) utilises the “Wallet Game” as a benchmark to explore derivatives 
of this in explaining almost common value auctions.  The typical Wallet Game adopts 
an ascending auction framework with two bidders. The following mathematical 
analysis is based upon the analysis described by Klemperer (1999) who demonstrates 
the existence of multiple symmetrical equilibrium points in the game. 
 
There are two students i = 1, 2.  Each student is asked to determine the amount of 
money present in his or her wallet.  They are then invited to participate in an auction, 
where a prize is offered to the higher bidder that equates to the value of the combined 
contents of the wallets. 24   To present the existence of symmetrical equilibria, it is 
important to consider the following stylised facts: 
 
1. Each bidder i is aware of the amount ti of money present in his/her wallet. 
2. The bidders are bidding for a prize of common value, conceptualised by: 
 
v = t1 + t2                                                                (4.6) 
 
                                                 
24 In an ascending auction with two bidders, the higher or winning bid is determined when one of the 
bidders withdraws from the auction. 
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Using this information, students should remain in the auction up to the point price p 
equates to 2ti.  If the opponent adopts the identical strategy then the student who wins 
the auction at price p can determine that the actual value is: 
 
v = t1 + (p/2)                                                     (4.7) 
 
This result is greater than p if p <  2ti and thus, the player obtains positive economic 
rent. In this setting both players’ strategies conform to symmetric functions of the 
signals and thus the strategy exhibits a symmetric equilibrium.25   This is not the only 
symmetric equilibrium, however.   For instance, equilibrium can be established if 
player i remains in the auction up to a price 10ti and player j quits at (10/9)tj .  In this 
framework the actual value player i will receive is: 
 
v= ti + (9p)/10  > p<=>p < 10ti                                                   (4.8) 
 
Conversely, if player j wins at p then:   
v= tj + p/10 > p<=>p < (10/9)tj                                                   (4.9) 
 
In this equilibrium player i will win more often than player j, and at any given price at 
which he/she finds money in player j’s wallet, he/she makes more money than in the 
symmetric equilibrium.  However, player j wins much less frequently and finds less 
money in i’s wallet when he/she does win, so he/she is worse off. 
 
                                                 
25 However, if player i wins the auction and bids a price p above 2ti then this results in i losing money. 
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Klemperer (1999) extends this game to describe auctions when small bidding costs 
are present using anecdotal evidence from the Glaxo-Wellcome merger in 1995. 
 
The exact value of Wellcome was uncertain but was worth approximately the same to 
the six bidders, with the exception of Glaxo who had particular synergies that made 
Wellcome worth more to them.  The situation is characterised by a “variant of the 
wallet game in which one bidder has a small private advantage.”  However, there was 
also the presence of non-trivial bidding costs. 
 
Glaxo bid £9 billion and the response from Wellcome was to invite counteroffers in 
excess of Glaxo’s bid.  Two companies: Zeneca and Roche prepared reported bids of 
£10 billion and £11 billion respectively if they could guarantee winning.  
Unfortunately, neither firm was prepared to participate in an auction that they 
expected to lose.  Thus, Zeneca and Roche declined to bid and Wellcome was sold to 
Glaxo for the initial £9 billion - and shareholders received significantly less than had 
been anticipated. 
 
In the context of Experiment II, the sunk cost, while not an entry cost to the auction, is 
still a cost.  The cost of £0.5 million pounds provides the subject with a more precise 
valuation of the company.  Under the manipulation of (2) from Table 4.9, the subject 
faces an environment with which he/she has an information advantage over his/her 
rivals.  In such a situation, having paid for the information, subjects will submit a bid 
that guarantees them the highest bid.   
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Hypothesis 4.8:  In manipulation (3), subjects will submit a bid that is greater than 
the valuation to justify the competitive advantage they have over their competitors. 
 
 
4.5.2.5 Attitudes to Risk and Bidding Behaviour 
 
Bidding behaviour can be conceptualised as a function of the flow of information 
between bidders and sellers.  More specifically an individual’s bidding propensity is a 
function of the asymmetry of information across bidders.  In fact “asymmetry of 
information is the crucial element of the auction problem” (McAfee and McMillan, 
1987, pg. 704).  This asymmetry of information develops uncertainty in auction 
markets and a bidder’s response to uncertainty is centred around their attitude to risk.  
According to Milgrom (2004) “A bidders’ risk aversion increases bids in a first-price 
auction, because raising one’s bid slightly in a first price auction is analogous to 
buying partial insurance: it reduces the probability of a zero payoff and increases the 
probability of winning, although with a lower profit margin.” (Milgrom, 2004, pg. 
122-123) 
 
 In this experiment under the no sunk cost treatment, (i.e the auction assumes a 
standard first-price sealed-bid common-value auction) risk averse subjects bid higher 
than their valuation to increase the likelihood of winning the auction. 
 
Hypothesis 4.9: Attitudes to risk will promote systematic differences in the valuation 
of the asset.   
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Hypothesis 4.10: Risk averse subjects will submit a bid that is higher than their 
valuation. 
 
 
 
4.5.2.6 Transmission of Sunk Costs 
 
The rationale for investigating the transmission of sunk costs across parties is to 
extend the pervasive within-person analysis of the phenomenon to a “broader” 
interpersonal examination. 
 
Results in this field can almost exclusively be attributed to the work of Diekmann et 
al. (1996) who examine this concept in a property negotiation.  Consequently with 
little experimental and empirical evidence it emphasises the potential to discover 
novel findings pertinent to corporate decision-making.  However, their study did 
confirm the ubiquitous acknowledgement of sunk costs in the domain of transmission 
between buyers and sellers.  Whilst this experiment is concerned with the 
transmission across bidders in a competitive environment, one would expect 
analogous behaviour.  Specifically bidders will be influenced by the sunk costs of 
opposing bidders and will bid in the direction of the sunk costs. 
 
Hypothesis 4.11: Sunk costs of opposing bidders will affect the subject’s offer in the 
direction of these sunk costs. 
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4.5.2.7 Gender Differences 
 
As already described in Section 4.3.4.5, the experimental literature has found 
behavioural variation across genders in previous economics experiments.  However, 
little variation has been obtained involving bargaining and auction experiments, so for 
that reason, there is unlikely to be any systematic variation in patterns of behaviour 
across genders in this experiment. 
 
 
Hypothesis 4.12: There will be no systematic differences in patterns of behaviour or 
bidding strategy cross genders. 
 
 
4.5.3 Results 
 
To examine any significance the independent variables have upon the subject’s 
bidding we implement an ordinary least squares analysis to examine the effects of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable (BID).  The regression equation is 
specified as follows: 
 
BID = B0 + β1 TREATMENT + β2 GENDER + β3 INFORMATION + β4 RISK + β5 VALUATION +εi
           (4.9) 
 
The dependent variable BID in the bid submitted by each subject in the experiment.  
B0 is a constant. Four of the five independent variables are dummy variables and are 
defined as follows: 
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The TREATMENT variable is coded 1 if subjects are assigned to experimental 
treatment and 0 if assigned to the conditional treatment. GENDER variable is coded 1 
for males and 0 for females.  The INFORMATION variable is coded 1 for subjects 
who purchased the point estimate information and 0 for subjects who selected the 
range estimate.   The RISK variable is coded 1 for “less risk averse” subjects and 0 for 
risk averse subjects 
 
The fifth independent variable VALUATION contains information regarding the 
valuation given to the subjects.  In the case of subjects receiving the range valuation, 
i.e. for those subjects in the conditional treatment, the mid-point of the valuation is 
used in the regression equation.  
 
These values of the regression analysis are reported in Table 4.10. What is instantly 
apparent is that the treatment variable is highly significant.  Thus submitted bids are 
influenced by the sunk costs of the subject’s opponents in the direction which 
increases their bid (p = 0.00).  Such a finding confirms hypothesis 4.11. 
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Independent Variable Bid 
Constant 1.60 
(1.85)* 
Treatment 0.00 
(3.92)*** 
Gender 0.36 
(0.93) 
Risk 0.03 
(2.33)** 
Valuation 0.00 
(3.28)*** 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.34 
Table 4.10: Ordinary Least Squares Statistical Analysis for Experiment II 
Defined by: 
BID = β0 + β1 TREATMENT + β2 GENDER + β3 INFORMATION + β4 RISK + β5 VALUATION +εi 
This table displays ordinary least squares regression statistics for Experiment II.  The statistics 
are calculated by regressing the dependent variable-bid against four independent variables, in 
which three are dummy variables: gender, treatment and risk.  For each independent variable, 
the coefficient, (t-statistic), and significance level is reported coupled with the adjusted R Square. 
 
*** = significant at 1% level 
**   = significant at 5% level 
*     = significant at 10% level. 
 
Specifically, the group of subjects in the experimental treatment bid higher than the 
consultancy valuation (18 out of 20).  Such behaviour is consistent firstly with the 
stated hypothesis of 4.10 and secondly with the findings from Diekmann, et al. (1996) 
who observed the transmission of sunk costs between buyers and sellers in a property 
negotiation.   
 
The ordinary least squares regression identifies bidding behaviour was influenced by 
the subject’s attitudes to risk (p = 0.03) which supports the findings of McAfee and 
McMillan (1987).   This accepts the hypothesis that attitudes to risk affect bidding 
behaviour.   
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The valuation variable was “strongly” significant in the bidding behaviour of the 
subjects (p = 0.00) which is not surprising as subjects were given a minimal amount 
of information so it was highly probable subjects would base their bid to a certain 
extent on the valuation provided.  This finding is in the direction of the anchoring 
heuristic which states that: (a) an arbitrarily chosen reference point will significantly 
influence value estimates and (b) value estimates will be insufficiently adjusted away 
from the reference point toward the true value of the object of estimation. 
 
Finally, gender effects had no influence on bidding strategy, analogous to findings 
observed in ultimatum games by Eckel and Grossman (1999) who documented no 
gender effects in games that required subjects to make decisions under risk.  
Conversely, games in which there is no risk they report women to be more socially 
oriented in their actions. 
 
 
4.5.3.1 What Drives the Transmission of Sunk Cost Behaviour? 
 
The regression analysis identified that the experimental variable was strongly 
significant (p = 0.00) and had an effect on bidding behaviour.  To understand how this 
effect arises, the mean valuations across the four treatments (sunk cost treatment/point 
estimation, sunk cost treatment/range estimation, conditional treatment/point 
estimation, conditional treatment/range estimation) are compared against the average 
bids submitted in these treatments.  These values are reported in Table 4.11.  A non-
parametric Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon test provides a statistical measure of whether 
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there are significant differences between the valuation and the bid. 26    The test 
indicates there is a significant difference in the sunk cost/range estimation (p = 0.01).  
This effect is almost mimicked in the sunk cost/point estimation (p = 0.05).  
Therefore, the data implies the difference between bidding and the valuation is driven 
by the sunk costs (the bid is driven in the direction of these sunk costs) of the 
competitors and this effect is not inhibited by the absence/presence of the subjects’ 
individual sunk costs.  This is reinforced by the insignificant values generated from 
the conditional treatments, where the bid approximately replicates the valuation.  In 
fact on average a decrease in the conditional treatments of £0.07 million and £0.05 
million respectively is observed for the conditional/point estimation and the 
conditional/range estimation.  These observations imply that not only is bidding 
behaviour driven by the sunk costs of others but also an increasing bid relative to the 
valuation is exogenously fuelled by the sunk costs of others.  These observations are 
consistent with the findings of Diekmann et al. (1996). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 This test is a “non parametric” test on two independent samples of numerical or ordinal values.  
These do not need to contain the same number of observations, or even refer to the same variable.  It is 
an identity test because it estimates how likely it is that two given sets of numerical (or ordinal) values 
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 MEAN 
VALUATION 
(V)  
MEAN BID 
(B) 
DIFFERENCE  MANN-WHITNEY-
WILCOXON TEST 
SunkCost 
Treatment 
Point Estimation 
£4.09 million £4.26 million £0.17 million (P = 0.05) 
Sunk Cost 
Treatment 
Range Estimation 
£4.07 million £4.33 million £0.26 million (P =0.01) 
Conditional 
Treatment 
Point Estimation 
£4.1 million £4.03 million £-0.07 million (P = 0.40) 
Conditional 
Treatment 
Range Estimation 
£4.1 million £4.05 million £-0.05 million (P = 0.30) 
Table 4.11: Mean Valuations and Bids across Treatments 
 
 
 
4.6 Discussion 
 
This experiment was designed to address two questions: What is the effect of 
interpersonal sunk costs in a bidding process and does this have a stronger effect than 
within person sunk costs when both are present in the decision making process?  It is 
found that submitted bids are driven by an exogenous effect and this effect depends 
strongly on the sunk costs of the subjects’ competitors but it does not depend on the 
sunk costs of the individual. 
 
The analysis of the results suggests subject behaviour on average was irrational.  In 
the experimental condition subjects were informed their opponents had paid for a 
single point estimate of the asset under auction.  Regardless of the subjects own 
                                                                                                                                            
originated from the same distribution.  It is “non parametric” because it makes no assumption whatever 
on the analytic form of this common distribution. 
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information they increase their bid.  In the absence of sunk costs, bidders should have 
made similar offers to the valuations they were given.  In the case of subjects 
accepting the standard range estimate it would be considered “normal” for subjects to 
take the mid range value.  However, in the experimental condition this rationale was 
not adopted as 72% of subjects increased their bids from the valuation given.  Of the 
72% the average increase was £0.27 million, suggesting that the competitors’ sunk 
costs had an influence on the buyers’ behaviour. 
 
Whilst this appears to be irrational to base one’s decisions on another’s sunk costs, it 
can be a strategically rational decision if the other party is in fact influenced by the 
analogous sunk costs.   Whilst the sunk cost of the opposing bidders influenced 
subjects with or without the sunk cost information, the strongest effect was observed 
for the subjects who didn’t buy the information.  Thus, the greater the difference 
between the sunk costs of opponents and the sunk costs of the subjects’, the greater 
the influence of opponents’ sunk costs to the subjects’ bids.   In this instance an 
asymmetry of information exists among the bidders and to offset this psychological 
disadvantage bidders respond by bidding higher than their valuation.  Essentially 
subjects attach greater importance to the sunk costs of their competitors than they do 
to those of their own.  
 
These results make sense in the light of what is known about the asymmetry of 
information in auction markets.  To be specific, asymmetry of information is found to 
influence bidding behaviour by creating uncertainty.  Whilst these results demonstrate 
that attitude to risk had no effect on bidding behaviour, subjects bidding behaviour is 
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influenced by the sunk costs of opponents and they increase their bid in excess of their 
valuation.  
 
 
4.6.1 Alternative Explanations 
 
The results could be subjected to alternative explanations.  The behaviour in the sunk 
cost treatment reflects a belief that the asymmetric information drives subjects to raise 
their bid in a misguided belief to offset the advantage their opponents have with the 
point estimate.  However, this fails to explain the increase in the group that purchased 
the point estimate themselves. 
 
Perhaps the increase in the sunk cost treatment reflects the misunderstanding that the 
strategy of others who are endowed with the point estimate will submit a bid 
approximately that value, i.e. a strong anchoring effect.  Subjects may assume that the 
point estimate will be approximately the mid-point of the range estimation so subjects 
bid in the upper-region of the valuation in the belief that this bid will be the highest. 
 
 
4.6.2 Challenges 
 
The results can be challenged on the following grounds.  Firstly, there was no 
capacity for enhancing investment decision making in the experiment. Secondly, the 
experiment lacked the verisimilitude of real world losses and amounts at stake were 
small. 
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Subjects participated in a single period auction experiment.  They were not given the 
opportunity to become acquainted with the experimental set-up through trial and 
error.  Note that all experimental treatments are the same in this respect, but there may 
still be a concern to what extent behaviour in the experiment reflects deliberate choice 
or just confusion.  Subjects were free to ask questions after they had read the 
instructions and our subject pool consisted of highly educated individuals so it is 
unlikely confusion was a principle driver of the observed behaviour. 
 
Repetition in the design was again avoided as it could promote tiredness and 
imprecise responses from the subject pool.  Furthermore the aim of all the 
experiments conducted in this dissertation is to make them realistic.  Real life 
investment decisions often lack instant and unambiguous feedback on success, which 
makes learning difficult.    
 
The experiment does not involve real losses in the sense that it was not possible that 
subjects would leave the experiment with less money than they brought to the 
experiment.  It is possible that bidding behaviour is influenced by whether real losses 
in this sense are possible.   
 
It could be argued that the attitude to risk exercise is not an appropriate instrument to 
grade an individual’s propensity to risk.  As already discussed, measuring risk has 
become a large area of study not only because of its importance in the discipline of 
economics but equally because previous research based on field and experimental data 
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has not yet been able to provide an unambiguous answer.  For the purpose of this 
experiment and the multi-issue negotiation experiment, a binary decision making 
problem is adequate in defining a broad classification of risk and is simple to elicit 
from the experimenter’s perspective. 
 
 
4.6.3 Relation to Pre-Existing Evidence 
 
The experiment demonstrates that bidding behaviour can be influenced by outside 
parties.  As the statistics show, these results are significant so there is confidence in 
the validity of the results in the context of this experiment.  As this experiment 
represents a new direction of research in sunk cost accounting, there is very little 
documented evidence to compare our results with.  However, in the broadest analysis 
the findings that this experiment has exhibited subjects altering behaviour in the face 
of sunk costs.  Furthermore, non-experimental evidence from actual bidding processes 
suggests that some individuals display a similar pattern of behaviour to subjects in the 
sunk cost treatment. 
 
Sunk costs in a first-price sealed-bid auction is essentially a very simple dynamic 
problem of sunk cost transmission and relates to a previous study by Diekmann et al. 
(1996).  They find strong evidence of the transmission of sunk costs between sellers 
and buyers.  Similarly, that experiment documents a strong transmission of sunk costs 
between buyers. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
 
Sunk cost accounting is not exclusive to within-person experimental designs.  This 
dissertation presents two experiments that illustrate sunk costs transmit across parties 
and have a strong influence on the decision-making strategies of individuals.  
Furthermore subjects are quick to identify sunk costs in discrete settings.   
 
When confronted with a multi-issue negotiation scenario, subjects in the experimental 
treatment identify the sunk cost and make fewer concessions on this to their opponent.  
Furthermore across periods subjects demonstrate a stronger commitment in this issue, 
i.e. subjects are reluctant to modify the concession in the second period.  This 
behaviour of increased risk taking by making fewer concessions in the sunk cost issue 
after a loss in the attitude to risk exercise reflects escalation of commitment (Staw, 
1976).  Thus, subjects irrationally attempting to justify their initial investment, which 
was sunk in the attitude to risk exercise, can explain these results.  This behaviour 
favours self-justification theory.  
 
The break-even treatment as expected displayed no escalation of commitment or no 
self-justification (as there were no prior losses to justify).  The general negotiation 
strategy is to adopt a “middle-of-the-road” approach and submit a bid which is 
approximately making half of the concessions. 
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In the first-price sealed-bid auction subjects assigned to the experimental condition 
exhibit a propensity to be influenced by the sunk costs of competing bidders. In fact, 
subjects attach a greater weight to their opponents’ sunk costs than they do their own, 
driving the bid in the direction of these sunk costs.  This behaviour mimics the 
observations of a previous study on the transmission of sunk costs between bidders 
and sellers (Diekmann et al. 1996).  Furthermore, attitude to risk was identified as a 
significant variable in the formulation of the subjects’ bid.  Specifically, the bid 
increases with greater risk aversion, which is in agreement with the theoretical 
framework of McAfee and McMillan (1987).    
 
The experiments suggest the phenomenon of sunk cost accounting is not exclusive to 
the within person designs as in interactive bargaining and bidding, peripheral sunk 
costs are just as pertinent and salient to future decision making as within-person sunk 
costs.   
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Chapter 5: 
The Disposition Effect in Financial 
Markets 
 
 
“Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent”  
John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters have documented the pervasive nature of sunk costs in 
investment decision-making and its application to corporate acquisitions.  This chapter 
extrapolates the phenomenon and focuses on a similar anomaly to the sunk cost effect 
which is prevalent in financial markets.  This phenomenon has been labelled the 
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Disposition Effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985).  The literature in this field draws upon 
evidence to suggest individual investors exhibit deviating systematic behaviour from 
predictions of rational theory.  
 
The disposition effect describes the phenomenon of selling previously purchased shares 
that have appreciated relative to the purchase price and a reluctance to sell shares that 
have depreciated in price since they were purchased.  Such behaviour violates rational 
behaviour as posited by economic theory. 
 
This dissertation presents an experimental investigation of the disposition effect at the 
aggregate and individual level.  Implementing a modified version of the Weber and 
Camerer (1998) experimental stock market model the study examines whether subjects 
exhibit the disposition effect i.e. the tendency to realise “winning” shares and hold 
“losing” shares. If the disposition effect is present, individuals demographic 
characteristics (such as gender) will be explored to examine if some individuals exhibit 
a greater propensity for this phenomenon than others.  Furthermore a group of subjects 
are exposed to a pre-trading sunk cost to discover whether the sunk cost impacts 
investment behaviour. 
 
The experiment makes several contributions to the existing literature on the behaviour 
of investors (Ritter, 2003) experimental stock markets (Camerer, 1998) and behavioural 
finance (Thaler, 1993). 
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Central to the explanatory theories of the disposition effect is prospect theory  (refer to 
Section 2.2.2).  Chapter 2 discussed how prospect theory predicts outcomes that are 
labelled as gains or losses relative to a reference point, and decision makers are risk-
averse in the gain domain and risk-seeking in the loss domain.  The use of a reference 
point to determine gains and losses will henceforth be called a “reference point effect”.  
The difference in risk attitudes for gains and losses is called a “reflection effect” 
 
Reference point effects have been studied in a variety of economic settings (e.g., Thaler, 
1985 on marketing; and Bowman et al. 1999, in a consumption savings models).  In a 
financial setting the reference point effect explains the disposition to sell winning 
stocks too early and ride losing stocks too long. 
 
Empirical studies demonstrate the disposition effect is present (Odean, 1998).  However, 
a conclusive test of the disposition effect using real market data is usually difficult 
because the investors’ expectations, as well as individual decisions, cannot be 
controlled or easily observed in markets like the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  If an 
effect is found at the aggregate level there are often competing plausible hypotheses to 
explain it.  This paper therefore presents an experimental investigation of the 
disposition effect. 
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The fundamental elegance of this experiment provides a direct test of the disposition 
effect.  Specifically as individual trading accounts can be analysed in equilibrium, the 
prices at which assets are traded is clearly acknowledged. 
 
The analysis strongly confirms the findings of previous studies (Weber and Camerer, 
1998; Odean, 1998; and Grinblatt and Kelohraju, 2001b) that individuals exhibit on 
average the disposition effect.  However, consistent with the hypothesis, the group of 
subjects who faced a pre-trading brokerage fee propagated behaviour on average that 
diminished the disposition effect.  Such behaviour is generated through uncertainty, a 
lack of information and the belief that maintaining the status quo is preferable to the 
synthesis of it.  This behaviour has been widely documented in a different guise as tax 
motivated trading (Stiglitz, (1983); Constantinides, (1984); Ritter, (1988); Poterba and 
Weisbenner, (2001); Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004); and Zoran et al. (2004).  
Furthermore, the disposition effect reduces over time, implying that repeated trading 
experience might ameliorate investors “out of” the disposition effect. 
 
These findings have pertinent implications for further academic research and the 
investment management industry.  First, certain investors are more susceptible to the 
disposition effect than others.  Private client investment firms should adopt a policy of 
informing investors about this phenomenon.  Second, the importance of “tax-free” 
motivated investing is likely to generate the disposition effect so investors should again 
be advised about this event.  The increase in self-investing emphasises the role of 
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government and private organisations in making investors aware of cognitive biases 
which more often than not result in a sub-optimal trading strategy. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Sections 5.2-5.4 review the 
literature pertaining to the disposition effect and cognitive biases associated with the 
phenomenon.  Section 5.5 details the experimental design, Section 5.6 highlights the 
competing hypotheses, Section 5.7 presents the experimental findings and statistical 
analysis and Section 5.8 concludes with a discussion and competing explanations. 
 
 
5.2 Related Literature 
 
The term “disposition effect” was coined by Shefrin and Statman (1985) to describe the 
tendency to “sell winners too early and ride losers too long” (Shefrin and Statman, 
1985, pg. 778) relative to a normative theory of investment behaviour.  As they 
acknowledge, the disposition effect is part of the “general folklore about investing” 
(Shefrin and Statman, 1985, pg. 778).  Furthermore there is strong empirical evidence 
in favour of the disposition effect. 
 
The early empirical literature on the disposition effect looks at consequences of the 
disposition effect in aggregate data.  Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) find that current 
trading volume is positively correlated with past price changes in line with the 
disposition effect.  Ferris, Haugen and Makhija (1988) demonstrate for small stocks 
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that contemporary volume can be predicted with historic volume at differential price 
levels.  If there was high volume at higher than current prices in the past i.e. there are 
many investors sitting on a loss, current volume is low.  The opposite is true if there 
was high volume at lower prices in the past. 
 
These studies are important because they suggest that the disposition effect may not be 
exclusive as an aggregate level phenomenon but also for the existence of the disposition 
effect since there are many competing explanations for the price-volume relationship.  
One alternative explanation is that investors re-balance their portfolios so as to keep the 
weights on each individual asset constant across time, which would be optimal under 
the assumption of expected utility maximisation with constant relative risk aversion and 
normal log-returns.  Such behaviour implies the selling of stocks with returns above the 
portfolio average and the purchase of stocks with returns below average. 
 
To be able to distinguish among alternative explanations of behaviour the more recent 
studies use disaggregate data.  Odean (1998) demonstrates on average investors sell 
winners more readily than losers using data on individual discount brokerage accounts.  
Investors realise 15 percent of their gains and only 10 percent of their losses. 27  
Moreover, Odean (1998) shows that this behaviour is not justified by subsequent 
portfolio performance, which makes it difficult (though not impossible) to argue that 
the preference for realising gains rather than losses is in accordance with some 
                                                 
27 Realised Gains = Shares sold at a price greater than the purchase price/ Shares sold at a price greater 
than the purchase price + Shares kept which are trading at a price greater than the purchase price. 
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normative theory of investor behaviour.  Similarly, Heisler (1994) documents the 
disposition effect for a sample of small Treasury futures speculators on the Chicago 
Board of Trade.   
 
Psychological biases are not exclusive to the “part-time” investor.  There is strong 
evidence that “professionalism” or investor sophistication does not bring immunity. For 
instance, Coval and Shumway (2005) analyse the trades of Chicago Board of Trade 
professional market makers. They discover traders with losing mornings (a) place more 
trades, (b) place trades with larger average size and (c) assume greater total dollar risk 
than those with profitable mornings. However, Shapira and Venezia (2000) find that 
while the disposition effect is pervasive it is significantly weaker among professional 
investors than among amateurs in Israel, where stock market gains are tax-free. They 
support the conclusion that greater investor sophistication is associated with less 
susceptibility to the disposition effect. Locke and Mann (2005) review the trading 
behaviour of professional futures traders and find that while all traders hold losers 
longer than winners, the least successful traders hold losses the longest, while the most 
successful traders hold losses for the shortest time.   
 
Notwithstanding that both ostensibly sophisticated and unsophisticated investors 
display varying susceptibility to the disposition effect in general, there is evidence that 
investors override their biases in cases where the benefits of doing so are salient, such 
as when tax payable may be minimised. Tax-paying investors may minimise tax 
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payable by postponing stock sales into future tax periods and realise capital losses by 
selling shares to shield other taxable income (Bremer and Kato, 1996). In line with this 
proposition, Odean (1998) finds that although investors realise a greater proportion of 
gains than losses for every month of the year, the highest proportion of losses realised 
is observed in December (the US fiscal year-end). Importantly, this remains true over 
different time periods and across different groups of traders based on trade frequency. 
Given that trade frequency is correlated with investor sophistication, Odean’s (1998) 
findings indicate the benefits of tax minimisation are salient to all investors. 
 
Weber and Camerer (1998) find evidence for the disposition effect in an experimental 
asset market.  They have participants in an experiment trade risky assets at exogenously 
determined prices.  Even though participants are correctly informed that the price 
process for each risky asset has a fixed trend, and that price changes are independent 
across time and assets, participants on average prefer to sell winners rather than losers. 
 
A competing explanation of the disposition effect is the momentum effect.  Momentum 
traders condition themselves on past prices. Specifically investors will purchase assets 
that have been “winning” assets and sell assets that have been “losers” in the past.  
Empirical research has produced evidence of unconditional positive autocorrelation of 
(excess) returns over horizons between 3-12 months.  Cutler Poterba, and Summers 
(1990) find momentum in excess returns stock, bonds, foreign exchange, and real estate 
markets.  There is also a large literature on positive serial correlation on cross sections 
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of individual stocks (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993 for the U.S.A and Rowenhurst 
1998 for Europe). 
 
Fama and French (1996) remark that the momentum findings of Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) constitute the “main embarrassment” (Fama and French, 1996, pg. 81) for their 
three-factor model.  The difficulty in reconciling the momentum effect with traditional 
theories of asset pricing has given rise to a number of behavioural models.  Daniel, 
Hirschleifer and Subrahman (1998) focus on a risk neutral representative investor who 
is prone to the overconfidence bias.  This bias can be conceptualised as “systematically 
overestimating the accuracy of one’s decisions and the precision of one’s knowledge.” 
(Dittrich et al. 2005, pg. 492)  Overconfidence leads to initial overreaction to news 
about fundamentals that is on average followed by even more overreaction due to 
biased self-attribution, which implies momentum.  Barberis et al. (1998) also assume 
that prices are driven by a representative agent, who, in their case, suffers from 
conservation bias, i.e. the representative investor updates his/her priors only 
insufficiently when new information about a stock becomes available.  If this under 
reaction is corrected over time, it implies momentum.  Hong and Stein (1990) use 
Copeland’s (1976) idea that sequential information arrival together with the failure to 
extract information from observed prices creates under reaction and momentum.  Their 
approach is different from Daniel et al. (1998) and Barberis et al. (1998) in that they 
appeal to plausibility rather than psychology to justify their assumptions. 
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In the microfoundations of behavioural finance, De Bondt and Thaler (1995) postulate 
that overconfidence is a prominent psychological trait amongst individuals   According 
to Benartzi and Thaler (2001) this is manifest in two guises.  First, individuals are 
poorly calibrated when estimating probabilities: events they think are certain to occur 
actually occur less frequently, and events they deem impossible occur with greater 
frequency.  Second, the confidence intervals people assign to their estimates of 
quantities, for example the level of the FTSE 100 Share Index in a year, is far too 
narrow.  Their 98% confidence intervals, for example, include the true quantity only 
60% of the time. 
 
Models of financial markets with overconfident investors predict that trading will be 
excessive and many psychological studies have shown that men are more prone to 
overconfidence than women (for example, Lundenberg et al. 1994). If overconfidence 
causes overtrading, then men should exhibit their greater tendency toward 
overconfidence by trading more.  Using account data from 35,000 households of a large 
brokerage house Barber and Odean (2001) found men exhibited a greater desire to trade 
- 45% more than women.  Trading reduced men’s net returns by 2.65 percentage points 
a year as opposed to 1.72 percentage points for women. 
 
Finally there are two papers that signal a conflicting argument against the disposition 
effect.  Barberis et al. (2001) examine the impact of past investment performance on 
asset demand in a model of the previously explained house money effect (see Section 
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4.3.4.4), the notion that gamblers increase their risk propensity following a gain.   They 
assume that investors become less risk averse after gains and more risk averse after 
losses.  Klein (2001), studies the capital gain lock-in effect.  He argues that capital 
gains taxes induce a tendency not to sell stocks with capital gains (winners) and to sell 
stocks with capital losses.  Since both Klein (2001) and Barberis et al. (2001) assume 
behaviour is opposite to traditional explanations of the phenomenon, they get opposite 
results:  They find reversals in equilibrium returns.  The fact there are contrasting 
theories pertaining to investment behaviour drives the experiment implementation in 
this dissertation. However, to date the three empirical papers that examine whether 
investors trade through the tax motivated strategies of Klein (2001), Barberis et al. 
(2001) or by the disposition effect (Coval and Shumway, 2005; Odean, 1998; Ferris et 
al. 1988 ;and  Lakonishok and Smidt, 1986) elicit evidence to support the latter. 
 
 
5.3 The Impact of Cognitive Biases in Financial Markets 
 
Disposition effect and momentum strategies are two non-exclusive strategies in 
explaining the anomalous trading patterns of investors.  This section presents a flavour 
of the competing biases in financial markets.28 
 
 
                                                 
28 For a comprehensive survey refer to Thaler (1993). 
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5.3.1 Representativeness 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1974) argue that when individuals try to determine the 
probability that a data set (A) was generated by a model (B), or an object (A) belongs to 
a class (B), they often adopt the representativeness heuristic.  This means that they 
evaluate the probability by the degree to which (A) reflects the essential characteristics 
of (B). 
 
The effect of representativeness in investment decisions can be seen when certain 
shared qualities are used to classify stocks. Two companies that report poor results may 
both be classified as poor companies, with bad management and unexciting prospects. 
This may not be true, however. A tendency to label stocks as either “bad-to-own” or 
“good-to-own” based on a limited number of characteristics will lead to errors when 
other relevant characteristics are not considered. 
 
Representativeness may also be related to the tendency of stock prices to reach 
extremes of valuation. If poor earnings and share price performance has a stock 
branded as “bad”, representativeness will tend to delay the reclassification of the stock 
as one investors would like to own. On the other hand, “good” stocks may continue to 
be classified as such by investors well after the firm's prospects for either earnings or 
price appreciation have diminished significantly. 
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Contrarian or value strategies seek to exploit just such erroneous classifications. If a 
firm has been classified by most investors as a bad one and the stock as a loser, initial 
changes in the company's outlook may leave the classification in investors' minds 
essentially unchanged. This collective classification can lead to stocks being unloved 
and under priced. A value investor seeks to buy the stocks others classify as “bad”, 
ideally at the time when the greatest majority holds this view. When fundamentals have 
started to deteriorate but the majority of investors have not yet reclassified the stock in 
their minds, it is often an ideal time to sell. 
 
 
5.3.2 Anchoring 
 
The anchoring heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Kahneman et al. 1982; and 
Northcraft and Neale, 1987) is a well-documented behaviour pattern and provides a 
compelling explanation as to why investors hold-on to “losing” stocks.  The underlying 
reasoning behind anchoring is as follows: when individuals are asked to make 
quantitative evaluations they are often influenced by suggestions.  These suggestions 
are known as anchors.  They impact the assessment regardless of their relevance to the 
assignment (Mussweiler and Strack, 2000a).29  Tversky and Kahneman (1974) invited 
subjects to indicate if the percentage of African countries in the United Nations was 
higher or lower than a random number generated (numbered 1-100) by spinning a 
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wheel.30  The subjects were then required to estimate this percentage.  The results 
displayed the median estimates of the percentage of African countries in the United 
Nations were 25 and 45 for groups that received 10 and 65 respectively as random 
starting points.  They concluded payoffs for accuracy do not reduce the anchoring 
effect. 
 
 Tversky and  Kahneman’s (1974) study was a pre-cursor to many others in this field 
and as a consequence, anchoring effects draw resonance in a variant number of 
domains such as economic transactions (Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2002; Joyce and 
Biddle, 1981; Mussweiler et al. 2000; and Northcraft and Neale, 1987), public policy 
assessments (Plous, 1989), judicial verdicts (Englich and Mussweiler, 2001), and 
interpersonal perceptions (Gilovich et al. 2000; and Gilovich et al. 1998).  Northcraft 
and Neale (1987) examine anchoring in a real-world setting. Undergraduate business 
school students and professional real-estate agents were given information about a 
house currently available for sale.  The information was correct, with the exception of 
the seller’s asking price for the house.  This price was different for every subject and it 
was hypothesised, it might act as an anchor for subjects’ estimates of the house’s value.  
Subjects visited the house and its neighbourhood and then provided four estimates of its 
value (its appraised value, an appropriate advertised selling price, a reasonable price to 
pay for it and the lowest offer they would accept if they were the seller).  For both 
                                                                                                                                              
29 It should be noted that anchors are quite distinct from the reference points observed in prospect 
theory.  An anchor reflects the valuation an individual makes, a reference point determines how a 
valuation is perceived. (Kahneman, 1992) 
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amateurs and experts, the sellers asking price was a highly significant anchor for each 
of the estimates of the value of the house.  However, it must be noted, experts seemed 
much less aware that they were being influenced by the anchor!  When asked what 
factors had influenced their valuations, 56% of the amateurs mentioned the asking price, 
while only 24% of the experts did.  
 
With reference to stock market trading, in the absence of reliable information, investors 
are likely to anchor on to past prices or more specifically the purchase point of the 
stock.  As a consequence investors will be reluctant to sell at prices less than the 
purchase point and under react to negative information concerning stocks that are 
below the purchase price.  It is intuitive that this methodology of stock market trading 
is irrational; past prices have little significance for future prices.   
 
 
5.3.3 The Longshot Bias 
 
A competing explanation to the mean reversion beliefs of investors is taken from the     
psychology and economics literature. It is referred to as the favourite-longshot bias or 
longshot bias (Coleman, 2004).  This behavioural anomaly is conceptualised within 
gambling markets in particular the betting markets for horse racing.  The literature on 
horse racing markets extends over six decades with Griffith’s, (1949) paper.   The focus 
of the research has been to determine whether horse race betting markets are efficient 
                                                                                                                                              
30 Kahneman and Tversky had manipulated the wheel, so that it always generated the numbers 10 or 25. 
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(Snyder, 1978; Ali, 1979; Busche, 1994; Hausch et al. 1994). If betting markets are 
deemed “efficient” they must satisfy the following criteria.  Firstly all bets should yield 
non-positive expected values and secondly all bets should have expected values 
of b)1( α− , where α is the bookmakers costs and b is the amount bet.  However, the 
expected returns from a unit bet increases montonically with the probability of the 
horse winning.  Favourites win more often than the subjective probabilities imply and 
longshots less often.  This observation suggests favourites are much better bets than 
longshots. 
 
Whilst the bias is widely documented within the sports betting arena, its observations 
are transferable as an explanatory description of the tendency of investors to purchase 
shares that have shown recent depreciations in value.  Further, betting markets possess 
many analogous features to those of financial markets (Shin, 1992; Vaughan Williams 
and Paton, 1997), which permit the application of such a behavioural bias to this 
domain desirable.  These features include: an extensive pool of investors with potential 
access to widely available information sets, but also the property that each asset 
possesses a finite point characterised by a definitive value. Further, the opportunity for 
the use of inside information to generate abnormal returns from horse race betting is 
analogous to the operation of conventional markets, but in some respects easier to 
measure and assess.    Another beneficial aspect of betting markets is the elimination of 
demand uncertainty, which arises from psychological tastes and beliefs, and 
endowments of other investors in stock markets.  Once all bets are placed at the track 
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prior to a given race, the result of the race and the corresponding payoffs depend only 
on nature. 
 
The favourite longshot bias has been extensively examined over the last fifty years and 
serves as a robust indicator of investment behaviour.  It is for this reason that findings 
from the body of research should be extended to other observations in economics and 
finance.  Coleman (2004) is a proponent of this view and links the favourite longshot 
bias to the propensity of individuals to overestimate the probability of unlikely events. 
“The longshot bias then becomes pervasive throughout finance, management and 
society and causes the return from investment to fall as the probability of loss increases.  
The return from risky investments such as developing markets are less than expected. 
So too is the payout from mergers and acquisitions, research and development, mineral 
exploration and innovative business models.” (Coleman, 2004, pg. 316) 
 
A further example occurs with the purchase of “high risk” common stocks. They are 
found to generate inferior returns to the level of associated risk (McEnally, 1974).  
Such an observation is consistent with the favourite-longshot bias.  A number of 
explanations have been offered for the poor return of “risky stocks”.  Firstly, the impact 
of an excessive number of investors with relatively limited risk aversion who are 
willing to offset the high risk for high expected returns, but lacking access to the 
borrowing necessary to lever up the returns from the lower risk stocks, seek out high 
risk stocks and bid down their returns.  Secondly, there is the tendency of investors to 
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be overly optimistic in appraising the potential performance of high risk common 
stocks.  These observations draw resonance with the findings of Thaler and Ziemba 
(1988) who document that less informed individuals bet on “outsiders” while 
sophisticated gamblers are attracted to favourites.     
 
 
5.3.3.1 The Generic Racetrack Betting Market 
 
Before exploring the features of a racetrack betting market it is important to 
discriminate between the two principal betting mechanisms.  These are: the parimutuel 
system or totalizator (Tote) and the bookmakers.  In a parimutuel betting market, bets 
are accepted up to the start of the race.  The money bet on the winning horse is pooled 
together and divided by the number of bets on that horse.  Bookmakers offer fixed odds 
for each horse in a race.  Thus bets with a bookmaker are at a marginal price, whereas 
dividends paid by the tote are an average; in practice the distinction is minimal as most 
bets are placed close to the start of the race. 
 
Racetrack betting markets are active for a “short”, finite period (20-30 minutes) during 
which time the investors may place bets on any number of the competing horses in the 
upcoming race.  For any given race, the investors are confronted with a series of 
stylised bets that range from fundamental bets such as betting for a horse to win 
outright, or to finish in the top three to more “exotic” bets which depend on the joint 
outcomes of two or more of the horses.  All participants who have bet on a horse to win 
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yield a positive return only if the horse wins, while a place bet realises a positive return 
if the horse is first or second.31  Regardless of the outcome, all bets have limited 
liability. 32  Analogous to the stock market, security prices (i.e. the “odds”) are jointly 
determined by all participants and a rule governing transaction costs (i.e. the track 
“take”).  In the simplest case, for a win, all bets across all horses to win are aggregated 
to form the win pool.  The nomenclature adopted in the following derivations is 
commonly adopted in the longshot bias literature following on from Griffith (1949), Ali 
(1977) and Coleman (2004).33  Let H represent the total number of horses in a race and 
they are numbered in decreasing order of favouritism. 1,2.  .  . h, H.  Xh represents the 
amount bet for a win on horse h.  The total win pool on the race is W, where 
 
           ∑
=
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1
                                 (5.1) 
 
In parimutuel markets the operator takes an amount α out of the pool to cover the costs 
and government taxes.  Thus the win dividend paid on any horse is: 
 
h
h X
WD )1( α−=                      (5.2) 
 
                                                 
31 The place bet is dependent upon the number of participants in the race.  The greater the number of 
participants the greater the number of positions available to realise the place bet. 
32 Limited liability in this context is defined as the maximum the investor will lose on a horse i is equal 
to the money the investor has put on horse i. 
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The win odds on any horse, ah, equal (Dh-1):1 and so 
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−−= α1                                                                                      (5.3) 
 
The subjective probability that any horse will win Ph is established by bettor 
preferences and is equal to the proportion of the pool that is bet on any horse. 
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The objective probability that any horse will win πh, is calculated as the proportion of 
times a horse starting at any particular position has historically won. 
 
The expected return Rh is calculated as follows: 
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The longshot bias is evidenced through the objective probability, πh, exceeding the 
subjective probability, Ph, for short priced favourites and by πh being lower for 
                                                                                                                                              
33 The derivation has no direct impact on the direction of this dissertation but is intended to assist in the 
understanding of the longshot-bias. 
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longshots.  When there is a longshot bias, the value of πh/Ph increases as Ph rises and so 
the expected return rises as Ph rises. 
 
 
5.3.3.2 What Drives the Longshot Bias? 
 
The underlying driving force of the longshot bias has so far been inconclusive.  
Coleman (2004) synthesised results from 18 studies on the longshot bias and generated 
five stylised observations about the phenomenon. This dissertation focuses on three of 
them: Firstly, bookmaker markets have a stronger longshot bias than parimutuel 
markets. Secondly, the longshot bias is not significantly different between 
thoroughbred races, harness races and greyhound races34 and finally, the longshot bias 
is independent of time.   
 
Prior to Coleman (2004), the literature identified inaccurate empirical data as a possible 
explanation of the longshot bias.  In light of Coleman’s study, this statement would 
appear false.  The literature documents its existence across variable size races, sample 
sizes, and types of races.  Further it is robust across boundaries (i.e. the bias has found 
to be present across several continents).  Such evidence reinforces the accuracy of the 
results.  Coleman (2004) supplements this further by doubting any statistical pretence.  
If there were it would be as a result of the methodology behind the odds calculations. 
                                                 
34 Coleman found at the 65% confidence level the values of β for harness racing and greyhound racing 
are equivalent to thoroughbred racing.  
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A potential defect could arise in the methodology of calculating the odds.  It is common 
practice to round the odds down or breakage, as it is known.  Such a method has been 
the focal point of several studies (Busche and Hall, 1988; Busche and Walls, 2001).  
The rationale behind this practice is as follows:  Rounding down reduces the expected 
odds in relation to the dividend.  Thus it has a greater impact on the shorter-priced 
horses as the return generated from backing favourites is greatly reduced.  Therefore, 
this diminished return from backing favourites implies a weakening of the longshot bias.  
 
Busche and Walls (2001) test the effects of breakage by rounding dividends using 
previously generated data from Ali (1977).  They postulate an index of breakage equal 
to the product of odds on the horse and bet fraction. 
 
Breakage Index = )11)(1(}/)1){(1(
h
hhhh D
DDPa −−=−−= αα                         (5.6) 
 
Their data have been used to derive the following expression: 
 
z = -2.2 +3.6(Breakage Index) + 0.39(Position of the Horse in Betting Market)       (5.7)                             
 
Adopting a mean index of breakage of 0.26, the formula illustrates a longshot bias with 
a subjective probability that is less than the objective probability for the first three 
horses.  “Thus whilst breakage has an impact it inevitably weakens the longshot bias 
which exists despite breakage, not because of it.” (Coleman, 2004, pg. 321) 
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Henery (1985) examines the bookmakers’ strategies and determines that betting on the 
favourites exhibits greater competition amongst the bettors.  In order to attract bets on 
these favourites the bookmakers purposely raise the odds.  To offset this process, the 
bookmaker will simultaneously lower the price on “outsider” horses. This is the 
explanatory finding of supply side causation of the longshot bias. 
 
Bruce and Johnson (1999) extended Henery’s (1985) findings to the examination of 
bookmakers and parimutuel markets operating in competition with one another.  Such a 
format is pervasive across the majority of UK race meetings.  They explored the 
bookmaker starting price and parimutuel Tote odds on 2109 UK thoroughbred races in 
1996 and discovered a strong longshot bias in bookmaker markets. This evidence was 
reinforced by Julienne and Salanié (2000) in their analysis of an earlier UK dataset. 
 
Certainly the presence of supply side factors may partially determine the longshot bias, 
but it is the actions of the investors that many academics believe are the major 
instruments of the longshot bias. Investors may distort the market with their 
behavioural actions.  Coleman (2004) classifies these investors as conscious embrace of 
risk and misjudgement of true probabilities.  
 
It is widely acknowledged amongst economists that risk seeking individuals gamble 
more money on longer odds horses than is justified by their objective chances of 
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winning.  Thaler and Ziemba (1988) argue that in the absence of short selling wagering 
markets, less informed bettors support longshots whilst more sophisticated bettors place 
money on favourites. 
 
Quandt (1986) postulates that bettors are risk loving.35  Bird et al. (1987) attribute 
bettors’ decisions to a preference for positive skew in returns that provides an 
occasional longshot win to compensate for the negative expected return. 
 
In financial markets, the purchase of “high risk” common stocks is found to generate 
inferior returns to the level of associated risk.  Such an observation is consistent with 
the favourite-longshot bias.  A number of explanations have been offered for the poor 
return of “risky stocks”.  Firstly, the impact of an excessive number of investors with 
relatively limited risk aversion who are willing to offset the high risk for high expected 
returns, but lacking access to the borrowing necessary to lever up the returns from the 
lower risk stocks, seek out high risk stocks and bid down their returns.  Secondly, the 
tendencies of investors to be overly optimistic in appraising the potential performance 
of high risk common stocks.  These observations draw resonance with the findings of 
Thaler and Ziemba (1988) who document less informed individuals bet on “outsiders” 
while sophisticated bettors are attracted to favourites.     
 
                                                 
35 This observation is naturally intuitive.  Risk averse individuals would disconnect themselves from 
gambling markets as by definition, risk averse agents would prefer to receive an expected value of an 
uncertain alternative rather than the uncertain alternative.  Therefore individuals entering such a 
marketplace are consistently expected to be at least risk neutral in their attitude to risk. 
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The gambler’s fallacy states that individuals mistakenly believe the probability of an 
event occurring deviates from its fixed value depending on recent occurrences.  Such an 
argument reinforces claims that gamblers systematically avoid betting on a recent 
winning number, for example, in the selection of lottery numbers (Morrison and 
Ordeshook, 1975).  According to Terrell (1997), in greyhound races at Woodlands, 
Kansas the number of the winning dog was the same as the number of the preceding 
winner on 13.8% of occasions, but gamblers’ only backed it 13.0% of the time.  The 
same bias was found by Clotfelter and Cook (1993) in the Maryland lottery: support for 
any particular winning number fell by a third within a day or two of being drawn and 
was still 10% two months later. 
 
Metzger (1985) made a comprehensive study of the gambler’s fallacy using over 
11,000 US thoroughbred races and concluded that betting on favourites is more 
common after a series of longshot winners (which is defined as any horse other than 
first or second favourite).   Results provide evidence for the gambler’s fallacy as 
support for the favourites decreases with the length of their run of success.  However, 
as the winning streak of less favoured horses extends their support grows.  Coleman 
(2004) likens this latter observation to a fallacy termed hot hands, which is pervasive in 
basketball.  Players are more likely to score a basket after just making one than after 
missing a shot.36  The gamblers fallacy assumes that outcomes mean revert and is 
analogous to the mean reversion in stock markets, whereas hot hands is momentum 
                                                 
36 The same observation is observed in golf.  Golfers who “hole” putts in the early holes will generally 
continue to hole putts in fewer strokes than golfers who “miss” putts in the opening holes. 
                                Chapter 5: The Disposition Effect in Financial Markets 
 
 202
following.  Significantly both approaches incorporate Bayesian probabilities, rather 
than assuming the absence of any statistical link between independent events. 
 
Upon inspection, Metzger’s (1985) study involved two populations of gamblers: those 
backing favourites who believe they can only win a fixed proportion of races; and those 
who back longshots and believe they can have runs of success. 
 
Another possibility is that decision makers going for the longshot may be adopting the 
Laplace Rule of Insufficient Reason which states that all outcomes are equally likely (at 
least on a risk-adjusted basis) and therefore decision makers should invest in the 
outcome that yields a large payoff.37 
 
 
5.3.3.3 Insider Trading 
 
In the domain of speculative markets it is widely accepted that inside information 
benefits the investor as this information is precluded to the public domain.  Under this 
observation, empirical research has sought to explain the favourite-longshot bias as an 
optimal supply-side response to market uncertainties. In a series of studies, Shin (1991, 
1992) examined the fixed-odds bookmaking system (in the United Kingdom) as a case 
of adverse selection in which the bookmaker faces a number of bettors who possess 
superior information, the proportion and identity of whom are unknown.  Assuming 
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that the incidence of insider trading is not larger when a favourite is tipped to win than 
when a longshot is tipped to win, it is shown that equilibrium prices will exhibit a 
favourite-longshot bias. 
 
Furthermore, Shin (1993) provides an estimate of the extent of insider trading as a 
function of the size of the bid-ask spread in the market and the prevalence of insider 
trading.  Central to this is the notion that the direct effect of insider trading on 
bookmakers’ margins will tend to increase as the number of runners (and therefore the 
size of the odds) increases.  Employing a sample of 136 UK races, Shin (1993) finds a 
strong positive correlation between the sum of bookmakers’ prices and the number of 
runners.  By isolating this effect from other influences on the bookmakers’ margin, he 
finds the incidence of trading in his data set to be about 2%. 
 
Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997) believe Shin’s (1993) results are ambiguous and 
are dependent upon “accepting the insider trading explanation of the observed 
correlation between the number of runners in a race and the sum of prices offered about 
runners in such races” (Vaughan Williams and Paton, pg. 2, 1997).  As a consequence 
they believe Shin’s observations could be consistent with explanations other than 
insider trading.    
 
                                                                                                                                              
37 A corollary of the argument is that the longshot bias should be absent in games involving pure chance 
and no skill. 
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Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997) extrapolate Shin’s (1993) findings to construct a 
model which exhibits a linear relationship between the number of horses and the sum of 
the bookmakers’ prices that can be explained not only by the presence of insider trading 
but  also by bettors counting only a fixed fraction of their losses. 
 
They assume that bookmakers in general are risk-neutral agents who compete on price 
up to the point that they expect the subjective returns to the set of bettors on each horse 
to be zero.  Under this principle two assumptions are used.  Firstly, bookmakers have 
zero costs and secondly, bettors are also risk-neutral and that both bettors and 
bookmakers have access to all publicly available information. 
 
In a field of n horses, the objective probability of winning for horse i be given by Pi (i = 
I to n).  The bookmakers’ over-round (OR) is defined as the sum of the winning 
probabilities implied by the odds of all horses in a race minus Ι.  If bettors count all 
their losses, the odds reflect the objective winning probabilities and the over-round is 
zero.  However, if only a fixed fraction of losses, f is counted by bettors (as in Henery, 
1985), the subjective probability of any horse is fqi = f(1-Pi), where qi is the objective 
probability of losing for horse i.   The winning probabilities implied by the equilibrium 
odds are now I – fqi. 
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OR may be defined as follows       
       
 
 
 
 
                                                                                   (5.8) 
       
 
The over-round is linearly related to the number of runners, which is precisely Shin’s 
(1993) result.  Thus insider trading is not the only theoretical explanation of a link 
between the sum of prices and the number of runners. 
 
One way to distinguish between these two alternative explanations is to isolate those 
races in which insider trading is likely to be more prevalent.  In order to identify and 
distinguish such situations, Crafts (1985) suggests separating handicap races (where 
horses are allocated weights so as to equalise as far as possible their chances of winning) 
from non-handicaps.  In the latter, therefore, bookmakers are likely to believe there to 
be greater possibilities for betting on the basis of privately held information. 
 
It is possible that insiders may use public information to improve their private 
information.  For this reason Vaughn and Williams and Paton (1996) consider only 
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higher grade handicaps as indicative of the absence of useful information.  The reason 
is that these race types are the subject of particular media attention and might be 
expected by bookmakers to offer very little opportunity for non-disclosure of useful 
private information and that the informational content of any private information 
available about these race types is expected to be close to zero. 
 
Further more, the market may reveal ex-post information as to whether bookmakers 
perceive certain races to be subject to insider trading through movement in the odds.   
At the opening of the market, bookmakers are unlikely to know on which horse private 
information is held.  Thus they may post less favourable odds on all horses in races 
where they suspect insider trading will be prevalent.  As the market progresses, 
bookmakers reduce the odds of those horses which are heavily backed.  In races where 
insider trading is not suspected, bookmakers are less likely to adjust prices during the 
life of the market.  Following suggestions in Crafts (1985, 1994) and Bird et al. (1987), 
they single out races in which the odds on the winning horse have decreased 
significantly over the course of the market. 
 
The data set consists of observations on 5,903 horses running in 510 races in the 1992 
UK flat season.  The following equation taken form Shin (1993) is used to estimate the 
results: 
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Where *D = sum of starting prices in each race, n = number of runners in each race, 
Var P = vector of Shin’s variance of winning probabilities in each race. 
 
Shin (1993) interprets z as the incidence of insider trading which he finds to be 2%.  
The value of z is then used to estimate the variance of probabilities and the equation re-
estimated.  The process is repeated until convergence is achieved. 
 
The estimates of z are slightly lower than Shin’s (1993), although at convergence the 
difference is marginal (0.019 compared to 0.02).  On the basis of Shin’s (1993) 
theoretical model, this positive link between the sum of prices and the number of 
runners provides evidence of insider trading at work in the market.  However, demand 
size explanations of the longshot bias can also bring about this result. 
 
 
5.3.3.4 The Favourite-Longshot Bias in Futures and Options 
 
Complementary domains for the longshot bias transcend sports betting markets and one 
such arena that has received attention is the option and futures market.  The motivating 
factor underlying this research is that these markets provide a platform for investors to 
occupy long or short positions and thereby at a fundamental level offering a similar 
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market to that of horse race betting.38  Individuals invest in options as primarily a 
vehicle for hedging but also investors do purchase put options for pure speculative 
purposes.  A call option will generally serve as an instrument that is sold against 
existing holdings of equity. 
 
The expectation of a favourite longshot bias in options markets is not a relatively new 
observation.  Figlewski (1989) conjectured investors perceive out of the money call 
options as low-cost, large payoff gambles.  Such an activity can be described as 
irrational.  Furthermore, Dumas et al. (1998) suggest stock index put options are 
purchased at higher prices due to the demand for insurance.  Certainly, the dynamics of 
an option market are similar to the horse race betting market as the option market 
provides a platform for investors to occupy long or short positions. 
 
Hodges et al. (2002) examined returns from investments in put and call options on 
stock index futures and assessed whether average returns are biased against high 
leverage situations.  They examined the S&P Futures Options Market, which is 
dominated by institutional investors purchasing insurance. The authors connoted the 
bias would be most evident with retail investors so they examined another market with 
                                                 
38 A long position exists when an investor purchases a contract to create a market position and has not 
yet closed this position through an offsetting sale.  A short position on the other hand, exists when an 
investor has sold a contract to create a market position and has not yet closed this position through an 
offsetting purchase.  These features are analogous to “backing” and “laying” in horse race betting 
markets. 
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greater retail activity.  This market was the Financial Times Stock Index (FTSE) 100 
Futures. 
 
The results demonstrated a negative expected return for out of the money call options 
on the S&P 500 Futures and the FTSE 100 Futures. 39   During the period 1985-2002, 
the expected returns for a $1 investment on a 3-month call option in the probability 
range of 0%-5% was less than 0.7 and 3.7 cents for the S&P 500 and the FTSE 100 
respectively.  In addition investments in deep in the money 3-month call options 
demonstrated expected returns that were in excess of the investment (on average).  
Such behaviour is similar to the findings of the favourite longshot bias in racetrack 
markets.  The results from the put options were in accordance with the hypothesis from 
Dumas et al. (1998) who believe investors overpay for puts.  However, it should be 
noted the degree of overpaying is not uniform.  “[o]verpaying for these options 
increases monotonically as the probability of finishing in the money decreases.” 
(Hodges et al. 2002, pg. 19) Unlike 3-month options, the 1-month options displayed no 
sign of a favourite longshot bias.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 In finance literature the term “out-of-the-money” refers to a call or put option that has a zero intrinsic 
value.  For example, a call option which is “out-the-money”, has a price, which is less than the exercise 
price. 
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5.4 Reflection and Reference Points in Financial Markets 
 
In most decision situations there are several possible reference points.  In a financial 
setting, the purchase price of a stock is a natural reference point for evaluating the stock.  
Shefrin and Statman (1985) found evidence that “investors tend to sell winners too 
early and ride losers too long” (Shefrin and Statman, pg. 778, 1985).  Investors judging 
gains and losses relative to their initial purchase price and being risk averse toward 
gains and risk seeking toward losses can explain this disposition effect. 
 
 
5.4.1 Subjective Valuation 
 
 
An extension of reference point effects is that based on subjective valuation (see e.g. 
Lakonishok and Smidt, (1986), and Harris and Raviv, (1993)).  According to this line 
of reasoning, an investor who bought a stock for £11 only to see the price subsequently 
drop to £10.50 may rationalise that if buying at £11 was a transaction with a positive, or 
at least zero net present value, holding the stock at £10.50 is even more profitable ex 
ante. This of course requires that the investor perceives the price drop as an 
overreaction by the market. 
 
Changes in subjective valuation as time passes depend on how the investor interprets 
new information versus how the market capitalises it on the stock price.  Suppose the 
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investor valued the stock at £12 when he/her bought it at £11.  Just prior to the stock 
declining to £10.50 the company made an earnings announcement that fell short of 
expectations.  Now the investor re-estimates the stock’s value in light of this new 
information.  If he/she agrees with the market about the decrease in value he/she arrives 
at an estimate of £11.50 (12-0.50), in which case the net present value (NPV) of the 
investment is still a positive £1. However, the investor may well disagree with the 
market and attach a greater or lesser significance to the information.  A subjective 
estimate of a negative impact in excess of £1.50 would bring the subjective value below 
the market value of £10.50, and the investor would then sell the stock. 
 
Naturally, the prediction of the subjective valuation hypothesis with respect to the 
disposition effect depends entirely on the model investors adopt for updating their 
beliefs.  At one extreme, suppose an investor never changes his/her subjective valuation.  
This would imply that the investor never sells at a loss, and always sells if the stock 
price exceeds the subjective valuation, which, by definition, is higher than the purchase 
price.  A market populated with many such investors with heterogeneous valuations 
would produce the disposition effect with the following pattern: the likelihood for 
observing realised losses is low and invariant to the magnitude of the loss, and the 
likelihood for observing realised gains is much higher, and the distribution of the gains 
realised reflects the distribution of the subjective valuations across investors.  In this 
pathological case the disposition effect would be entirely a result of belief-based 
trading. 
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The disposition effect can thus be rationalised by saying that the investor simply acts on 
his/her beliefs.  He/she would sell when the market price exceeds his/her subjective 
valuation and hold on to the stock when the price is below the level.  Clasping to this 
argument, investors would then be expected to often purchase a greater number of those 
stocks that decline in value. Odean (1998) shows that this does happen to some degree, 
but stocks with heavier paper losses are accumulated much less to the portfolio than 
stocks with smaller losses.   
 
As another extreme example, consider a scenario where the prior beliefs of the investor 
are different from the representative investor, but the interpretation of further signals is 
identical between the two. In this case the investor disagrees with the market about the 
“fair” value of the stock at all times.  This motivates the initial purchase, but never a 
sale, as the stock would never reach the investor’s reservation price. 
 
Testing the subjective valuation hypothesis requires imposing some weak assumptions 
on the manner of how investors update their beliefs.  Assume that the set of events 
deemed value-relevant by the investor is at least partially, but not perfectly, overlapping 
with the set of events associated with market price changes, and further, that the 
investor’s set of events is equal or smaller.  This position can be based e.g. on the work 
by Shiller (1981), Roll (1984), and Campbell and Ammer (1993), which suggests that 
asset prices move much more than justified by changes in expected cash flows.  
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Consequently, subjective valuations would be “sticky” with respect to the market price 
changes.  However, the further the market price deviates from the starting point, the 
more likely it is that the investors’ subjective valuation changes. 
 
The disposition effect should be considerably weakened after revisions in subjective 
valuation have occurred.  The subjective valuation may still later coincide with the 
purchase price, particularly around stock price levels near the purchase price.  
However, generally it will be different from that because the market price and the 
investors’ subjective valuation level do not move in lockstep.  Another reason that 
would weaken the disposition effect is that the market price may exceed subjective 
valuation, also at levels that are not close to the purchase price. 
 
In summary, as the price moves significantly in either direction, the investors original 
target price should lose its status as a reservation price, if the investor is not reluctant to 
realise losses per se, but is only acting based on subjective valuation. 
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5.5 Experiment III: A Test of the Disposition Effect in Securities Markets 
 
5.5.1 Research Design 
 
 
In this experiment subjects made portfolio decisions before each of the 14 periods in a 
virtual stock market game.  Before each period they could buy and sell 12 risky stocks 
at announced prices.  A random process (described below in more detail) generated 
prices of the risky stocks.  Prices were independent of the subjects trading actions, as in 
many market experiments, because it was important in isolating disposition effects – 
the tendency to buy and sell at different prices – from the process of price formation.  
 
Each subject was given a fictitious sum of £10,000 at the beginning of the experimental 
session.  At the end each subject’s portfolio value was converted into a mark that 
contributed to the subjects overall module mark.  Subjects could not “leverage” their 
portfolio or sell stocks short.40 
 
The experiment utilised 12 fictitious stocks, labelled A-L.41 Subjects were given a brief 
description of the company coupled with financial data, which encompassed: Stock 
price, price variability and leverage.  From the 12 stocks listed subjects were instructed 
they must construct an initial portfolio of 6 stocks and decide whether to invest £1000, 
£2000, or £3000 in each of them.  An overview of the experiment is presented in Table 
5.1. 
                                                 
40 Leverage refers to funding an investment through debt instruments.   
                                Chapter 5: The Disposition Effect in Financial Markets 
 
 215
 
Read Instructions 
Portfolio selection Subjects invest in six companies from a 
list of twelve  
Period 0: No trading Subjects observe the price of their 
portfolio stocks, but are prohibited from 
trading. 
Period 1-14 Subjects can actively trade throughout at 
the end of each period.  
Subjects final portfolio balance is positively correlated to a percentage 
Table 5.1:  Overview of Experiment III 
 
The instructions provided detailed explanations of how the prices were formed.  In each 
period it was determined whether the price of each stock would rise or fall.  The 12 
stocks had different probabilities of rising, falling, or zero change.  These probabilities 
were fixed for each stock during the entire 14 periods of the experiment.  The chances 
of a price increase/no price movement were 65% for 2 stocks, 55% for two stocks, 50% 
for 4 stocks, 45% for 2 stocks, and 35% for 2 stocks.  The stocks assigned these 
probabilities are shown in Table 5.2.   Figure 5.1 displays the price variations across the 
14 periods for the 12 stocks.  Unlike Weber and Camerer’s (1998) design this model 
featured a market composed of stocks which have the ability to show trans-period price 
stability (i.e. zero price change from period-period) The underlying rationale across 
periods for this modification is constant price level stocks over a given period p are 
pervasive in global financial markets and such a feature enhances the verisimilitude of 
the experiment.  In addition, it is important to understand how individuals behave 
towards stocks that remain constant in price in relation to reference points. 
                                                                                                                                              
41 Refer to Appendix F for the descriptions of the stocks. 
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Stock Probability Rating Price at t=0 Price at t=14 Percentage 
Increase 
A: Imperial Chemicals 45% £3.30 £2.90 -12.1 
B: Lantro Group 50% £4.60 £3.90 -15.2 
C: RMA 50% £1.00 £1.30 30.0 
D:AH Land Consultancy 50% £2.70 £2.00 -25.9 
E: Synergist 35% £1.50 £0.90 -40.0 
F: S. Robinson 65% £4.80 £5.60 24.3 
G: Easydough 35% £1.30 £1.10 -15.3 
H: Sintra Investments 55% £8.80 £9.30 5.7 
I: Peninsula Banking 65% £6.40 £7.60 18.8 
J: Interaction 55% £3.30 £3.70 12.1 
K: Utilium 45% £4.40 £4.20 -4.5 
L: Oceanic Drilling 50% £1.10 £1.10 0 
Table 5.2: Probability Rating of Assets 
This table describes the probability of each stock appreciating in any given period together with 
the actual starting price of the company and the price at the close of the experiment.  A computer 
programme generated the probabilities randomly.   
      
 
If the stocks were deemed to rise or fall, it was determined randomly whether the price 
would rise or fall by 1, 3 or 5%.  All three possibilities were equally likely, and were 
independent, across the 12 stocks.  Price sequences were predetermined before the 
experiment, using a random number table.  Predetermination of prices permitted 
identical sequences of share prices in the experiment, so data could be pooled from 
different subjects. 
 
In this design, subjects had to infer the distribution underlying each stock’s share price 
movements from past data.  A Bayesian subject would continually update their 
probabilities that each of the six stocks had each of the six increase probabilities, based 
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on observed price movements.  The optimal Bayesian method corresponds to a simple 
heuristic way to judge which of the twelve stocks has which trend: count the number of 
times the share price doesn’t fall.  The stocks displaying this feature were likely to be 
the ones that had a 65% chance of appreciating. 
 
This design had an important advantage.  Since the stocks that had increased the most 
frequently were most likely to be the 65% stocks, the investors should be least eager to 
sell; similarly the most frequent losers were most likely to be the 35% stocks and 
investors should have been keen to sell.  Thus, a disposition effect is clearly a mistake 
in this setting. 
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Figure  5. 1: Share Price Movements of Companies across Periods 
This graph displays the share price movement in each of the fourteen periods of the experiment.  
In total there were 59 price appreciations, 59 price depreciations and 62 zero price movements. 
 
 
5.5.1.1 Brokerage Fee versus No Brokerage Fee Condition 
 
In this manipulation, subjects were informed that they had an initial fund of £10,000 to 
invest but £2,000 has to go to a stockbroker as a one-off administration charge.  Whilst 
the subject had to make this obligatory payment, the cost is most definitely sunk and it 
would be interesting to see if this had any effect upon trading behaviour. 
 
 
                                Chapter 5: The Disposition Effect in Financial Markets 
 
 219
5.5.2 Experimental Procedure 
 
The experiment was conducted at the University of St Andrews.  The subjects were 37 
(22 male and 15 female) postgraduate students majoring in economics with an average 
age of 24.  The experiment was a paper-based experiment.  This was a compulsory task 
for the postgraduate students enrolled in a “Strategic Thinking” module.  Their 
performance was converted into a mark that contributed to their final module mark.  
The experiments took about 100 minutes.  All parts of the written instructions were 
collected after the experiments.42     
 
Economics Postgraduate students were considered an appropriate sample because of the 
following: 
 
1. Their interest in financial markets could be expected to be greater than the 
average individual and representative of lay investors. 
2. Their knowledge of financial markets could be expected to be uniform, though 
not well developed.  In this case they could be expected to reasonably mirror the 
profile of the majority of private investors.  Their behaviour could be expected 
to follow rational economic utility optimisation. 
3. By incorporating performance in the exercise into subject assessment, 
meaningful rewards and punishments could be incorporated into the experiment. 
                                                 
42 A parallel experiment using identical methodology was conducted using professional investors from 
Deutsche Bank.  Unfortunately the sample size of eight subjects was insufficiently large enough to 
provide any meaningful and accurate conclusions between the disposition effect and investor 
sophistication. 
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4. Their attention and continuous availability was reasonably assured. 
5. Their motivation could be confidently expected on the basis of the game’s 
learning potential and the competitive spirit encouraged within the experiment. 
 
 
5.5.3 Competing Hypotheses 
 
5.5.3.1 Prospect Theory 
 
Prospect Theory can be considered a pre-cursor to the disposition effect in securities 
trading.  As already discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, under prospect theory, investors 
behave as though they are maximising an S-shaped value function.  The value function 
is defined on the basis of gains and losses rather than levels of wealth.  Critical to this 
value function is the reference point from which gains and losses are measured.   
 
The following example is taken from Oehler et al. (2003) and demonstrates how the 
reference point and the reflection effect cause the disposition effect in investment 
situations. 
 
An investor purchases a stock at £65 and adopts this price as the reference point.  
Suppose the stock rises to £70, the investor has made a gain relative to the purchase 
price.  Now, suppose the price of the stock rises to £73 or falls to £67 with equal chance.  
In the first case the gain would be £3 and in the latter case the loss would be £3.  Thus 
the absolute gain would be equal.  As a consequence of the concave nature of the value 
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function the possible loss is valued as a much larger decrease.  For that reason the 
investor does not hesitate to sell the stock in order to realise the value added.  The 
investor is risk averse in the domain of gains. 
 
The same investor purchases another stock for £65 and continues to adopt the purchase 
price as the reference point.  This stock depreciates to £60 and thus the investor has 
made a £5 loss.  The price may decrease further to £57 or increase to £63 with equal 
probability.  Due to the convex nature of value function in the domain of losses the 
additional value of £3 is valued as a small increase, but the possible loss reduction is 
valued as a much larger decrease.  In this situation the investor maintains the stock 
because there is still a chance the stock may rise to at least the purchase price in the 
future.  The investor is risk seeking in the domain of losses. 
 
Hypothesis 5.1: Subjects sell more shares when the sale price is above the purchase 
price than when the sale price is below the purchase price. 
 
 
      5.5.3.2 Mean Reversion 
 
The disposition effect is restricted to predicting the variation in the number of shares 
sold.  By adopting an experimental setting the effect of stock price movement on 
buying behaviour can be examined.  Buying behaviour is equally important because the 
prospect-theoretic account may not be the only possible explanation for investors 
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selling shares after they rose in value than after they fell.  A competing explanation is 
that subjects expect mean reversion.  There are many definitions of mean reversion, the 
broadest definition and the one which shall be used in this dissertation is as follows: 
 
An asset model is mean reverting if asset prices tend to fall (rise) after hitting a 
maximum (minimum).43 
 
In this experiment a disposition effect could occur if subjects believe that winning 
stocks would fall and losers would rise. Andreassen (1988), observes subjects in an 
experimental setting trade stocks as if they expected short-term mean reversion. Shiller 
(2000) presents questionnaire results showing that investors believe the market is more 
likely to bounce back up after a day of heavy losses than to fall further, although the 
same investors also believe stock returns to be mostly unpredictable. 
 
Empirical studies demonstrate that in the short run (a period up to a month) returns 
reverse (Lo and MacKinlay, 1988; Lehman, 1990; and Jegadeesh, 1990), However, this 
trend does not continue when returns are measured over the interval of 3-12 months 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) and, for periods greater than 12 months, returns tend to 
follow the momentum effect. (DeBondt and Thaler (1985)).  Of these deviations from 
the random walk model, the profits generated by the momentum strategy show most 
robustness to alternative statistical methods and the inclusion of transaction costs. 
                                                 
43 This proposition follows the heuristic that in the long run stocks are cyclical. 
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However, in this design belief in mean reversion is irrational because stocks that rise 
are more likely to be positive-trend stocks and are more likely to rise again; similarly 
losers are likely to continue losing.  Nonetheless subjects may mistakenly believe in 
mean reversion.  If they do they should buy stocks that have gained in price more than 
they buy stocks which lost. 
 
Hypothesis 5.2: Subjects purchase “losing trend stocks” rather than stocks that have 
“winning trends” 
 
 
5.5.3.3 Status Quo Bias 
 
Research shows that decision makers are often biased toward alternatives that 
perpetuate the status quo because the disadvantages of exiting appear larger than the 
advantages (Kahneman et al. (1991)).  Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) label this the 
status quo bias.  Psychologists code this a “comfort zone” bias based on research 
suggesting that breaking from the status quo is, for most people, emotionally 
uncomfortable. It requires increased responsibility and opening oneself up to criticism. 
For example, if you introduce a lower-cost/lower-quality version of an existing product 
to your product line, you may have to confront the trade off between increased profits 
and the risk of damaging your brand image. Sticking to the status quo is easier because 
it creates less internal tension. 
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There are often good reasons, of course, for leaving things unchanged. But, studies 
show that people assign too much value to the status quo. In one experiment, for 
example, each participant in a group of students was randomly given a gift consisting of 
either a coffee cup or a candy bar. When offered the chance to trade with each other, 
few wanted to exchange for the alternative gift. Apparently, “owning” what they had 
been given made it appear more valuable. 
 
Lack of complete information, uncertainty, and too many alternatives promote holding 
to the status quo. For example, many organisations continue to support failing projects 
due to lack of solid evidence that they've failed. Killing a project may be a good 
business decision, but it is often uncomfortable for the people involved. Many 
companies question why so many of their projects fail, but a better question may be, 
“Why don't they fail sooner?” 
 
Hypothesis 5.3: Subjects in the brokerage fee group will exhibit less trading than the 
conditional group as they will remain with the “status quo” in their portfolio having 
spent £2000 into their selection already. 
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5.5.3.4 Documenting the Disposition Effect at the Individual Level  
 
Previous studies differ in the methodology adopted to measure the disposition effect.  
Shefrin and Statman (1985) and Shapira and Venezia (2001) calculate the length of the 
round-trip holding period for winners and losers in investors’ portfolios.  Odean (1998) 
calculates the disposition effect as the difference between investors’ propensity to 
realise winner and loser stocks in their portfolios.  This study utilises the construct 
proposed by Odean (1998).  By assuming individual trades or accounts are independent, 
Odean (1998) shows there exists the disposition effect at the aggregate level.  This 
study focuses on calculating the Realised Gain, Realised Loss, Paper Gain and Paper 
Loss at the aggregate and individual investor level as these measures facilitate the 
examination of the cross sectional variation in the disposition effect for individuals with 
different characteristics. 
 
Particularly, Proportion of Gains Realised (PGR) and Proportion of Losses Realised 
(PLR) are defined as: 
 
PGR = Realised Gain/(Realised Gain + Paper Gain)   (5.10) 
PLR = Realised Loss/ (Realised Loss + Paper Loss)    (5.11) 
 
 “Realised Gain/Loss” is defined as the number of winner/loser stocks sold in a 
portfolio.  If a stock’s price is higher/lower than its purchase price at the time of 
calculation, it is considered a winner/loser.  The “Paper Gain/Loss” is defined as the 
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number of winner/loser stocks in an investor’s portfolio at the time of calculation.  The 
disposition effect is defined as the difference of each investor’s PGR and PLR: 
 
Disposition Effect (DE) = PGR-PLR      (5.12) 
 
A positive disposition effect is considered evidence that this particular investor is more 
likely to realise gains than losses in his/her portfolio. The bigger the disposition effect, 
the more likely one investor is to realise winners than losers.  Table 5.2 displays the 
published aggregate values of the disposition effect.  Whilst these results are 
exclusively attributed to aggregate trading data, the same methodology can be 
employed for individual disposition effects. Whilst the methodology and data may vary 
there is a common thread to the results: they all report a positive PGR-PLR value, i.e. 
the presence of the disposition effect.  Further the global nature of these results 
discourages the notion that cultural identity has a significant impact on trading 
behaviour. 
 
There are several reasons why it may be pertinent to measure the disposition effect for 
each investor. First, as Odean (1998) notes; the aggregate description of average 
investors will “mask considerable cross-sectional variation” (Odean, pg.1295, 1998) in 
understanding individual investment behaviour.  One limitation of calculating the 
disposition effect at the aggregate level is that the PGR (Proportion of Gains Realised) 
of one investor does not necessarily correspond to the PLR (Proportion of Losses 
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Realised) of the same investor.  As a result, aggregating the total number of paper gains 
and realised losses is equivalent to treating all investors as one representative agent.  
This may blur the matching between PGR and PLR of each individual and disguise the 
difference in the disposition effect across investors.  The focus on computing PGR, 
PLR and the disposition effect for each investor thus may sharpen the measurement of 
the effect. 
 
Study Data Description PGR PLR PGR-
PLR 
Brown et al. (2005) Australian stock exchange data for 
investors in 480 IPO and index stocks. 
1.02 0.65 0.37 
Chiu et al. (2003) Mutual funds in Taiwan, 13377 
investor accounts 
0.638 0.517 0.21 
Dhar and Zhu (2002) 50,000 investors accounts between 
1991 and 1996. 
0.27 0.16 0.11 
Frazzini (2004) Stock returns and accounting data for 
29812 mutual funds between 1980 and 
2002. 
0.176 0.145 0.031 
Odean (1998) Trading records from 10,000 accounts 
from brokerage house 
0.148 0.098 0.05 
Oehler et al. (2002) Experimental market, 490 subjects 
across call market, continuous trading 
market and dealer market. 
  0.20 
Raymond et al. (2005) UK managed funds from September 
2001 to September 2004 
0.9 0.78 0.12 
Mean  0.53 0.39 0.16 
     
Table 5. 3: Published Aggregate Values of the Disposition Effect 
 
At the aggregate level, examining the absolute magnitudes of PGR and PLR, even for 
two investors with the same disposition effect, their investment behaviour is not 
necessarily the same.  For example, one investor selling 90% of his/her winners and 
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80% of his/her losers exhibits a disposition effect of 0.1.  On the other hand, another 
investor exhibiting disposition effect of 0.1 sells 20% of his/her winners and 10% of 
his/her losers.  Although, these two investors have the same disposition effect, they are 
quite different in their overall tendency to trade stocks.  Hence, the disposition effect 
does not depict a complete picture about investors’ overall tendency to sell winners and 
loser stocks.  Measuring PGR and PLR at the individual level allows one to 
differentiate these investors by examining potential differences in investor 
characteristics. 
 
Measuring the disposition effect at the individual level could reveal traits pertaining to 
the individuals’ decision-making profile, which would be precluded under an aggregate 
analysis. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) link investor sophistication with the 
disposition effect.  They find a negative correlation between investor sophistication and 
the propensity of investors to involve themselves with behavioural biases. 
 
Defining an investor as sophisticated is determined by evaluating the underlying 
demographics of the individual.  The more sophisticated demographic groups which 
have better access to information or better understanding of market forces in setting 
prices have a smaller disposition effect. 
 
The composition of the subject pool in Experiment III fails to permit an analysis of 
investor sophistication.  However, gender and investor experience are independent 
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variables that can be examined.  Investor experience is hypothesised to influence the 
disposition effect, the rationale being as investors repeat tasks they familiarise 
themselves with the objectives and perform better than those individuals who perform 
the same tasks less frequently.  This can be distilled into the following pair of 
hypotheses. 
 
      Hypothesis 5.4: At the individual level, investors will observe the disposition effect. 
 
Hypothesis 5.5: Trading Frequency reduces the magnitude of the disposition effect. 
 
 
5.5.4 Results 
 
5.5.4.1 Selling Behaviour 
 
The data used in this experiment contains the trading records of 37 subjects.  The 
descriptive statistics are contained in table 5.4a and 5.4b.  These display the aggregate 
trading volume of shares and sales per period across the experimental and conditional 
treatments.  The tabulation of this data permits the inspection of trading patterns 
amongst subjects within the experiment.   The data demonstrates key patterns amongst 
investor behaviour.  Firstly, subjects initiate less trading in the brokerage fee treatment 
compared to the conditional treatment.  Secondly, subjects have a greater propensity to 
trade in the earlier periods than the later periods.  In fact no trading was recorded for 
any subject in the last 3 periods.  Such a trend implies subjects were sensitive to early 
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price movements in their search for the stocks with the highest probability of price 
rises.  Once the subjects believed they had acquired a portfolio weighted by these 
stocks they appear satisfied to remain with the status quo.  
 
Aggregate Number of Shares Sold Per Period 
Period Conditional Experimental 
1 11678 2222 
2 5010 4950 
3 10295 9876 
4 7122 3292 
5 13040 3532 
6 4298 3326 
7 6392 1750 
8 10250 2178 
9 5052 3023 
10 340 3502 
11 2266 3124 
12 0 3250 
13 0 0 
14 0 0 
Total 75743 44025 
t-statistic 1.98 (p=0.07) 
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Table 5.4a and Figure 5.2a: Aggregate Number of Shares Sold per Period across Treatments 
This table displays the aggregate number of shares sold per period by all subjects in the 
conditional (£10,000) and experimental (£8,000) treatment.  A graphical representation is 
illustrated in figure 5.2 a. 
 
 
 
Aggregate Number of Sales Sold Per Period 
Period Conditional Experimental 
1 20 2 
2 11 11 
3 18 21 
4 17 6 
5 19 7 
6 7 16 
7 12 10 
8 12 12 
9 14 6 
10 1 12 
11 1 5 
12 0 5 
13 0 0 
14 0 0 
Total 132 113 
t-statistic 0.62 (p=0.55) 
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Table 5.4b and Figure 5.2b: Aggregate Number of Sales per Period across Treatments 
This table displays the aggregate number of sales per period by all subjects in the conditional 
(£10,000) and (£8,000) treatments 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 5.1 stated that subjects sell more shares when the price is above the 
purchase price than when the price is below the purchase price i.e. subjects would 
generate an aggregate level disposition effect.    This hypothesis can be determined 
using a number of quantitative techniques and for robustness of results each will be 
utilised in this section. Firstly, extracting data from both treatments, segmenting the 
number of shares sold for each subject across the 12 stocks into gains, break-even and 
losses subject to the purchase price provides a comparison of the number of shares sold 
in each of these three categories.  If subjects exhibit the disposition effect, the 
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percentage of shares sold that gained in price relative to the purchase price should be 
greater than the percentage of shares sold that lost or stayed the same in price relative to 
the purchase price.   The accounting method adopted was the “first-in, first-out” (FIFO) 
principle which assumes that the shares which are sold are those which were bought 
first.44    
 
Table 5.5a and 5.5b shows the number of shares sold after making a gain, breaking 
even, or making a loss in the £10,000 and £8,000 treatments.  Aggregation across the 
12 stocks in each treatment illustrates that 62% and 31% respectively of the shares sold 
were winners and 22% and 41% of the shares sold were losers. Thus, intuitively across 
treatments there exists a stark contrast in the selling behaviour of the subjects and upon 
closer inspection one in which there is a significant difference (t=2.09, p=0.05).  
Certainly in the £10,000 treatment there is clear evidence of the disposition effect, 
which is consistent with previous research (Weber and Camerer, 1998).  Across the 12 
stocks, the disposition effect was evident in nine of them.  For share E, (0.35 
probability period-period share decrease) there was no disposition effect because the 
stock demonstrated sequential price decreases throughout the game and subsequently 
the share price never displayed a period-period increase for subjects to display the 
disposition effect.  To a lesser extent the same applies to shares G (0.35 probability 
period-period share decrease) and K (0.45 probability period-period share decrease).  
Both showed price increases in only two out of the 14 periods.  Intuitively in these 
                                                 
44  The other accounting principle is the “last in, first out” (LIFO) principle which assumes that shares 
which are sold are those which are bought last.  This method was also adopted but there were no 
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stocks, the disposition effect would be difficult to observe because there is only a small 
proportion of periods to observe period-period price increase. 
   
 
COMPANY GAIN % EVEN % LOSS % 
A 6178 84 710 10 466 6 
B 4508 54 922 10 2996 36 
C 11634 79 3094 11 0 0 
D 2278 62 410 11 986 27 
E 504 13 302 8 3073 79 
F 3522 91 0 0 200 9 
G 1856 21 2200 24 4980 55 
H 733 91 72 9 0 0 
I 888 96 0 0 37 4 
J 1000 67 231 15 267 18 
K 805 47 682 39 243 14 
L 12978 64 3352 18 3636 18 
Total 46884 62 11975 16 16884 22 
                   Table 5.5a: Total Number of Shares Traded for £10,000 Treatment using FIFO Method 
This table compares the number of shares that were sold after a gain in price, a loss in 
price and a no price change relative to the purchase price in the £10,000 treatment (sunk 
cost treatment).   Under the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) assumption, the purchase price in 
determining realised gains and losses is the average price of earlier purchase(s). 
 
 
 
In the £8,000 treatment (Table 5.5b) a much “weaker” disposition effect is observed.  
Only 31% of the total numbers of shares sold were “winners”.  Upon first inspection, 
subjects in this treatment would appear to adopt a more “rational” strategy in portfolio 
maintenance by identifying the stocks with the smallest probabilities of price 
appreciation and selling them.     However, under closer analysis the disposition effect 
is observed in 50% of the 12 stocks (C, F, H, I, J and L). Indicative of the disposition 
                                                                                                                                              
substantial differences in results using the two methods .  
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effect these stocks exhibit the greatest number of period-period price increases in the 
experiment thus implying subjects still exhibit a propensity to realise “winners”. 
 
  
COMPANY GAIN % EVEN % LOSS % 
A 1782 38 960 21 1930 41 
B 554 30 231 12 1084 58 
C 2000 51 954 25 909 24 
D 779 28 485 17 1511 55 
E 0 0 4000 46 4640 54 
F 808 73 0 0 300 27 
G 468 7 2589 39 3633 54 
H 843 68 200 16 200 16 
I 648 88 89 12 0 0 
J 1327 78 0 0 400 23 
K 382 18 400 19 1335 63 
L 4243 50 2256 26 2085 24 
Total 13834 31 12164 28 18027 41 
              Table 5. 5b: Total Number of Shares Traded for £8,000 Treatment using FIFO Method 
This table compares the number of shares that were sold after a gain in price, a loss in 
price and a no price change relative to the purchase price in the £8,000 treatment 
(conditional treatment).   Under the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) assumption, the purchase 
price in determining realised gains and losses is the average price of earlier purchase(s). 
 
 
Continuing the analysis of selling behaviour amongst subjects, a second test of the 
hypothesis is shown in Table 5.6.  These tables compare in each treatment the average 
profit on shares sold during the experiment with average profit on shares that were kept 
to the end of the experimental session.  If the disposition effect is present, subjects will 
sell shares which gain in value and keep shares which lose.  Thus, shares kept until the 
end should yield less profit (or a loss) than shares that were sold during the experiment.  
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The £10,000 treatment clearly supports this hypothesis and confirms previous research 
by Weber and Camerer (1998).  Subjects realised an average profit of £0.20 per share 
sold, while shares kept until the end resulted in a loss of £0.10 per share. 
 
In the £8,000 condition subjects generate a much smaller profit from selling their shares, 
which corresponds to the results presented in Table 5.6.    As subjects showed a greater 
propensity to selling losers than the subjects in the £10,000 treatment it is intuitive to 
believe that the average profit generated from these sales is likely to yield an overall 
loss and that is exactly what Table 5.6 illustrates. Subjects lose £0.10 per share sold 
compared to a gain of £0.10 per share from shares which were left to the end of the 
experiment. 
               
Stock £8,000 £10,000 
 Sold Kept Sold Kept 
A 0.1 0.1 0 -0.3 
B 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 
C 0 0 0.2 0.1 
D -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.4 
E -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 
F 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 
G 0 0 -0.1 -0.2 
H 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 
I 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 
J 0.5 0.6 0.7 0 
K -0.1 0 0.1 0 
L 0 0 0.2 -0.1 
Total 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.1 
        Table 5.6: Average Profit for Shares Sold and Kept until the End £8,000 and £10,000  
This table displays the average profit generated for each treatment on shares that were sold 
during the experiment and shares that remained in the portfolio at the end of the experiment. 
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Within the framework of the £10,000 treatment, results indicate the presence of a 
disposition effect.  It is pertinent to question when subjects do realise their gains?  Is it 
immediate, i.e. upon one price increase, or does it require sequential price increases for 
subjects to liquidate their assets?  Table 5.7 breaks-down the selling behaviour in both 
treatments of assets after prices gained in price in two consecutive periods (GG), lost 
then gained (LG), remained constant then gained (-G), gained then lost (GL), lost twice 
(LL), remained constant then lost (-L), remained constant twice (--), gained then 
remained constant (G-I), lost then remained constant (L-). In the £10,000 condition, 
approximately twice as many shares were sold when the price rose in the last period 
(GG, LG, -G) as were sold when the price fell (GL, LL, -L).  The data is consistent with 
the joint hypothesis that there is a disposition effect and the previous period’s price 
serves as a reference point.  The £8,000 condition demonstrates an approximately even 
distribution of sales across the three price (G, L, -) changes in the last period.  This 
weaker effect suggests that the sunk cost shifts how subjects frame their investments:  
There appears a propensity for less trading and more of a desire to hold onto winning 
shares.  Thus, the sunk cost has seemed to initiate “smarter” investment behaviour 
amongst the subjects. 
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  Conditional Treatment Experimental 
Treatment 
Price Trend 
Period t-2 
t-1 Volume of 
Sales 
Percentage Volume of 
Sales 
Percentage 
G G 7660 13 1340 4 
L G 11292 19 2324 6 
- G 10866 18 3097 8 
G L 6296 11 5398 15 
L L 1880 3 7030 19 
- L 9868 17 4119 11 
- - 3834 6 6582 18 
G - 4543 8 1200 3 
L - 2816 5 5763 16 
Total  59055  36853  
Table 5.7: Volume of Sales in Period t Depending on t-1 and t-2 Period Prices 
This table compares the volume of sales in period t prior to price movements in periods t-1 and t-2 
for each treatment.  There are nine permutations of possible prior price movements: Gain-Gain, 
Loss-Gain, “Zero Change”-Gain, Gain-Loss, Loss-Loss, “Zero Change”-Loss, “Zero Change”-
“Zero Change”, Gain-“Zero Change”, and Loss-“Zero-Change” 
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5.5.4.2 Robustness Tests: Determining PGR and PLR 
 
As stated in Section 5.4.4, the constructs proposed by Odean (1998) to calculate the 
disposition effect (PGR and PLR) are adopted for this data set. At the aggregate level 
Tables 5.8a and 5.8b illustrate the findings for each treatment.    In the conditional 
treatment the value of the aggregate value of the disposition effect implies subjects 
demonstrated a propensity for this phenomenon (0.12).  By segmenting the experiment 
into two halves (Periods 1-7 and Periods 8-14) and examining the disposition effect 
over these time frames one can determine if there are any differences in investment 
behaviour over time.  The results show there is a much stronger disposition effect in 
Periods 1-7 (0.12) than in Periods 8-14 (0.09).  This reinforces the findings from Table 
5.4b; subjects engage more frequently in share selling in the early periods of the 
experiment than towards the end.  
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       Table 5.8a: Statistics for Disposition Effect, Conditional Treatment 
This table compares the aggregate Proportion of Gains Realised (PGR) to the aggregate 
Proportion of Losses Realised (PLR) of subjects in the conditional treatment (£10,000).     A 
realised gain (loss) is recognised when a sale takes place and its selling price is higher (lower) 
than the reference price.  A paper gain (loss) is recognised when the period of a sale takes place 
and the net assets value of the portfolio is higher (lower) than the reference price.  In period’s 
where no sales take place in an account, no gains or losses, realised or paper are counted.  As 
previously described in this section the accounting principle adopted is the First-In-First-Out 
procedure.  PGR, according to Odean (1998), is the number of realised gains divided by the 
number of realised gains plus the number of paper (unrealised) gains, and PLR is the number 
of realised losses divided by the number of realised losses plus number of paper (unrealised) 
losses.  Realised gains, paper gains, realised losses, and paper losses are aggregated across the 
fifteen periods and across all subjects in the treatment.  PGR, PLR, PGR/PLR and PGR-PLR 
are reported for the entire experiment, for Periods 1-7, and Periods 8-14.  
 
 
With respect to the experimental treatment (Table 5.8b), the disposition effect is 
negligible (-0.03) which concurs with the earlier findings in this section, i.e. fewer 
“winning” shares are sold and more “losing” shares are realised.  As with the 
conditional treatment subjects “actively” trade in periods 1-7 relative to periods 8-14.  
However, in this treatment subjects exhibit a larger disposition effect in Periods 8-14 
than in Periods 1-7. 
 
 Entire 
Experiment 
Periods 1-7 Periods 8-14 
Conditional Treatment 
Realised Gains 24778.5 2112.5 3666 
Realised Losses 21485 14620 6761 
Paper Gains 25532.5 21112.1 4583.1 
Paper Losses 36717 24350 12574 
PGR 0.49 0.50 0.44 
PLR 0.37 0.38 0.35 
PGR/PLR 1.33 1.33 1.27 
Disposition 
Effect 
0.12 0.13 0.09 
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       Table 5.8b: Statistic s for Disposition Effect: Experimental Treatment 
This table compares the aggregate Proportion of Gains Realised (PGR) to the aggregate 
Proportion of Losses Realised (PLR) of subjects in the experimental treatment (£8,000).  A 
realised gain (loss) is recognised when a sale takes place and its selling price is higher (lower) 
than the reference price.  A paper gain (loss) is recognised when the period of a sale takes place 
and the net assets value of the portfolio is higher (lower) than the reference price.  In Period’s 
where no sales take place in an account, no gains or losses, realised, or paper are counted.  As 
previously described in this section the accounting principle adopted is the First-In-First-Out 
procedure.  PGR, according to Odean (1998), is the number of realised gains divided by the 
number of realised gains plus the number of paper (unrealised) gains, and PLR is the number 
of realised losses divided by the number of realised losses plus number of paper (unrealised) 
losses.  Realised gains, paper gains, realised losses, and paper losses are aggregated across the 
fifteen periods and across all subjects in the treatment.  PGR, PLR, PGR/PLR and PGR-PLR 
are reported for the entire experiment, for Periods 1-7, and Periods 8-14.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5.4.3 Purchase of Shares and Mean Reversion 
 
The disposition effect only predicts variation in the number of shares sold.  The data 
permits an investigation into the effect of stock price movement on buying behaviour.  
Buying behaviour is especially important because prospect theory may not be the only 
 Entire 
Experiment 
Periods 1-7 Periods 8-14 
Experimental Treatment 
Realised Gains 10922 7958 2964 
Realised Losses 23781 16991 6790 
Paper Gains 33882 20125 13757 
Paper Losses 62153 42223 19930 
PGR 0.24 0.28 0.18 
PLR 0.28 0.29 0.25 
PGR/PLR 0.88 0.99 0.70 
Disposition 
Effect 
-0.04 -0.01 -0.08 
                                Chapter 5: The Disposition Effect in Financial Markets 
 
 242
possible explanation for the observed fact that subjects sold more often after shares rose 
in value than after they fell.  A competing explanation is that subjects expected mean-
reversion: a disposition effect could occur if subjects thought winner stocks would fall 
and losers would rise.  In our design belief in mean reversion is wrong because stocks 
that rise are more likely to be positive trend stocks and are more likely to rise again; 
similarly, losers are likely to continue losing.  However, subjects might have 
mistakenly believed in mean reversion.  If they do they should buy stocks that have 
gained in price, more than they buy stocks, which lost. 
 
 
COMPANY GAIN % EVEN % LOSS % 
A 608 16 1103 29 2134 55 
B 773 23 1332 40 1255 37 
C 1203 24 1799 36 1995 39 
D 508 18 977 35 1805 47 
E 0 0 5779 45 6895 55 
F 608 28 677 31 918 41 
G 0 0 1717 19 7543 81 
H 186 16 449 40 496 44 
I 1108 51 668 31 400 18 
J 285 22 732 58 248 20 
K 633 16 628 16 2659 68 
L 3753 52 1701 23 1818 25 
Total 9655 17 17562 32 28126 51 
                    Table 5.9a: Buying Behaviour of Subjects in £10,000 Treatment 
This table compares the number of shares for each stock that were bought 
after a gain in price, a loss in price and a “zero price” change relative to the 
original price in the £10,000 treatment (conditional treatment).    
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COMPANY GAIN % EVEN % LOSS % 
A 380 18 0 0 1789 82 
B 429 26 431 26 806 48 
C 1433 28 1987 39 1663 33 
D 388 16 870 37 1102 47 
E 0 0 4257 42 5870 58 
F 400 22 600 33 800 45 
G 1000 8 5430 42 6489 50 
H 389 37 453 44 195 19 
I 450 30 644 43 398 27 
J 0 0 993 67 483 33 
K 308 26 300 25 598 49 
L 665 16 1232 29 2319 55 
Total 5860 13 17197 38 22512 51 
                    Table 5.9b: Buying Behaviour of Subjects in £8,000 Treatment 
This table compares the number of shares for each stock that were bought 
after a gain in price, a loss in price and a “zero price” change relative to the 
original price in the £8,000 treatment (experimental treatment).    
 
 
Table 5.9a and 5.9b give the percentage of purchased shares of stocks, which gained in 
price, remained constant or lost from the starting price.  On average subjects bought 
more after losses than they bought after gains suggesting a belief in mean-reversion.  
The effect is weaker in the £8,000 condition, with the sunk cost, than in the £10,000 
condition. 
 
 
5.5.4.4 Individual Level Statistics 
 
The disposition effect at aggregate market level for the conditional treatment was 0.12.  
At the individual level (table 5.10a and 5.10b) the disposition effect is significantly 
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larger 0.25.  This difference could be attributed to two reasons.  Firstly, the aggregate 
disposition effect does not capture the idiosyncratic differences between PGR and PLR 
for each individual investor.  Secondly, since aggregating across all investors assigns 
more weight to the frequent traders who are predicted to have a lower disposition bias, 
it reduces the magnitude of the effect. 
 
Although, a value of 0.25 indicates the presence of the disposition effect, 5% of 
subjects in this treatment displayed no disposition effect and 25% of subjects displayed 
behaviour opposite to the prediction of the disposition effect.   
 
In the brokerage fee treatment, the market aggregate disposition effect was -0.04.  At 
the individual level (table 5.10b) the disposition effect was 0.08, which again is 
significantly larger. The breakdown of investor behaviour is more diverse in this 
treatment.  30% of subjects exhibit no disposition effect, 20% of subjects exhibit 
behaviour opposite to the behaviour of the disposition effect and 50% exhibit the 
phenomenon. 
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 Entire 
Experiment 
Periods 1-7 Periods 8-14 
                                                  Conditional Treatment 
PGR (Mean) 0.51 0.45 0.26 
PLR  (Mean) 0.26 0.31 0.23 
PGR/PLR 1.73 1.85 2.01 
Disposition Effect 0.25 0.14 0.03 
t-statistic 2.27 2.03 1.52 
Kolmogorov 
Smirnoff Test 
0.05 0.28 0.11 
       Table 5.10a: Disposition Effect at Individual Level: Conditional Treatment 
This table offers individual level statistics for the disposition effect for the £10,000 
treatment (conditional treatment).  The PGR and PLR values are calculated aggregating 
the PGR and PLR for every individual within the data set and dividing by the sample 
number.  The Disposition Effect is calculated as the difference between PGR and PLR.  
PGR, PLR, PGR/PLR and PGR-PLR are calculated across the 14 periods of the game as 
well as for periods 1-7, and periods 8-15.  The t-statistics and the Kolmogorov Smirnoff 
Tests test the null hypothesis that the difference in proportions is equal to zero assuming 
that all realized gains, realized losses, and paper losses result from independent decisions. 
 
       
25%
5%
70%
Disposition Effect Zero Disposition Effect Negative Dispsoition Effect
 
 
 
          Figure 5.3a:  Percentage Breakdown of Investment Behaviour in Conditional Treatment 
This pie chart displays categorises the subjects from the conditional treatment 
(£10,000) into 3 groups based upon the PGR-PLR value (disposition effect).  Subjects 
with a value greater than 1 are assigned to the disposition effect.  Subjects with a value 
less than 1 are assigned to the negative disposition effect and those subjects with a 
value equal to 0 are assigned the no disposition effect. 
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 Entire 
Experiment 
Periods 1-7 Periods 8-14 
                                                  Experimental Treatment 
PGR (Mean) 0.26 0.25 0.15 
PLR  (Mean) 0.18 0.19 0.18 
Disposition Effect 0.08 0.06 -0.03 
t-statistic 1.87 0.55 0.09 
Kolmogorov 
Smirnoff Test 
0.04 0.17 0.17 
       Table 5.10b: Disposition Effect at Individual Level: Experimental Treatment 
This table offers individual level statistics for the disposition effect for the £8,000 
treatment (experimental treatment).  The PGR and PLR values are calculated aggregating 
the PGR and PLR for every individual within the data set and dividing by the sample 
number.  The Disposition Effect is calculated as the difference between PGR and PLR.  
PGR, PLR, PGR/PLR and PGR-PLR are calculated across the 15 periods of the game as 
well as for periods 1-7, and periods 8-15.  The t-statistics and the Kolmogorov Smirnoff 
Tests test the null hypothesis that the difference in proportions is equal to zero assuming 
that all realized gains, realized losses, and paper losses result from independent decisions. 
20%
30%
50%
Disposition Effect Zero Disposition Effect Negative Dispsoition Effect
 
           Figure 5.3b: Percentage Breakdown of Investment Behaviour in Experimental Treatment 
This pie chart displays categorises the subjects from the conditional 
treatment (£8,000) into three groups based upon the PGR-PLR value 
(disposition effect).  Subjects with a value greater than 1 are assigned to the 
disposition effect.  Subjects with a value less than 1 are assigned to the 
negative disposition effect and those subjects with a value equal to 0 are 
assigned the no disposition effect. 
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                                                               The Disposition Effect 
(1) (2) 
 
Constant 0.38 
(2.02) 
0.17 
(1.28) 
Ln (Numtrade) -0.12 
(-1.95) 
 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Treatment -0.18 
(-1.37) 
-0.10 
(-1.09) 
 
Gender 0.11 
(0.82) 
0.11 
(1.13) 
 
Return of Realised Gains  0.00 
(3.56)** 
 
Return of Realised 
Losses 
 -0.00 
(3.67)*** 
Adjusted R Square 0.06 0.58 
       Table 5.11: The Impact of Control Variables on the Disposition Effect 
The regression is specified as follows: 
DE = γD + βX + ε 
The dependent variable is the disposition effect (DE).  The independent variables include 
demographic dummy variables of different treatment and gender, the logarithm of the number 
of trades an investor has executed, the return of realised gains, and the return of realised losses 
 
The implementation of regression analysis provides an extrapolation on the impact of 
investor characteristics on the disposition effect.  The regression function is specified as 
follows and is adapted from the function utilised by Dhar and Zhu (2002): 
 
      DE = γD + βX + ε                                       (5.11) 
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Where DE is the disposition effect.  The D matrix contains demographic variables of 
each investor.  Specifically contains dummy variables of “gender” and “treatment”.  
The X matrix is composed of information on each investor’s idiosyncratic trading 
pattern.  In this specification it includes the logarithm of the number of trades an 
investor has executed and the realised returns of winning and losing trades of each 
investor. 45   ε is the error term. 
 
The results are reported in Table 5.11.  The result shows that the coefficient for 
Ln(Numtrade) is negative but insignificant which counters previous arguments to 
suggest trading frequency helps investors accumulate experience and become more 
sophisticated about selling losers.  Such experience, in turn, helps reduce their 
disposition effect.  The coefficient for control variable “gender” is positive and 
insignificant which reinforces previous findings suggesting that gender has no influence 
on the disposition effect.46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 The logarithm is adopted because of its skewed distribution. 
46 Surprisingly, the treatment variable has no impact on the disposition effect.    Further, the adjusted R-
square increases from 0.06 to 0.58, indicating that the magnitude of the realised gains and realised losses 
has a significantly explanatory power for investors’ tendency to observe the disposition effect. 
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PGR PLR  
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Constant 0.14 
(1.04) 
 
0.08 
(0.34) 
-0.20 
(-1.79)* 
-0.09 
(-1.13) 
Ln (Numtrade) 0.09 
(1.99)* 
 
0.01 
(0.34) 
0.19 
(5.33)*** 
0.05 
(1.55) 
Treatment -0.18 
(-1.90)* 
 
 
-0.08 
(-0.09) 
-0.02 
(-0.20) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
Gender 0.29 
(2.98)*** 
0.22 
(2.50)** 
 
0.12 
(1.53) 
0.71 
(1.22) 
Return of 
Realised Gains 
 0.00 
(3.49)*** 
 
  
Return of 
Realised Losses 
   0.00 
(5.90)*** 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 
0.27 0.45 0.43 0.71 
Table 5.12: PGR and PLR Regressions 
The regression is specified as follows: 
Y= γD + βX + ε 
The dependent variables of various regressions are Proportion of Gain Realised (PGR), Proportion 
of Loss Realised (PLR).  The independent variables include demographic dummy variables of 
different gender and treatment, the logarithm of the number of trades that each investor has 
executed , the return of realised gains, and the return of realised losses. 
 
 
This dissertation seeks to examine the impact of investor characteristics in the 
variability of PGR and PLR, the difference of which determines the disposition effect.  
As previously stated a regression analysis is performed and is specified as follows: 
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Y= γD + βX + ε                                                                                 (5.13) 
 
Where Y is PGR or PLR and all other variables are defined as in equation (5.4).  
Different from the disposition effect regression that includes return of both realised 
gains and losses, PGR regression only includes the return of the realised gains and PLR 
regression only includes the return of realised losses. 
 
The results are reported in Table 5.12.  For the PGR regression Ln (Numtrade) is 
positive and significant, meaning that the more investors trade the greater the 
significance, which again runs counter to the argument that the disposition effect 
diminishes with investor sophistication.   The treatment coefficient is negative and 
significant, implying the proportion of gains realised is influenced by investors in the 
conditional treatment.  The coefficient for return of realised gains is positive and highly 
significant.  This is as expected.  The number of gains realised by subjects affects the 
PGR, the greater the realised gains, the greater PGR. 
 
For the PLR regression Ln(Numtrade) is highly significant and positive which means 
the proportion of losses realised is heavily affected by the number of trades of an 
investor which again generates a finding to suggest investor sophistication does not 
necessarily diminish the disposition effect.  The treatment and gender coefficients are 
insignificant implying that both subjects from both treatments showed similar patterns 
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of investment behaviour in the context of realising losses.  The coefficient return of 
realised losses is statistically highly significant. One possible explanation is that 
investors with bigger realised losses also have poorer portfolio performance.  As the 
losses are so deep, investors do not expect further downside risk in their losing stocks 
and decide not to sell them.  In addition the adjusted R-square increases from 0.43 to 
0.7 indicating that the magnitude of the realised losses has a highly significant power 
for investors’ tendency to sell loser stocks. 
 
 
5.5.5 Discussion 
 
5.5.5.1 Selling Behaviour 
 
This dissertation tests firstly, the existence of the disposition effect through an 
experimental stock market and secondly whether a pre-trading sunk cost affects trading 
behaviour in this market.   At the aggregate level, results indicate the presence of the 
disposition effect in the conditional treatment (no prior trading cost) i.e. subjects sell a 
higher proportion of shares that appreciate in price relative to the purchase price than 
compared to shares that depreciate in price relative to the purchase price. The 
underlying theory pertaining to the observed investor behaviour in this treatment can be 
explained  by the following statement.  According to prospect theory the disposition 
effects occur because subjects adopt their purchase price as a reference point and are 
reluctant to recognise losses; they are risk seeking in the domain of losses (by keeping 
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stocks that have lost value) and avoid risk in the domain of gains (by selling stocks that 
have gained value).   
 
Whilst these results confirm the findings of previous experimental and empirical 
literature in this domain (Shefrin and Statman 1985; Ferris et al. 1988; Oehler, 1994; 
Oehler, 1995; Odean, 1998; Weber and Camerer, 1998; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; 
and Oehler et al. 2003) the selling behaviour of the individuals in the sunk cost 
treatment (subjects paid a pre-trading £2,000 brokerage cost) was in the direction 
against the disposition effect i.e. subjects sold a greater proportion of shares that 
depreciated in price relative to the purchase price than shares that appreciated in price 
relative to the purchase price.  Not only do subjects in the brokerage fee treatment 
exhibit a selling behaviour that mimics the systematic behaviour postulated by rational 
economic theory, the volume of shares in this treatment is significantly smaller47 than 
the conditional treatment. If this rationale is correct, it is pertinent to query why should 
the brokerage fee play such a prominent role in the future decision making of the 
investor?  From previous documented research the answer may be embedded in the 
behavioural anomaly known as the status quo bias.  This phenomenon perpetuates the 
status quo because the disadvantages of exiting appear larger than the advantages 
(Kahneman et al. 1991).  In this experimental setting, promptly after being informed 
that they have received £10,000 to invest in the stock market they are ordered to 
relinquish £2,000 as a brokerage cost. The lack of uncertainty and information that this 
                                                 
47 Significant at the 10% level (P=0.068). 
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command could perpetuate is likely to give rise to the status quo bias and would explain 
the significantly lower volume of trading which occurred in this treatment throughout 
the experimental session.   Furthermore it may explain why the trading methodology of 
the subjects was inconsistent with the conditional group.  Even though the brokerage 
fee was a unique fee for the experimental group subjects might perceive the brokerage 
fee as a quasi tax and future transactions would be taxed accordingly to the profit 
accrued on a stock.  A stock being sold at a loss could be perceived as a tax-free 
strategy for subjects in the experimental group and therefore displayed selling 
behaviour in the opposite direction of the disposition effect. 
 
 
5.5.5.2 Mean Reversion induced Disposition Effect 
 
The mean reversion argument claims that losers are not sold, because good 
performance is expected following bad performance (and vice versa for winners).  An 
investor equipped with these beliefs would tend to sell stocks with paper losses, 
provided that they have been performing poorly recently.  In other words, the 
disposition effect pattern would be reversed for stocks with such price paths. 
 
Unlike the selling behaviour of the two treatments, the differences in buying behaviour 
are insignificant.  Even though subjects in the experimental group have a much lower 
propensity to sell “winners” than losers than the conditional group both treatments 
display a desire to purchase shares that have depreciated in price relative to the original 
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price (the price of the stock in Period 1).  Such behaviour would suggest both groups 
believe in mean reversion, i.e. an autocorrelation of returns.  This finding provides 
further evidence to suggest the experimental group have been affected by the 
exogenous brokerage cost and in the absence of such a cost their behaviour would draw 
resonance with the disposition effect. 
 
Whilst this behaviour mimics the findings by Weber and Camerer (1998) it is still 
irrational to purchase stocks that have under performed as these stocks have a high 
probability of being the “loser” stocks and subsequently a belief in mean-reversion in 
this setting is certainly a sub-optimal strategy to accruing gains in this experiment.    
 
 
5.5.5.3 Individual Level Disposition Effect 
 
 
The findings from this experiment report that the disposition to sell “winners” and hold 
“losers” is widely distributed with DE values with a minimum of –1 and a maximum of 
1 in both treatments.  Consistent with previous research (Odean, 1998; and  Dhar and 
Zhu, 2002) both treatments observe positive mean disposition effects.48 However, only 
the conditional disposition effect is statistically significant (t=2.27, D = 0.05).  In light 
of the previous findings in this experiment it is unsurprising to find a statistically 
insignificant value with regard to the disposition effect.  Furthermore, in both 
                                                 
48 The conditional treatment has a DE of 0.25102,  the experimental treatment has a DE value of 
0.084956 
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treatments the disposition effect appears to diminish over time, which supports previous 
findings that the disposition effect diminishes with experience (List, 2002).  The 
disposition effect is much smaller in the periods 8-14 than periods 1-7. 
 
However, whilst there is a strong indication of the phenomenon present in the 
conditional treatment there are still 30% of subjects who did not demonstrate such an 
effect in their trading behaviour.  As a consequence, as expected the degree of the 
disposition effect to a large extent is determined by investor sophistication.  Especially 
in this experiment, subjects should lock-in to the fact that “winning” shares should be 
easy to spot when a probability model determines prices exogenously. In the 
experimental group, 50% of investors observe the disposition effect but this statistic 
partially masks the fact that half of the subjects displaying the disposition effect have 
DE values between 0 and 0.1, indicating a small disposition effect.  At the aggregate 
level, brokerage fee was the driving force of the trading behaviour in this group.   
 
5.5.5.4 Alternative Explanations 
 
As with the previous experiments the results from this experiment are open to 
alternative explanations.  The behaviour in the experimental treatment could reflect a 
belief that “winning” shares held in the portfolio could appreciate further. Thus, the 
regret of not maximising the return from the stock is greater than the realised gain 
accrued from the sale.  Such a belief is a consequence of the processes that give rise to 
                                Chapter 5: The Disposition Effect in Financial Markets 
 
 256
regret theory (Bell, 1982).  However, such an argument fails to explain why the 
behaviour is not observed in the domain of “losing” shares.  According to Shefrin and 
Statman (1985) it is the realisation of losses that brings about regret and conversely it is 
the realisation of gains that begets pride.  Such a framework mimics the disposition 
effect, i.e. the expected behaviour would be for subjects to crystallise the “winners” and 
hold “losers”.  
 
 
Another explanation is naturally based that subjects in the experimental group observe 
the instructions more closely and adopt a more “rational” trading strategy. Thus subject 
“lock-in” to the notion that the underlying framework of exogenously priced probability 
determined stocks is to identify from previous periods the stocks that have the highest 
probability of price appreciation.  If this is the case it is pertinent to query the buying 
behaviour of these subjects as both treatments display a propensity for purchasing 
“loser” stocks.  In the conditional group who on average observe the disposition effect 
this is understandable and expected.  In the experimental treatment if subjects were 
trading by speculating the “high probability” stocks, it would be expected for subjects 
to display a propensity for stocks with sequential price appreciations.  Therefore it is 
unlikely that the experimental subjects are more aware of the probability distribution 
than the conditional group. 
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5.5.5.5 Challenges 
 
The results can be challenged on the following grounds: There was not enough capacity 
for subjects to learn. Subjects were under time constraints and were information 
deficient.  These challenges will be discussed in turn. 
 
Subjects were allowed to trade in fourteen periods.  They were allocated one period to 
acquaint themselves with the format of the experiment.  They were not given enough of 
an opportunity to become acquainted with the experimental format through trial periods 
and there is little to be learnt from one period. The predominant feature of all 
experimental treatments irrespective of what they are testing is the same in this respect.  
Weber and Camerer (1996) implement three practice trading periods.   However, there 
may be some confusion as to what extent behaviour in the experiment represents 
deliberate choice or just confusion.  That subjects were not simply confused can be seen 
from all the relevant calculations, such as the calculations of gains, losses, cost of 
purchase of units, on their own.  By checking these calculations, one can determine that 
subjects understood the basic procedure.  All subjects performed their calculations, 
which is expected with highly educated individuals.  
 
It could be argued that subjects were not allocated sufficient time between periods to 
calculate their portfolio value and to trade.  As already discussed above subjects 
certainly had enough time to complete their calculations accurately and had enough 
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time to make rational decisions.  In real financial markets, professional traders have to 
make instant decisions if they are to realise gains.  This experiment has tried to capture 
the verisimilitude of real financial markets so that the results are applicable and 
transferable to the “real world” and as a consequence subjects should behave according 
to a strict time constraint. 
 
Subjects were presented with several measurements of financial performance about 
each company and invited to select their portfolio.  There is no correlation between any 
one measure of financial performance given and share performance during the 
experiment.  It could be argued that subjects were given too much information and were 
trading on the basis of irrelevant financial data at the start of the experiment.  Whilst 
previous experiments in financial markets are based upon a simple and “stripped down” 
model, this experiment sought a higher degree of verisimilitude to simulate “real” 
decision making.  Ambiguity is present in many facets of everyday life and there is no 
reason why it should be precluded from experimentation.  Furthermore it allows a 
comparison of results between previous experiments. 
 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Brokerage fees affect investment behaviour in financial markets.  With a prior 
brokerage fee, the disposition effect is diminished as subjects on average sell more 
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“losers” than “winners”.  The brokerage fee induces a cognitive predisposition coded 
the status quo bias. This kind of behaviour has been identified in previous studies 
(Odean, 1998) using market data when individuals adopt a tax-motivated strategy.   In 
the absence of a brokerage fee subjects on average observe the disposition effect and 
reinforce previous findings from Weber and Camerer (1996).  With respect to buying 
behaviour the findings report an unjustified belief in mean reversion.  It is unjustified 
because the probability determining methodology incorporated in this experiment 
alludes to the fact that subjects should be purchasing stocks that display sequential price 
appreciations.  The observed behaviour is in the opposite direction. 
 
These findings should be pertinent to investment management firms, which dedicate 
themselves to assisting investors make better investments.  It is in these firms’ best 
interest to better inform their clients of the existence of the disposition bias and its 
implications. 
 
Finally, trading experience seems to ameliorate the disposition effect, which supports 
other findings showing that experience can eliminate some market anomalies (List, 
2002).  However, trading frequently has also been shown to be hazardous to investors’ 
wealth (Barber and Odean, 2001), indicating that it is rather costly to alleviate 
behavioural bias through trading.
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6.1 Conclusions 
 
 
 
This dissertation presents an experimental analysis of the impact of sunk costs in 
corporate acquisitions and financial markets.    The objective of this dissertation is to 
contribute to the understanding of individual decision making by examining sunk cost 
accounting in the following contexts.  Firstly, when faced with a sunk cost that 
comprises a larger investment decision, is the sunk cost ignored?  Secondly, do 
opponents’ sunk costs affect one’s own future investments? (the transmission of sunk 
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costs across investors) and finally, do external costs affect investment behaviour in 
endogenously driven sunk cost environments? 
 
 
6.1.1 Impact of Peripheral Sunk Costs on Investment Decision Making 
 
In Experiment I, subjects assume the role of a CEO of an oil exploration company that 
is preparing a takeover bid of a competitor.  In a two-round bidding process, subjects 
must submit a bid which is a function of the following five issues: price per share of 
target company, research and development budget for Site A, research and 
development budget for Site B, the number of overseas offices that would close and 
the level of debt that would be acquired by the target company.  In each issue, 
subjects are presented with the range of values they can offer coupled with the value 
that maximises their payoff.  Their payoff is negatively correlated to the value they 
offer.  As a pre-cursor to this experiment, an attitude to risk assessment is conducted 
to observe subjects’ risk posture and to initiate a sunk cost.  The sunk cost is then 
transmitted across into Experiment I.  The purpose of the experiment is to examine 
whether peripheral sunk costs influence investment decision-making. 
 
Results from Experiment I provide evidence to suggest individuals are influenced by 
peripheral sunk costs.  Ordinary least squares regression confirmed subjects conceded 
less to their opponent in the issue that had the sunk cost attached.  Furthermore, across 
periods subjects increase their commitment in the issue.  This behaviour of increased 
risk taking by making fewer concessions in the sunk cost issue after a loss in the 
attitude to risk component of the experiment, reflects escalation of commitment.  The 
break-even group, as conjectured, displayed no escalation of commitment and were 
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not influenced by the attitude to risk component.  In general, subjects adopted a policy 
of offering the mid-point concession in each issue.   
 
 
6.1.2 The Transmission of Sunk Costs across Bidders  
 
Experiment II continues with a corporate acquisition context but in this case examines 
the transmission of sunk costs across investors in a first-price sealed-bid common-
value auction.  As CEO’s, subjects must decide whether to purchase additional 
information regarding the acquisition of the target company.  Subjects must 
acknowledge whether they wish to purchase the information.  Independent of their 
decision, subjects are informed of whether rival bidders purchased the information.  
This is the sunk cost.  In the sunk cost treatment, subjects are informed that all 
competing bidders purchased the information and in the conditional treatment, 
subjects are notified that none of their rival bidders purchased the information. 
 
Findings suggest subjects assigned to the experimental condition exhibit a propensity 
to be influenced by the sunk costs of competing bidders.  Subjects drive the bid in the 
direction of these sunk costs, demonstrating similar behaviour to a previous study of 
the transmission of sunk costs between bidders and sellers (Diekmann et al. 1996).   
In the conditional treatment, subjects submit a bid, which is lower than the valuation, 
irrespective of the information they have. 
 
The experiments suggest the phenomenon of sunk cost accounting is not exclusive to 
the within-person designs that have dominated the literature in this doamin.  In 
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interactive bargaining and bidding, peripheral sunk costs are just as pertinent and 
salient to future decision making as within-person sunk costs.   
 
 
6.1.3 The Disposition Effect in Financial Markets 
 
In financial markets there exists an analogous phenomenon to the sunk cost effect: the 
disposition effect.  It is a descriptive theory based upon the selling behaviour of 
investors in stock markets.  In such an environment, individuals demonstrate 
systematic propensity to sell recently purchased shares that have appreciated relative 
to the purchase price and a reluctance to sell shares that have depreciated in price 
since they were purchased.  Such behaviour violates the efficient market hypothesis, 
which assumes investors are “rational traders” 
 
Using a virtual stock market based upon Weber and Camerer’s (1998) model, the 
experiment seeks to determine how individuals will treat an up-front brokerage fee in 
an experimental stock market.  Two groups, one with a brokerage fee and one without 
are compared and their trading behaviour analysed.  Subjects with the brokerage fee 
trade less frequently throughout the experiment and exhibit less of a propensity to sell 
“winning” shares rather than losers.  The brokerage fee induces a cognitive 
predisposition coded the status quo bias. This kind of behaviour has been identified in 
previous studies (Odean, 1998) using market data when individuals adopt a tax-
motivated strategy.  Subjects without the brokerage fee observe the disposition effect 
i.e. selling a greater majority of “winning shares” than “losing shares.”    This pattern 
supports the findings of Weber and Camerer (1998) 
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With respect to buying behaviour, the findings report an unjustified belief in mean 
reversion.  It is unjustified because subjects are informed of the probability of the 
stocks appreciating in price in any period.  Thus, as the game progresses, subjects 
should be able to identify the stocks with the greater probability of appreciation.    The 
observed behaviour is in the opposite direction i.e. subjects purchase stocks that have 
demonstrated sequential price decreases. 
 
Finally, trading experience seems to ameliorate the disposition effect, which supports 
other findings showing that experience can eliminate some market anomalies (List, 
2003).  However, trading frequently has also been shown to be hazardous to investors’ 
wealth (Barber and Odean, 2001), indicating that it is rather costly to alleviate 
behavioural bias through trading. 
 
 
6.2 Contributions of this Work 
 
The findings of this dissertation contribute to the greater field of experimental 
economics in three directions: 
 
Firstly, this dissertation extends the sunk cost literature to a relatively unexplored area 
of investment decision making, i.e. sunk cost accounting beyond a “within-person” 
process.  As detailed in Chapter 2, examining sunk costs in an interpersonal process 
has been confined to Diekmann et al. (1996) on property negotiations.  This 
dissertation presents a novel experiment on sunk costs across bidders in a first-price 
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sealed bid common-value auction.  It is anticipated such an experiment will stimulate 
further interest in this area by examining the benefits of sunk costs.  
 
Secondly, the work shows subjects are able to identify and acknowledge sunk costs in 
a merger and acquisition context and that use of deception in experimentation can be 
advantageous. Subjects displayed no suspicious effects of being deceived in the 
experiment.  Such work indicates that deception may not be a necessary evil for 
experimental studies, which supports the evidence presented by Bonetti, (1998).  
These results merit the extension of this work and the use of deception as a measure to 
enhance experimental control without fear of ill effects upon future subjects. 
 
Finally, Experiment III provides a modified experimental design of Weber and 
Camerer’s (1998) stock market.  It shows that external, unanticipated costs can 
diminish future irrational behaviour.  This effect provides the behavioural finance 
literature with a novel observation and the encouragement to determine other factors 
that reduce behavioural biases within financial markets. 
 
 
6.3 Entrapment Avoidance 
 
The preceding chapters have demonstrated the driving forces mediating sunk cost 
accounting and entrapment.  As a consequence, this section presents strategies that 
can ameliorate this phenomenon.   
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6.3.1 Increase Saliency 
 
Increasing the saliency of sunk costs should enable individuals to recognise the 
factors that lead to entrapment and thus avoid falling blindly into decisions that harm 
them. 
 
For example, if the sunk costs associated with the Taurus Project (refer to chapter 
1.21 for a detailed account) had been recognised earlier, the stock exchange could 
have cut its losses much sooner and with it saved millions of pounds.  
 
 
6.3.2 Active Decision Making 
 
The approach to decision making should be rational and systematic: it should identify 
the potential challenges in attaining goals; and construct several scenarios for possible 
changes in economic, regulatory, or agency conditions. With this approach, it is 
possible to (1) identify probable costs that would be incurred if short-term goals take 
longer than expected to materialize, and (2) prepare cost-benefit analyses to determine 
if projected benefits would be worth the probable long-term commitment of 
resources.  Entrapment can occur with passive administrative renewals, such as with 
the automatic billing of services that requires active decisions to stop services. 
 
With further reference to the Taurus case, executives in 1992 refused to spend more 
money for additional staff as negative feedback mounted and pressure increased to 
channel further funds into the project.  This was a symbolic move because it 
represented the first serious attempt to assert control over Taurus and began to shape 
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how others viewed it.  Whilst the executives were far too removed from Taurus and 
waited far too long to take action, when they did take control of the project, they 
moved effectively to cancel it and prevent further harm. 
 
 The practice of automatically renewing project budgets falls into this category as well. 
Zero-based budgeting, 49 which requires an active approach to continued commitment 
of resources, is a valuable active decision-making strategy that can reduce entrapment. 
 
 
6.3.3 Consider Alternatives 
 
If exogenous factors, such as economic shocks or natural disasters, might produce a 
poor outcome for a project, managers tend to increase commitment to a project. 
Because it can be difficult to identify the “real” reasons for failure (e.g., whether 
failure is due to bad luck or more to unrealistic projections), entrapment is more likely 
to occur. It would be advantageous to work through various scenarios for project costs 
and revenues (best, worst, and average cases) to differentiate the relative contribution 
of bad luck versus poor planning. Understanding how little of the problem may really 
lie in bad luck lets managers make more rational decisions about continuing 
commitments.  The notion of bringing in an external auditor - to conduct a project 
assessment is a technique that can promote de-escalation by providing an independent 
third-party perspective.  In the Taurus case, external consultants provided valuable 
ammunition that the executive was later able to use in persuading the board to cancel 
                                                 
49 The objective of Zero Based Budgeting is to "reset the clock" each year. While a traditional 
budgeting process allows managers to start with last year's expenditures and add a percent for inflation 
to come up with next year's budget, Zero Based Budgeting implies that managers need to build a 
budget from the ground up, building a case for their spending as if no baseline existed -to start at zero. 
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the project.  Consultants can be a powerful way to identify and legitimise alternative 
courses of action, while at the same time reducing an executive’s exposure to risk. 
 
 
6.3.4 Limit Setting 
 
Individuals should set a limit on the resources to be invested before embarking on a 
project. Once the limit is reached, it is far easier to reconsider the value and expected 
benefits of further investment and then if necessary, decide to discontinue the project, 
if necessary. The limit provides a justifiable escape route for managers if the project 
does not attain the desired goals. Teger (1980) found that setting limits publicly 
induces individuals to commit only to the designated value, as it may be brought up 
later in order to permit the decision maker to quit while appearing consistent and 
without losing face.   
 
If Nick Leeson had adopted this strategy by implementing stop loss orders on his 
investments, then it could have precluded the mounting losses in his trading account. 
Thus, preventing Leeson from highly irrational trading strategies culminating in the 
bankruptcy of Barings Bank. 
 
 
      6.3.5 Review Decisions 
 
 Individuals need to anticipate all that might go wrong and prepare an exit strategy to 
get out so resources can be saved. Also, obtaining perspectives from individuals who 
are not responsible for the initial decision can reveal innovative strategies.  Such a 
situation occurred in 1988 when Robert Campeau initiated a hostile takeover bid for 
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Federated Department Stores.  A highly public bidding war ensued between Campeau 
and Macys, which Campeau eventually won with an irrational act, bidding over $500 
million.  However, shortly after Campeau declared bankruptcy. Once Robert 
Campeau tried to acquire Federated, he probably considered data that supported and 
confirmed that decision, and ignored data that contradicted it. According to Bazerman 
and Neale (1983), this operation is prevalent. It is easy to identify this “confirmation 
trap.” Individuals make a tentative decision (e.g., to buy a new car, to hire a particular 
employee, to start research and development on a new product line). They 
subsequently search for data that supports their decision before making the final 
commitment. However, few search for data that challenges it. A manager committed 
to a basic strategy is likely to be biased in favour of the data consistent with it. 
 
 
6.3.6 Reframe Decisions 
 
Individuals should be aware of how to frame their decision to end a losing project. 
Sunk costs almost always come into play, and many managers do not know how to 
defend themselves against the argument of so much time and money has been 
committed to the investment how can we abandon it?   In fact in some instances a 
project may be tied so integrally to the values and purposes of an organization that it 
becomes institutionalised.  Pan American airlines exhibited characteristics of such a 
situation.  In the late 80’s Pan Am suffered major losses as the airline came to terms 
with deregulation of the airline industry.  As losses accumulated, it sold off most of its 
non-airline assets.  Initially the Pan Am building was sold to meet debt obligations, 
which was subsequently followed by the sale of the Intercontinental Hotel chain.  
Finally, Pan Am was forced to sell its valuable Pacific routes to United Airlines.  
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Withdrawing from the real estate and hotel business was probably an easier decision 
for the organisation than ending the more institutionalised airline operations, 
irrespective of the economics involved. 
 
Individuals need to emphasize future cost savings. In self-defence, managers need to 
carefully frame their decisions as ultimately “saving resources” rather than as “losing 
resources.” With this approach, a change of mind may not be held against the 
manager.  
 
It is necessary to evaluate the approach to evaluations. In some organisations, 
managers who stick to their guns—even if doing so harms the organization—receive 
better evaluations than managers who experiment with different approaches. This 
creates a paradox: If a manager chooses not to pursue a failing project, then the 
organization is better off, but the manager may be perceived as being “wishy-washy.”  
 
 
6.4 Future Work 
 
Given that the three experiments were designed and developed specifically to test the 
research questions presented in this dissertation, several areas of additional work have 
emerged for consideration. 
 
1. Further examination of the effect of sunk costs in negotiation contexts.  Whilst 
this dissertation has provided evidence to suggest sunk costs influence 
negotiations, there is much to be learnt in this area by investigating the role of 
sunk costs in various negotiation contexts.  Furthermore, it may also play a 
           Chapter 6: Conclusions, Contributions, Observations and Future Work 
 271
role in the analysis of the effect of complementary cognitive biases upon 
CEO’s in merger and acquisitions.  For instance, could the reason for such a 
large percentage of M&A’s resulting in failure be a direct result of the 
overconfidence of the acquiring company CEO’s?  This dissertation 
conjectures initial overconfidence of CEO’s in their belief of improving the 
corporate performance of the target company generates sunk cost accounting, 
once the acquisition has taken place.  The rationale for this being poorly 
performing companies are acquired under the false belief of the CEO who 
overestimates the probability of “turning around” the fortunes of the target 
company.  Once the acquisition takes place, the CEO realises the sunk cost of 
purchasing the company and escalates commitment to low probability events 
to generate a return comparable with initial expectations.  Thus, is 
overconfidence a pre-cursor to sunk cost accounting? 
 
2. The experiments were concerned with the sunk costs of buyers, but future 
work should consider the sunk costs of sellers in negotiations and supplement 
earlier work by Diekmann et al. (1996).  It might also consider such contexts 
as how previous transfer fees affect future sell-on fees in sports, most notably 
in European football. The existence of players who fail to perform at a level 
consistent with the level of the transfer fee paid by a football club is pervasive 
throughout the major leagues of Europe.  Take for example, Blackburn Rovers 
who in 1997/98 finished 6th in the English Premier League.  In the 1998/99 
season the club spent £38 million on purchasing new players and subsequently 
relegated from the league.  Player performance (or a lack of it!) would appear 
to have been a major determinant of Blackburn’s failure to compete in the 
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Premier League. As a result when these players were later sold, it may well be 
the case that the price Blackburn Rovers paid not only affected the club, but 
also potential buyers.  Research on actual negotiations may provide further 
evidence of the sunk cost effects documented in this dissertation. 
 
3. The extension of sunk costs across buyers and sellers in auctions.  This 
dissertation provides evidence to suggest sunk cost transmit across sellers, in a 
private, first-price, sealed-bid auction.  Further research should follow to 
determine whether sunk costs are pervasive across common value, first-price, 
sealed bid auctions and other derivatives of auctions such as English, Dutch 
and second price.  The implications of this research would develop the 
understanding of the phenomenon in such an important arena of individual and 
corporate investments.  This would provide the possibility of adopting bidding 
strategies that are shifted towards the optimal models posited in the literature. 
 
4. The extension of cognitive biases and their effects in financial markets.  The 
findings in this dissertation reinforce previous work from behavioural finance 
that when individual investors are able to trade “freely”, i.e. without 
transaction costs and taxes, they on aggregate adopt a strategy that closely 
follows the disposition effect.  Such a finding appears robust in stock markets 
but to the author’s knowledge there exists no prior work that deals with the 
effect of the impact of this phenomenon in foreign exchange markets.  These 
markets are less actively traded by the private investor but evidence from 
equity markets suggest professional institutional investors are not immune 
from the phenomenon so this dissertation hypothesises institutional investors 
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will succumb to a similar phenomenon in the trading of global currencies.  An 
analogue of the experimental design used in Experiment III could be adopted, 
exchanging the companies for global currencies.     
 
The experiments from this dissertation have extended the sunk cost and behavioural 
literature.  It is hoped that these experiments will be developed further in the future 
and re-evaluated within a variety of other contexts. 
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Appendix A: Part 1 of Pre-game Instructions to Competitors for Experiment I
  
 
Dear Contestant, 
Thank you for your interest in the St Andrews Bargaining Championships.  This is a 3 
round tournament.  You must perform to a certain level to progress to the next round.   
Attached is a pre game test, which all participants must complete.  There is no right or 
wrong answer to this question.  Below is a description of the game you will be 
playing in the quarterfinals.  Game 1 is an interactive test of your negotiation and 
bargaining skills.  You will be bargaining simultaneously with other players. 
 
There are 3 sessions available for this week if you can play? 
 
Friday 23rd January: 12pm-1pm 
Friday 23rd January:  2m-3pm 
Friday 23rd January:  3pm-4pm 
 
If these are unsuitable could you please provide dates and times of when you are? 
 
Could you please reply and let me know either way? 
 
Once you have a time you will be sent another message from STAB at the start of 
your session issuing you with a username and password to enter the game as well as 
further instructions. 
 
Look forward to hearing from you. 
 
St Andrews Bargaining Championship 
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Appendix B: Part 2 of Pre-game Instructions to Competitors for Experiment I
  
 
Dear Competitor 
 
 You are about to play the First Round of the St Andrews Bargaining 
Championships.  This is played online and you will be bidding against three 
other individuals at the same time.  The winner will progress to the next round 
and will face a different challenge. 
 
We will be using AOL's instant messenger to play this game so once you have read 
this information please follow the link below. 
 
 
 The link is www.aol.co.uk click on “buddie” list.  DONT TYPE THE USERNAME  
AND 
PASSWORD UNDER SCREENNAME.  Sometimes the buddylist will take a while 
to load 
so be patient.  When prompted please type in the following username and 
password. 
   
username: castlecliffe321 
Password: 12345 
 
 
Once logged on you will receive a message from stabstandrews and you will be 
given further instructions.  You can now start the game by going to www.aol.co.uk 
 
If you encounter any problems, send a message to stab and we will endeavour to sort 
it out  
 
Good Luck! 
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Appendix C: Part 1 of Instructions for Experiment I 
 
 
Game1: Drilling for Oil in Argentina 
 
Please read the following instructions and answer the following 
question. 
 
Part 1 
 
You are the Vice President of a South American Oil company called Tripetrol 
Oil and Exploration Company.  You are keen to invest in Argentina as you 
have been advised that this is an emerging area for oil. 
 
You have been given £100,000 to invest in an oil well.  There are two onshore 
projects in Argentina that have been alerted to you by a consultant.  You may 
choose to invest the £100,000 in only one of them.  As a guide the consultant 
has provided you with the possible payoffs and risk associated with investing 
in the particular site (shown below). Which site will you invest in? 
 
Please note.   The money you gain or lose from this investment will be carried 
through to part 2 of the game.  At the end of the game your investment 
account will be converted into real money at a specific exchange rate. 
 
 
Site A: Drilling in Tierra del Fuego 
 
         £100,000 
 
              0.3               0.5 
 
 
         0.2 
         £0           £100,000      £1,000000 
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There is a: 
30% chance that you will lose £100,000  
20% chance that you will break even 
50% chance that you will make a profit of £900,000 
 
 
Site B: Drilling in Aguada Pichana 
 
    £100,000 
 
         0.5                   0.3 
 
 
           0.2 
  £0            £100,000         £1.50000 
 
50% chance that you will lose 100,000.  
20% that you will break even 
30% chance that you will make a profit of £1.4 million 
 
 
 
Game 1, Part 2: Risk Averse, Conditional 
 
Bridas, an Argentinian Oil Firm has oil platforms in Tierra del Fuego and 
Aguada Pichana (A and B from part 1) has been enjoying substantial profits in 
the last 8 months.  The company finds itself with surplus cash and its board of 
directors are unwilling to utilise the money in dividend payoffs to stockholders 
or redeploy it with “wise acquisitions”.  Bridasl as a consequence finds itself as 
a takeover target by rival Oil firms who wish to capture Bridas’s cash flow to 
make sure it isn’t frittered away on negative NPV oil exploration projects. 
As the Vice President of Tripetrol Exploration and Production Company, you 
are keen to make an offer for Bridas as it would make you one of the largest 
Oil firms in South America.  You have been allocated a fund of £0.5 million to 
negotiate the purchase of Bridas.  You are in competition with 3 other firms for 
the acquisition of Bridas.  There are 3 issues to be negotiated over (Price per 
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Share, Expenditure for Drilling in Tierra del Fuego and Expenditure for Drilling 
in Aguada Pichana).  Should your offer be accepted you will receive a bonus 
payoff which reflects how much you paid for Bridas.  The more you pay the 
smaller your bonus!  There are 2 rounds of bidding and the less competitive 
bid will be eliminated after the first round. 
 
A summary of your position so far is that you have invested £100,000 in 
Venture A.  (Tierra Del Fuego)  After 6 months you broke even. Therefore you 
have currently lost £0.  Your remaining budget is £500,000  
 
 
 
Experiment I, Part 2: Risk Averse, Experimental 
 
Bridas, an Argentinian Oil Firm has oil platforms in Tierra del Fuego and 
Aguada Pichana (A and B from part 1) has been enjoying substantial profits in 
the last 8 months.  The company finds itself with surplus cash and its board of 
directors are unwilling to utilise the money in dividend payoffs to stockholders 
or redeploy it with “wise acquisitions”.  Bridasl as a consequence finds itself as 
a takeover target by rival Oil firms who wish to capture Bridas’s cash flow to 
make sure it isn’t frittered away on negative NPV oil exploration projects. 
As the Vice President of Tripetrol Exploration and Production Company, you 
are keen to make an offer for Bridas as it would make you one of the largest 
Oil firms in South America.  You have been allocated a fund of £0.5 million to 
negotiate the purchase of Bridas.  You are in competition with 3 other firms for 
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the acquisition of Bridas.  There are 3 issues to be negotiated over (Price per 
Share, Expenditure for Drilling in Tierra del Fuego and Expenditure for Drilling 
in Aguada Pichana).  Should your offer be accepted you will receive a bonus 
payoff which reflects how much you paid for Bridas.  The more you pay the 
smaller your bonus!  There are 2 rounds of bidding and the less competitive 
bid will be eliminated after the first round. 
 
A summary of your position so far is that you have invested £100,000 in 
Venture A.  (Tierra Del Fuego)  After 6 months you lost your £100,000 
investment. Therefore you have currently lost £100,000.  Your remaining 
budget is £490,000  
 
 
Experiment I, Part 2: “Less Risk Averse”, Conditional 
 
Bridas, an Argentinian Oil Firm has oil platforms in Tierra del Fuego and 
Aguada Pichana (A and B from part 1) has been enjoying substantial profits in 
the last 8 months.  The company finds itself with surplus cash and its board of 
directors are unwilling to utilise the money in dividend payoffs to stockholders 
or redeploy it with “wise acquisitions”.  Bridas as a consequence finds itself as 
a takeover target by rival Oil firms who wish to capture Bridas’s cash flow to 
make sure it isn’t frittered away on negative NPV oil exploration projects. 
As the Vice President of Tripetrol Exploration and Production Company, you 
are keen to make an offer for Bridas as it would make you one of the largest 
Oil firms in South America.  You have been allocated a fund of £0.5 million to 
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negotiate the purchase of Bridas.  You are in competition with 3 other firms for 
the acquisition of Bridas.  There are 3 issues to be negotiated over (Price per 
Share, Expenditure for Drilling in Tierra del Fuego and Expenditure for Drilling 
in Aguada Pichana).  Should your offer be accepted you will receive a bonus 
payoff which reflects how much you paid for Bridas.  The more you pay the 
smaller your bonus!  There are 2 rounds of bidding and the less competitive 
bid will be eliminated after the first round. 
 
A summary of your position so far is that you have invested £100,000 in 
Venture B.  (Tierra Del Fuego)  After 6 months broke-even on your investment.  
Your remaining budget is £500,000  
 
 
Experiment I, Part 2: “Less Risk Averse”, Experimental 
 
Bridas, an Argentinian Oil Firm has oil platforms in Tierra del Fuego and 
Aguada Pichana (A and B from part 1) has been enjoying substantial profits in 
the last 8 months.  The company finds itself with surplus cash and its board of 
directors are unwilling to utilise the money in dividend payoffs to stockholders 
or redeploy it with “wise acquisitions”.  Bridas as a consequence finds itself as 
a takeover target by rival Oil firms who wish to capture Bridas’s cash flow to 
make sure it isn’t frittered away on negative NPV oil exploration projects. 
As the Vice President of Tripetrol Exploration and Production Company, you 
are keen to make an offer for Bridas as it would make you one of the largest 
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Oil firms in South America.  You have been allocated a fund of £0.5 million to 
negotiate the purchase of Bridas.  You are in competition with 3 other firms for 
the acquisition of Bridas.  There are 3 issues to be negotiated over (Price per 
Share, Expenditure for Drilling in Tierra del Fuego and Expenditure for Drilling 
in Aguada Pichana).  Should your offer be accepted you will receive a bonus 
payoff which reflects how much you paid for Bridas.  The more you pay the 
smaller your bonus!  There are 2 rounds of bidding and the less competitive 
bid will be eliminated after the first round. 
 
A summary of your position so far is that you have invested £100,000 in 
Venture B.  (Tierra Del Fuego)  After 6 months you lost your £100,000.  Your 
remaining budget is £490,000  
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Appendix D: Scenario Description for Experiment II 
 
 
Tripetrol, is looking to diversify it’s portfolio of companies and is paying 
attention to European Supermarket Chains.  They have alerted you to the 
following information. 
 
Due to a 10 million “blackhole” in its account, Marpetal a multinational food 
company has plunged into liquidation and the company’s affairs are now in 
the hands of the receivers.  They have undergone an asset stripping exercise 
to keep the company “afloat”.  A subsidiary of Marpetal  is Goshopping.com, 
an internet based  supermarket chain and has an increasing market share in 
the UK.  You have been asked to make a bid for Goshopping.com on behalf of 
Tripetrol. You are aware of at least two other bidders.  There is no reservation 
price and the bidding will take the form of a first price, English, sealed bid 
auction.  There is only one round of bidding. 
 
You have been allocated funds of £5 million to secure this company.  Should 
you acquire the company you will receive a payoff which reflects how much 
you paid.  For instance, the cheaper you acquire the company, the greater the 
amount your payoff will be.  Your payoffs will be zero if you fail to buy the 
company. 
 
In order to assist you, you have employed a management consultancy firm to 
provide a detailed analysis of goshopping.com and how much they think you 
should bid.  This consultancy firm has provided information for all your rival 
bidders too.  You now have a choice.  The consultancy firm has provided you 
with a bidding range with what they think you should bid. This information has 
already been paid for by your company but for an additional £0.5 million you 
can receive an exact value of what they think you should bid.   
Would you like to purchase the extra information at a cost of £0.5 million? 
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Appendix E: Part 2 for Experiment II: Range Estimation/ 
Rival Bidders Purchase Point Estimation 
 
 
You have decided to use the range estimation provided by the consultancy 
firm.  There is no charge for this service.   I can tell you that all your rival 
bidders purchased the point information.  They do not necessarily have 
the same budget as you so it would be unwise to assume this. 
 
The range given to you by your consultant is in the range £ 4.1-4.5 million. 
 
Please make an offer. 
 
Remember you will be rewarded on how much acquired the company, but no 
company, no payoff.  There is only 1 round of bidding. 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 2 for Experiment II: Point Estimation/ Rival Bidders 
Purchase Point Estimation 
 
You have decided to use the point estimation provided by the consultancy firm.  
There is a charge of £0.5 million which will be deducted from your budget.   I 
can tell you that all your rival bidders purchased the point information.  
They do not necessarily have the same budget as you so it would be unwise 
to assume this. 
 
The point estimation given to you by your consultant is in £4.4 million. 
 
Please make an offer. 
 
Remember you will be rewarded on how much acquired the company, but no 
company, no payoff.  There is only 1 round of bidding. 
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Part 2 for Experiment II: Range Estimation/ Rival Bidders 
Purchase Range Estimation 
 
 
You have decided to use the range estimation provided by the consultancy 
firm.  There is no charge for this service.   I can tell you that all your rival 
bidders purchased the range information.  They do not necessarily have 
the same budget as you so it would be unwise to assume this. 
 
The range given to you by your consultant is in the range £ 4.1-4.5 million. 
 
Please make an offer. 
 
Remember you will be rewarded on how much acquired the company, but no 
company, no payoff.  There is only 1 round of bidding. 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 2 for Experiment II: Point Estimation/ Rival Bidders 
Purchase Point Estimation 
 
You have decided to use the point estimation provided by the consultancy firm.  
There is a charge of £0.5 million which will be deducted from your budget.   I 
can tell you that all your rival bidders purchased the range information.  
They do not necessarily have the same budget as you so it would be unwise 
to assume this. 
 
The point estimation given to you by your consultant is in £4.4 million. 
 
Please make an offer. 
 
Remember you will be rewarded on how much acquired the company, but no 
company, no payoff.  There is only 1 round of bidding. 
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Appendix F: Stock Description’s for Experiment III 
 
 
Company A: Imperial Chemicals 
LEVERAGE: 4.4 PRICE VARIABILITY: 1.4 
PRICE: 330.00 CUMULATIVE VOLUME 
16,870,088 
 
This may no longer be the pioneer of British industry but it still has 
a large amount of products ranging from food ingredients, 
flavourings, fragrances to paints and industrial adhesives. The 
company liquidated its cyclical bulk chemicals business three years 
ago to make it less susceptible to nasty economic surprises, but the 
share price halved this year as food flavourings division Strang hit 
trouble. 
 
 
 
Company B: Lantro Group 
LEVERAGE: 0.4 PRICE VARIABILITY: 0.9 
PRICE: 460.00 CUMULATIVE VOLUME 
1,906,661 
 
The company was originally a road haulage business, founded in 
1920. It is now a leading multi-franchise car retailer distributing 
both new and used vehicles for leading European Car 
Manufacturers. 
 
Company C: RMA 
LEVERAGE: 3.2 PRICE VARIABILITY: 0.3 
PRICE: 100.00 CUMULATIVE VOLUME 
4,150,034 
 
RMA is a microchip designer that has licensed its technology to 
many of the world's leading electronics companies, including FG 
Microelectronics, SSZ Electronics, Karlstrom, Magnico Instruments 
and Otram. These companies use RMA’s designs in devices such as 
mobile phones, digital cameras, games consoles and motor cars. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix
 
 
 
 308
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company D: AH Land Consultancy 
LEVERAGE: 4.0 PRICE VARIABILITY:1.0 
PRICE: 270.00 CUMULATIVE VOLUME 
1,098,094 
 
One of the UK's oldest property group's, AH  Land has been 
dominated by chairman ever since his Union Property group 
reversed into it in 1970. The portfolio, predominately office and 
retail, has grown to £11bn in that time, but some investors have 
been getting restless recently with calls for Ritblat to loosen his grip 
and something be done about the wide gap between the share price 
and the value of the AH’s Land's properties. 
 
 
 
Company E: Synergist 
LEVERAGE: 2.4 PRICE VARIABILITY: 0.8 
PRICE: 150.00 CUMULATIVE VOLUME 
2,567,145 
 
The company is a leading property development and investment 
business whose portfolio consists of property based primarily in 
central London and in prime UK locations. Its investment division 
includes interests in early stage and mature businesses in both the 
UK and US. 
 
 
Company F: S. Robinson 
LEVERAGE: 0.8 PRICE VARIABILITY: 0.4 
PRICE: 480.00 CUMULATIVE VOLUME 
5,649,088 
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UK supermarket group was originally founded in Drury Lane, 
London, in 1869. The group began life as listed company in 1973, 
which at the time was the UK's largest ever flotation. The group 
now has interests in the US-based supermarket chain Shaw's and in 
1997 moved into financial services with the establishment of 
Robinson’s Bank. The company is now the UK's third largest 
supermarket chain, having lost its second place in 2003. 
 
 
 
 
Company G: Easydough 
LEVERAGE: 3.6 PRICE VARIABILITY: 0.5 
PRICE: 130.00 CUMULATIVE VOLUME 
1,372,101 
 
Easydough is a leading sandwich, savouries and bakery related 
products retailer, focusing primarily on takeaway food and catering. 
The group operates around 1,200 retail outlets. 
 
 
Company H: Sintra Investments 
LEVERAGE: 1.6 PRICE VARIABILITY: 1.4 
PRICE: 880.00 CUMULATIVE VOLUME 
3,273,009 
 
At one time in the nineties Sintra Investmnets was the biggest bank 
in Europe and seemingly unstoppable after deals to take over 
Fundamentalist Finance and life insurer Perpetuality. Now the 
Perpetuality acquisition does not looks so clever and Sintrahas been 
overtaken and some would say left behind by its three main high 
street rivals. A way above average yield is indicative of the 
problems the market thinks SBT faces. A merger could solve a lot of 
them but all of the good candidates have either been snapped up or 
are out of reach on regulatory grounds. 
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Company I: Peninsula Banking 
LEVERAGE: 2.8 PRICE VARIABILITY: 1.1 
PRICE: 640.00 CUMULATIVE VOLUME 
6,997,095 
 
Anyone needing a reminder of the reach of the British Empire need 
only look at where Peninsula does its businesses. At one time the 
bank to the British India company, now it is becoming the bank to 
the rapidly growing Asian economies. Peninsula claims it is now the 
world's leading emerging markets bank employing 30,000 people in 
over 500 offices in more than 50 countries. Sintra Investments was 
interested in making a bid many moons ago but with many 
emerging markets showing signs of maturity Peninsula seems more 
than happy enough on its own. 
 
Company J: Interaction 
LEVERAGE: 4.8 PRICE VARIABILITY: 1.2 
PRICE: 330.00 CUMULATIVE VOLUME 
3,766,992 
 
Interaction originally started out as a construction company during 
the industrial revolution, however the company is now an 
international publishing house. The group comprises of three main 
divisions: Education, Finance Today and Morphose. Almost two 
thirds of its revenues are generated from the Education arm, 
however it is the other two that Interaction is most famous for. The 
financial publishing arm has suffered heavily over the last few years 
both from the global advertising and stock market downturn. 
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Company K: Utilium 
LEVERAGE: 2.0 PRICE VARIABILITY: 0.7 
PRICE:440.00 CUMULATIVE VOLUME 
19,010,886 
 
Consisting of North West Water, Norweb and telecoms company 
Your Communications, Utiliumis one the leading multi-utilities in the 
UK though the recent emphasis has been on building up outsourcing 
arm Vortex. Utilium recently launched a £1bn rights issue to shore 
up its balance sheet ahead of a huge capital expenditure 
programme at North West Water.Another utility with a big dividend 
yield. 
 
 
 
 
Company L: Oceanic Drilling 
LEVERAGE: 1.2 PRICE VARIABILITY: 1.3 
PRICE: 110.00 CUMULATIVE VOLUME 
8,778,098 
 
Britain's premier company, Oceanic Drilling moved into the big 
league of oil companies with the acquisitions of US concerns Amoco 
and Atlantas Richfel in the late nineties. More geared to oil 
production and exploration than its main rivals Oceanic Drilling has 
taken a big leap into the former soviet union to secure future 
production as its current key assets in the North Sea and Alaska 
wind down. A ruthless cost-cutting programme has boosted its 
performance. There may be a succession problem when current 
chief executive John Kelly decides to call it a day. 
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Appendix G: Instructions for Experiment III: Sunk Cost 
Treatment   
 
Virtual Stock Market Game 
 
How to Play 
 
This is a test of selecting and managing a portfolio so that it increases in value over 
the course of the game.  There are 2 main parts of the game: 
 
1. Selection of your original portfolio 
2. Trading your shares as the game progresses. 
 
Share Selection 
 
The shares of 12 companies are available for buying and trading in the virtual stock 
market.  Initially you must choose 6 companies to invest in. 
 
You have a starting pot of £10,000 and you must invest either £1000, £2000, or £3000 
in the 6 companies.  All transactions are carried out by a broker, who demands a one-
off-up-front payment of £2000. No other payments will be made to the broker.  
Therefore, with the £2000 reduction you now have £8,000 to select your shares. 
You don not have to spend all of the £8,000.  Any unspent money will be stored in an 
interest free account and can be used for future purchases during the game.   
Trading 
 
There are 14 trading periods.  The first period-period 1 will allow you to gauge   the 
current price trends of the shares before you start trading. Please note you must have 
selected your portfolio prior to period 1. From period 2 you start trading Share prices 
movements in this game are different to real world share prices.    All share prices will 
follow a probability distribution where: 
 
There is a 0.65 probability that 2 out of 12 stocks will show an increase in any period. 
There is a 0.55 probability that 2 out of 12 shares will show an increase in any period. 
There is a 0.50 probability that 4 out of 12 shares will show an increase in any period 
There is a 0.45 probability that 2 out of 12 shares will show an increase in any period 
There is a 0.35 probability that 2out of 12 shares will show an increase in any period 
 
At the start of each trading period you will be given the current share price of all the 
companies and you are free to buy or sell £1000, £2000, or £3000 in all these 
companies.  If you want to trade in any period you will send an email to me notifying 
me how much you want to invest.  I will calculate how much your current portfolio is 
worth in each period for you. 
 
Happy Trading!. 
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Instructions for Experiment III: Conditional Treatment 
  
 
 
Virtual Stock Market Game 
 
How to Play 
 
This is a test of selecting and managing a portfolio so that it increases in value over 
the course of the game.  There are 2 main parts of the game: 
 
3. Selection of your original portfolio 
4. Trading your shares as the game progresses. 
 
Share Selection 
 
The shares of 12 companies are available for buying and trading in the virtual stock 
market.  Initially you must choose 6 companies to invest in. 
 
You have a starting pot of £10,000 and you must invest either £1000, £2000, or £3000 
in the 6 companies.  You don not have to spend all of the £10,000.  Any unspent 
money will be stored in an interest free account and can be used for future purchases 
during the game.   
 
Trading 
 
There are 14 trading periods.  The first period-period 1 will allow you to gauge   the 
current price trends of the shares before you start trading. Please note you must have 
selected your portfolio prior to period 1. From period 2 you start trading Share prices 
movements in this game are different to real world share prices.    All share prices will 
follow a probability distribution where: 
 
There is a 0.65 probability that 2 out of 12 stocks will show an increase in any period. 
There is a 0.55 probability that 2 out of 12 shares will show an increase in any period. 
There is a 0.50 probability that 4 out of 12 shares will show an increase in any period 
There is a 0.45 probability that 2 out of 12 shares will show an increase in any period 
There is a 0.35 probability that 2out of 12 shares will show an increase in any period 
 
At the start of each trading period you will be given the current share price of all the 
companies and you are free to buy or sell £1000, £2000, or £3000 in all these 
companies.  If you want to trade in any period you will send an email to me notifying 
me how much you want to invest.  I will calculate how much your current portfolio is 
worth in each period for you 
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Happy Trading! 
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Appendix H: Experiment 1 Data Set 
 
 
Experiment 1: Linear Regression Data Set
Age gender Experimental Risk Proj Pick
0=female 0=control 0=averse 0=,A1=B Price 1 Price 2 R&D A 1 R&D A 2 Closure 1 Closure 2 R&D B 1 R&D B 2 Debt 1 Debt 2 ownR&D1 ownR&D2 otherR&D1 otherR&D2
19 1 0 1 0.00 2.00 2.20 3.75 4.25 0.00 0.00 3.80 3.80 2.45 3.50 3.75 4.25 3.80 3.80
19 1 1 0 0.00 2.00 2.00 4.25 4.25 2.00 3.00 3.80 3.80 2.80 2.80 4.25 4.25 3.80 3.80
23 1 1 0 0.00 2.20 2.40 1.75 1.75 1.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 3.50 3.50 1.75 1.75 3.00 3.00
24 1 1 0 0.00 1.00 1.60 3.25 3.75 0.00 0.00 3.80 4.20 2.80 3.15 3.25 3.75 3.80 4.20
22 1 1 0 0.00 1.60 1.80 1.75 1.75 1.00 1.00 3.40 3.40 3.15 3.50 1.75 1.75 3.40 3.40
21 1 0 0 0.00 1.80 2.00 2.75 3.25 2.00 2.00 3.80 3.80 2.10 2.10 2.75 3.25 3.80 3.80
21 1 1 0 0.00 1.60 1.60 3.25 3.75 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 2.80 2.80 3.25 3.75 3.00 3.00
21 1 1 1 0.00 1.20 1.40 2.75 3.25 2.00 2.00 3.40 3.00 2.10 2.10 2.75 3.25 3.40 3.00
21 1 1 0 0.00 2.40 2.60 3.25 3.25 2.00 1.00 5.00 5.60 2.45 2.45 3.25 3.25 5.00 5.40
21 1 0 0 0.00 2.20 2.20 1.75 1.75 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.40 2.10 2.45 3.75 3.75 3.00 3.40
21 1 0 0 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.75 2.25 3.00 2.00 3.80 4.20 2.45 2.45 2.75 2.25 3.80 4.20
19 1 0 0 0.00 2.20 2.40 3.25 2.75 2.00 2.00 4.60 5.00 2.45 2.80 3.75 3.75 4.60 5.00
19 1 0 0 0.00 1.20 1.60 3.25 3.75 2.00 1.00 3.00 3.40 3.50 3.85 3.25 3.75 3.00 3.40
23 1 0 0 0.00 2.20 2.40 2.25 2.75 1.00 0.00 5.40 5.60 3.50 3.50 2.25 2.75 5.40 5.80
22 0 0 0 0.00 1.80 2.00 2.25 2.75 2.00 2.00 3.80 4.20 2.10 2.10 2.25 2.75 3.80 4.20
21 0 1 0 0.00 1.80 2.00 4.25 4.25 2.00 2.00 3.40 3.40 1.40 1.40 4.25 4.25 3.40 3.40
21 0 0 1 0.00 1.40 1.40 2.25 2.75 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.10 2.45 2.25 2.75 3.00 3.00
21 0 1 0 0.00 2.20 2.20 3.75 4.25 2.00 1.00 3.40 3.40 2.45 2.45 3.75 4.25 3.40 3.40
22 0 1 0 0.00 1.40 1.60 3.25 3.25 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.45 2.45 3.25 3.25 3.00 3.00
21 0 1 0 0.00 2.40 2.40 2.75 2.75 4.00 3.00 4.60 5.00 2.80 2.80 2.75 2.75 4.60 5.00
22 0 0 0 0.00 1.80 2.00 2.75 3.25 1.00 0.00 3.40 3.00 2.10 2.10 2.75 3.25 3.40 3.00
23 1 0 1 1.00 1.60 1.80 2.75 2.75 3.00 3.00 3.40 3.40 3.50 3.50 3.40 3.40 2.75 2.75
22 1 1 1 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.75 1.75 2.00 1.00 4.60 4.60 2.80 3.15 4.60 4.60 1.75 1.75
19 1 0 0 1.00 2.00 2.20 2.25 2.25 2.00 2.00 4.20 4.20 1.75 1.75 4.20 4.20 2.25 2.25
22 1 0 1 1.00 1.40 1.40 3.25 3.75 1.00 1.00 3.40 3.80 2.10 2.45 3.40 3.80 3.25 3.75
20 1 0 1 1.00 1.80 1.80 3.25 3.25 3.00 2.00 3.80 3.80 2.45 2.80 3.80 3.80 3.25 3.25
21 1 1 0 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.75 3.25 2.00 2.00 4.20 4.20 2.45 2.80 4.20 4.20 2.75 3.25
23 1 1 1 1.00 2.40 2.60 2.75 2.75 2.00 2.00 4.60 5.00 2.45 2.80 4.60 5.00 3.25 3.25
22 1 1 1 1.00 1.40 1.40 1.75 2.25 1.00 1.00 4.60 4.20 2.10 2.45 4.60 4.20 1.75 2.25
18 0 1 1 1.00 1.60 1.60 1.75 2.25 4.00 4.00 3.40 3.80 1.05 1.40 3.40 3.80 1.75 2.25
22 1 1 1 1.00 1.80 1.80 2.25 1.75 0.00 0.00 4.20 4.60 3.85 3.50 4.20 4.60 2.25 1.75
23 0 1 1 1.00 1.60 1.80 3.75 3.75 1.00 1.00 4.60 4.60 2.45 2.80 4.60 4.60 3.75 3.75
22 0 1 1 1.00 2.20 2.20 3.25 2.75 3.00 4.00 4.20 4.60 2.10 2.45 4.20 4.60 3.25 2.75
21 0 0 1 1.00 1.40 1.60 3.25 3.25 2.00 1.00 3.40 3.40 3.15 3.50 3.40 3.40 2.75 3.25
22 0 0 0 0.00 1.60 1.80 3.25 2.75 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.40 3.15 3.80 3.25 2.75 3.40 3.40
20 1 1 1 1.00 2.20 2.00 3.25 3.75 2.00 2.00 4.60 4.60 3.15 2.80 4.60 4.60 3.25 2.75
21 1 0 1 1.00 2.40 2.20 3.25 3.25 1.00 1.00 3.80 3.80 2.45 2.80 3.80 3.80 3.25 3.25
22 0 0 1 1.00 2.20 2.20 3.25 3.25 4.00 4.00 4.20 4.20 2.45 2.80 4.20 4.20 3.25 3.25
20 1 1 0 0.00 1.80 2.00 4.25 4.75 0.00 1.00 3.80 3.80 2.45 2.80 4.25 4.75 3.80 3.80
20 1 1 0 0.00 2.20 2.00 4.25 4.75 1.00 2.00 3.80 3.80 3.15 3.15 4.25 4.75 3.80 3.80
19 1 0 1 1.00 2.00 2.20 3.25 3.25 0.00 1.00 3.80 3.80 3.15 2.80 3.25 3.25 3.80 3.80
22 0 1 0 0.00 1.60 1.60 1.75 2.25 0.00 0.00 3.40 3.00 2.45 2.45 1.75 2.25 3.40 3.00
20 0 1 1 1.00 2.60 2.60 1.75 1.75 1.00 1.00 4.20 4.20 3.50 3.85 4.20 4.20 1.75 1.75
20 0 0 0 0.00 2.20 2.40 2.25 2.25 2.00 1.00 3.80 3.80 2.45 2.45 2.25 2.25 3.80 3.80
20 1 1 1 1.00 2.40 2.40 2.25 2.25 2.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 2.45 2.45 5.00 5.00 2.25 2.25  
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Experiment 2 Data Set 
 
 
Experiment 2: Ordinary Least Squares Data Set
Gender Risk 0=Averse Condition 0=Condition Information Value of company Bid Difference (Bid-Value)/Value
0=Female 0=Averse 0=Conditional 0=Range Estimate
1 1 1 0 4 4.2 0.2 0.05
1 0 1 0 4 3.8 0.2 -0.05
1 1 1 0 4 4.6 0.6 0.15
1 1 1 0 4 4.3 0.3 0.08
0 1 1 0 4 4.4 0.4 0.10
0 1 1 0 4 4.1 0.1 0.02
0 1 1 0 3.9 4.2 0.3 0.08
1 1 1 0 4.3 4.7 0.4 0.09
0 1 1 0 4.4 4.7 0.3 0.07
1 1 0 0 4 4.1 1 0.02
0 1 0 0 4 3.9 0.1 -0.03
1 1 0 0 4.1 3.8 0.3 -0.07
1 0 0 0 4.3 4.1 0.2 -0.05
1 1 0 0 4 4.1 0.1 0.02
1 1 0 0 4 4 0 0.00
1 0 0 0 4.3 3.9 0.4 -0.09
1 1 0 0 4 4.1 1 0.02
1 0 0 0 4 4.2 0.2 0.05
0 1 0 0 4.4 4.3 0.1 -0.02
1 1 0 0 4.2 4.1 0.1 -0.02
1 1 0 0 4 4.2 0.2 0.05
1 1 0 0 4 4 0 0.00
1 1 0 1 4.4 4.1 0.3 -0.07
1 1 1 0 4.1 4.3 0.2 0.05
1 0 1 1 3.9 4.3 0.4 0.10
1 0 1 1 3.9 3.8 0.1 -0.03
1 0 1 1 4.1 4.3 0.2 0.05
1 0 0 1 4.1 4 0.1 -0.02
1 0 1 1 4.1 4.4 0.3 0.07
0 1 1 1 4.3 4.5 0.2 0.05
1 0 0 1 4.3 4.1 0.2 -0.05
0 1 1 1 4.3 4.4 0.1 0.02
0 0 1 1 4 3.9 0.1 -0.03
1 0 0 1 4.2 4.1 0.1 -0.02
0 1 1 1 4.2 4.5 0.3 0.07
1 1 1 1 4.3 4.5 0.2 0.05
1 0 0 1 3.8 4.3 0.5 0.13
1 1 0 1 4.1 3.8 0.3 -0.07
0 1 0 1 3.8 3.8 0 0.00
0 1 1 1 3.8 4.1 0.3 0.08
4.09 4.175 0.26 0.02Mean  
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Experiment 3 Data Set 
 
 
Disp Effect Gender Treatment PGR PLR ln of Frequency Frequency of Trades Frequency of Trades Return of Return of
1=Male 1=SC of Trades Squared Realised Gains Realised Losses
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
-0.25644 1 1 0.89258 0.345901 1.945910149 7 49 1005.7 1000
0.081279 1 1 0.363415 0.281236 1.609437912 5 25 610.9 2447.7
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.176814 1 1 0.5 0.323186 2.564949357 13 169 1081.6 1936.55
-0.24835 1 1 0.155121 0.403466 2.708050201 15 225 3063.1 5121.6
0.316049 0 1 0.415341 0.098932 2.397895273 11 121 1770.6 1144.8
0.540221 1 1 0.540221 0 2.833213344 17 289 4112 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-0.22185 1 1 0.542857 0.764076 3.401197382 30 900 3610 2780
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.098662 0 1 0.184534 0.085873 2.197224577 9 81 1039 822
0.173429 0 1 0.173429 0 1.945910149 7 49 695 0
1 1 1 1 0 1.609437912 5 25 1589 0
-0.55652 0 1 0.134019 0.690542 2.772588722 16 256 1187 2987
-0.2847 0 1 0.0723954 0.364309 3.091042453 22 484 833 1996
0.564613 1 1 0.697694 0.13351 1.791759469 6 36 4876 1022
0.316409 1 1 0.415341 0.098932 1.386294361 4 16 1088.56 332
0.052109 0 0 0.184534 0.132346 3.044522438 21 441 987.5 655
1 1 0 1 0 0.693147181 2 4 3288 0
-0.48916 1 0 0.510843 1 2.564949357 13 169 2090.4 2166
0.164171 1 0 0.161471 0 1.945910149 7 49 1069 0
-0.1508 1 0 0.814129 1 3.737669618 42 1764 4887 5932
0.14966 0 0 0.510779 0.368813 2.63905733 14 196 7288 2881
1 1 0 1 0 1.945910149 7 49 7330 0
-0.42319 1 0 0.76809 0.5 3.044522438 21 441 3551 3668
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.784672 1 0 0.786742 0 2 2 4 1002 0
-0.11208 0 0 0.140823 0.259204 2.944438979 19 361 2331 3981
0.43056 1 0 0.43056 0 1.609437912 5 25 1773 0
0.3592 1 0 0.402985 0.043875 2.397895273 11 121 3332 881
-0.78911 1 0 0 0.78911 2.833213344 17 289 0 6511
0.188504 1 0 1 0.881584 3.295836866 27 729 4399 4285
0.743056 0 0 0.743056 0 0.693147181 2 4 1044 0
0.1173 0 0 0.161471 0.068457 2.397895273 11 121 1775 1772
0.03871 0 0 0.290284 0.252904 2.079441542 8 64 2880 990
0.046307 1 0 0.73422 0.68206 2.564949357 13 169 4128 3881
0.77636 1 0 0.77636 0 1.386294361 4 16 3359 0
Experiment 3: Regression Data
 
